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Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0000479 Current Judge: Jonathan P. Brody 
Sharon R Hammer vs. City of Sun Valley, Idaho, etal. 
User: CRYSTAL 








New Case Filed - Other Claims 
Plaintiff: Hammer, Sharon R Appearance Eric B. Swartz 
Judge 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Fiiing: A -Ali initiai civil case filings of any type not listed in categories 8-H, Robert J. Elgee 
or the other A listings below Paid by: Jones & Swartz Receipt number: 
0005184 Dated: 6/29/2012 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: Hammer, 
Sharon R (plaintiff) 
Complaint For Damages and Demand for Jury Trial Filed Robert J. Elgee 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 6/29/2012 to City of Sun Valley, Robert J. Elgee 
Idaho; Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00. 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 6/29/2012 to Nils A Ribi; 
Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00. 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 6/29/2012 to Dewayne L 
Briscoe; Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of 
$0.00. 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 6/29/2012 to Adam King; 
Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00. 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 6/29/2012 to Robert Youngman; Robert J. Elgee 
Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00. 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 6/29/2012 to Kelly Rae Ek; Robert J. Elgee 
Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00. 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 6/29/2012 to Michelle Robert J. Elgee 
Frostenson; Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of 
$0.00. 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 6/29/2012 to Franz Suhadolinik; Robert J. Elgee 
Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00. 
Subpoena: Document Service Issued: on 6/29/2012 to Michelle Griffith; Robert J. Elgee 
Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00. 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 6/29/2012 to Joan Robertson Robert J. Elgee 
Lamb; Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00. 
Summons: Document Service Issued: on 6/29/2012 to Wayne Willich; Robert J. Elgee 
Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of $0.00. 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Robert J. Elgee 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Naylor & Hales, PC Receipt number: 0005260 
Dated: 7/2/2012 Amount: $35.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Naylor & Hales, Robert J. Elgee 
PC Receipt number: 0005260 Dated: 7/2/2012 Amount: $3.00 (Credit 
card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Robert J. Elgee 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Naylor & Hales PC Receipt number: 0005289 
Dated: 7/3/2012 Amount: $51.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Naylor & Hales Robert J. Elgee 
PC Receipt number: 0005289 Dated: 7/3/2012 Amount: $3.00 (Credit 
card) 
Order of disqualification 
Order of assignment 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Date: 7/21/2015 
Time: 10:53 AM 
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Change Assigned Judge 
Notice Of Service of discovery requests 
Notice Of Service of Amended discovery requests 
Notice Of Service Of Second Amended Discovery Requests 
Acceptance Of Service 
Amended Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial 
Notice Of General Appearance for Defendents 
Defendant: City of Sun Valley, Idaho Appearance Kirtlan G. Naylor 
Defendant: Ribi, Nils A Appearance Kirtlan G. Naylor 
Defendant: Briscoe, Dewayne L Appearance Kirtlan G. Naylor 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or 
petitioner Paid by: Naylor, Kirtlan G. (attorney for Briscoe, Dewayne L) 
Receipt number: 0000033 Dated: 1/2/2013 Amount: $66.00 (Check) For: 
Briscoe, Dewayne L (defendant), City of Sun Valley, Idaho (defendant) and 
Ribi, Nils A (defendant) 
Defendent's Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for Damages and 
Demand for Jury Trial 
Judge 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Defendants' Motion For Costs Of Previously Dismissed Action Pursuant to Jonathan P. Brody 
I.R.C.P 41(d) 
Affidavit of Jacob H. Naylor in Support of Defendent's Motion for Costs of Jonathan P. Brody 
Previously Dismissed Action Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41 (d) 
Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion for Costs of Previously 
Dismissed Action 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/19/2013 01 :30 PM) Motion for Costs of Jonathan P. Brody 
Previously Dismissed Action 
Defendants' Motion to Appear Telephonically for Hearing on Motion for Jonathan P. Brody 
Costs of Previously Dismissed Action 
Order granting Defendants' Motion to Appear Telephonically for Hearing on Jonathan P. Brody 
Motion for Costs of Previously Dismissed Action 
Plaintiffs Motion for permission to appear telephonically 
Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Costs of 
Previously Dismissed Action 
Affidavit of Sharon R. Hammer in Support of Plaintiffs Response in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Costs of Previously Dismissed 
Action 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Order granting Plaintiffs motion for permission to appear telephonically Jonathan P. Brody 
Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Costs of Previously Jonathan P. Brody 
Dismissed Action Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41 (d) 
Continued (Motion 03/19/2013 09:00 AM) Telephonic in Minidoka Co. Jonathan P. Brody 
Motion for Costs of Previously Dismissed Action-Plaintiffs counsel, 
Defendants and Counsel to Appear Telephonically 
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Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Jonathan P. Brody 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: brennan rego Receipt number: 0002199 Dated: 
3/19/2013 Amount: $84.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: brennan rego Jonathan P. Brody 
Receipt number: 0002199 Dated: 3/19/2013 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 03/19/2013 09:00 AM: Court Jonathan P. Brody 
Minutes Telephonic in Minidoka Co. 
Motion for Costs of Previously Dismissed Action-Plaintiff's counsel, 
Defendants and Counsel to Appear Telephonically 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 03/19/2013 09:00 AM: District Jonathan P. Brody 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:NONE 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: Telephonic in 
Minidoka Co. 
Motion for Costs of Previously Dismissed Action-Plaintiff's counsel, 
Defendants and Counsel to Appear Telephonically 
Hearing Vacated Motion scheduled on 03/19/2013 01 :30 PM Jonathan P. Brody 
Amended Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendants' Matin for Costs of Previously Jonathan P. Brody 
Dismissed Action 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/16/2013 01:30 PM) Motion for costs of Jonathan P. Brody 
Previously Dismissed Action 
Notice Of Service Of Discovery Requests to Defendant City of Sun Valley Jonathan P. Brody 
Request to obtain approval to video record, broadcast or photograph a Jonathan P. Brody 
court proceeding & Order 
Court Minutes Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 4/16/2013 
Time: 2:02 pm 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: MINI 
Party: City of Sun Valley, Idaho, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Sharon Hammer, Attorney: Eric Swartz 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 04/16/2013 01:30 PM: District Jonathan P. Brody 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: Motion for costs of 
Previously Dismissed Action less 100 
Case Taken Under Advisement Jonathan P. Brody 
Memorandum Decision Denying Defendants' motion for costs of previously Jonathan P. Brody 
dismissed action pursuant to IRCP 41(d) 
no longer u/a Jonathan P. Brody 
Notice Of Service of Defendants City of Sun Valley's First Set of Jonathan P. Brody 
Interrogatories, Requests for Produciton of Documents, and Requests for 
Admission to Plaintiff 
3 
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Notice Of Service Re: Defendant City of Sun Valley's Responses to 
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents 
Acceptance Of Service of Subpoena 
Notice of Compliance 
Notice of Compliance 
Notice of compliance 
Stipulation for Protective Order 
Order Re: Stipulation for Protective Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 10/01/2013 02:00 PM) 
Motion to Dismiss 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Affidavit of Kirtlan G. Naylor in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Errata to Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss 
Hearing date: 10/1/2013 
Time: 2:45 pm 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: ANDREA 
Tape Number: 
Party: City of Sun Valley, Idaho, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Dewayne Briscoe, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Nils Ribi, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Sharon Hammer, Attorney: Eric Swartz 
Judge 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 10/01/2013 02:00 PM: Jonathan P. Brody 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: 1-100 pages 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 10/01/2013 02:00 PM: Jonathan P. Brody 
Case Taken Under Advisement 
Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Subpoena Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and Jonathan P. Brody 
to Compel the Production of Documents Withheld from Production in 
Discovery and in Response to Subpoena 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena Against Jonathan P. Brody 
Non-Party Patricia Ball and to Compel the Production of Documents 
Withheld from Production in Discovery and in Repsonse to Subpoena 
Affidavit of Wayne Willich Former Mayor of the City of Sun Valley in Jonathan P. Brody 
Support of Motion to Compel 
Affidavit of Attorney James R. Donoval Related to Motion to Compel Jonathan P. Brody 
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Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena Jonathan P. Brody 
Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and to Compel the Production of 
Documents Withheld from Production in Discovery and in Response to 
Subpoena 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/03/2013 01:30 PM) Motion to Enforce Jonathan P. Brody 
Subpoena 
Notice Of Hearing Jonathan P. Brody 
Continued (Motion 12/17/2013 01:30 PM) Motion to Enforce Subpoena Jonathan P. Brody 
Amended Notice Of Hearing Jonathan P. Brody 
Notice Of Taking Deposition of Franz Suhadolnok 
Stipulated Joint Discovery Management Plan 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Michelle Griffith 
Notice Of Taking Deposition of Robert Youngman 
Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Michelle Griffith 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Franz Suhadolnik Jonathan P. Brody 
Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Robert Youngman Jonathan P. Brody 
Order Re: Stipulated Joint Discovery Management Plan 
Memorandum Decision Granting Defendants Motion to Dismiss 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Defendants' Motion to Remove Defendants Ribi and Briscoe from the Case Jonathan P. Brody 
Caption 
Defendant's Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena Jonathan P. Brody 
Affidavit of Kirtlan G. Naylor in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Jonathan P. Brody 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Defendants Ribi and Briscoe's Motion to Dismiss 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Defendants Ribi and Briscoe's Jonathan P. Brody 
Motion to Dismiss 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Reconsideration 01/07/2014 01 :30 PM) Jonathan P. Brody 
Notice Of Hearing 
Continued (Motion for Reconsideration 01/21/2014 02:00 PM) 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena Against Jonathan P. Brody 
Non-Party Patricia Ball and To Compel the Production of Documents 
Withheld From Production in Discovery and in Response to Subpoena 
Supplemntal Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Jonathan P. Brody 
Subpoena Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and To Compel the Production 
of Documents Withheld From Production in Discovery and in Response to 
Subpoena 
Supplemental Affidavit of James R. Donoval in Support of Plaintiff's Motion Jonathan P. Brody 
to Compel 
Defendant's Motion to Appear Telephonically for Hearing Jonathan P. Brody 
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Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 12/17/2013 
Time: 2:03 pm 
Other Claims 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Party: City of Sun Valley, Idaho, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Sharon Hammer, Attorney: Eric Swartz 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 12/17/2013 01 :30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: Motion to Enforce 
Subpoena less 100 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Appear Telephonically for Hearing 
Transcript Filed (12/17/13 Hearing) 
Defendants' Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration 
Plaintiffs Motion for Permission to Appear Telephonically 
Judge 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Permission to Appear Telephonically Jonathan P. Brody 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Jonathan P. Brody 
Defendants Ribi and Briscoe's Motion to Dismiss 
Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena 
and Compel 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion for Reconsideration 
Hearing date: 1/21/2014 
Time: 2:45 pm 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Party: City of Sun Valley, Idaho, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Dewayne Briscoe, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Nils Ribi, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Sharon Hammer, Attorney: Eric Swartz 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing result for Motion for Reconsideration scheduled on 01/21/2014 Jonathan P. Brody 
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: telephonic less 
100 
Notice of Compliance 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 02/04/2014 01 :30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Plaintiffs Motion for Permission to Appear Telephonically 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Appear Telephonically for Hearing 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
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Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Permission to Appear Telephonically Jonathan P. Brody 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Jonathan P. Brody 
Subpoena Against Non-Party Patricia Ba!I and to Compel the Production of 
Documents Withheld from Production in Discovery and in Repsonse to 
Subpoena, Oral Argument Requested 
Supplemental Affidavit of Wayne Willich Former Mayor of the City of Sun Jonathan P. Brody 
Valley in Support of Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to Compel 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference 
Hearing date: 2/4/2014 
Time: 1 :45 pm 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Party: City of Sun Valley, Idaho, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Sharon Hammer, Attorney: Eric Swartz 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 02/04/2014 01 :30 Jonathan P. Brody 
PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: telephonic less 
100 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/03/2015 01 :30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/08/2015 09:00 AM) 8 days 
Notice Of Hearing 
Motion for IRCP 37(e) discovery sanctions against Plaintiff 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Affidavit of Kirtlan G. Naylor in support of discovery sanctions (Under Seal) Jonathan P. Brody 
Document sealed 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Jonathan P. Brody 
Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena Against Non-Party Patricia Ball and 
to Compel the Production of Documents Withheld from Production in 
Discovery and in Response to Subpoena 
Memorandum Decision Denying Motion to Reconsider Jonathan P. Brody 
Memorandum Decision Denying Motion to Amend 
Briefing Schedule for Defendant's Motion for Sanctions 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/14/2014 02:30 PM) for Reconsideration 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Notice Of Telephonic Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Jonathan P. Brody 
Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Subpoena Against Patricia Ball and to Compel 
Production of Documents 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/14/2014 03:00 PM) for Petition to Jonathan P. Brody 
Appeal-Plaintiff to appear telephonically 
Notice Of Telephonic Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Permission to Appeal Jonathan P. Brody 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Permission to Appeal Jonathan P. Brody 
Plaintiffs Motion for Permission to Appeal Jonathan P. Brody 
Notice Of Telephonic Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Permission to Appeal Jonathan P. Brody 7 
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Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/14/2014 03:00 PM) for Permission to 
Appeal 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Permission to Appeal 
Plaintiffs Motion for Permission to Appeal 
Plaintiffs Opposition To Defendant's Motion for Sanctions 
Notice of Compliance with Briefing Schedule for Defendant's Motion for 
I.R.C.P. 37(e) Discovery Sanctions Against Plaintiff 
Affidavit of James R. Donoval on Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Sanctions 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for I.R.C.P. 37(e) Discovery 
Sanctions Against Plaintiff 
Defendants' Objection to Motion for Permissive Appeal 
Judge 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Defendant's Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration to Deny Jonathan P. Brody 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Dates Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 04/14/2014 03:00 PM: District Jonathan P. Brody 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: for Permission to 
Appeal less 100 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 04/14/2014 03:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: for Petition to 
Appeal-Plaintiff to appear telephonically less 100 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 04/14/2014 02:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: for 
Reconsideration-Telephonic less 100 
Case Taken Under Advisement 
Order on motion for discovery sanctions 
Order Denying Permissive Appeal 
No Longer UA 
Scheduling Order, Notice Of Trial Setting And Initial Pretrial Order 
Memorandum Decision Denying Motion to Reconsider 
Amended Scheduling Order, Notice Of Trial Setting And Initial Pretrial 
Order 
Notice of Compliance 
Notice Of Taking Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Karen Gin nett 
Notice Of Taking Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Dr. Mary 
Barros-Bailey 
Declaration of Susan Robertson 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
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Memorandum in Support of Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment Jonathan P. Brody 
Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment Jonathan P. Brody 
Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 12/16/2014 03:00 Jonathan P. Brody 
PM) 
Declaration of Kirtlan G. Naylor Jonathan P. Brody 
Declaration of Kirtlan G. Naylor- Exhibit F of Exhibit J is Filed under Seal Jonathan P. Brody 
Document sealed 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 12/16/2014 02:00 Jonathan P. Brody 
PM) Plaintiff 
Notice Of Hearing Jonathan P. Brody 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Jonathan P. Brody 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Jonathan P. Brody 
Affidavit of Sharon R. Hammer in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Jonathan P. Brody 
Judgment 
Affidavit of James R. Donoval in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Jonathan P. Brody 
Judgment 
Affidavit of Wayne Willich in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Jonathan P. Brody 
Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment 12/16/2014 02:00 PM) Jonathan P. Brody 
Defendant 
Amended Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Corrected Memorandum in support of Sun Valley's motion for summary 
judgment 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Defendant City of Sun Valley's List of Lay Witnesses for Trial Jonathan P. Brody 
Sun Valley's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Jonathan P. Brody 
Judgment 
Plaintiffs Response to Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Response to Sun Valley's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Jonathan P. Brody 
Supplemental Affidavit of James R. Donoval in Support of Plaintiffs Motion Jonathan P. Brody 
for Summary Judgment 
Sun Valley's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Jonathan P. Brody 
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Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing date: 12/16/2014 
Time: 2:14 pm 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Party: City of Sun Valley, Idaho, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Sharon Hammer, Attorney: Eric Swartz 
Judge 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on Jonathan P. Brody 
12/16/2014 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: Defendant less 
100 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on Jonathan P. Brody 
12/16/2014 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: Plaintiff less 100 
Case Taken Under Advisement 
Notice of Compliance 
Notice of Compliance 
Memorandum Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment 
No longer U/A 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 02/03/2015 01 :30 PM: Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing Vacated telephonic 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 04/08/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Jonathan P. Brody 
Vacated 8 days 
Judgment 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Civil Disposition entered for: Briscoe, Dewayne L, Defendant; City of Sun Jonathan P. Brody 
Valley, Idaho, Defendant; Ribi, Nils A, Defendant; Hammer, Sharon R, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/16/2015 
Affidavit of Eric B. Swartz in Support of Motion to Withdraw as Attorneys Jonathan P. Brody 
for Plaintiff 
Motion to Withdraw as Attorneys for Plaintiff Jonathan P. Brody 
Associated Appearance of Attorney James R. Donoval for Reconsideration Jonathan P. Brody 
of Entry of Summary Judgment Purposes Only 
Motion for Reconsideration of Entry of Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Filing 
Affidavit of Kirtlan G. Naylor in Support of Defendant's Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorney Fees 
Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
Affidavit of Wayne Willich in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
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Affidavit of Sharon R. Hammer in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration 
Judge 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Affidavit of James R. Donoval in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Jonathan P. Brody 
Reconsideration 
Facts in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Entry of Summary Jonathan P. Brody 
Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Entry Jonathan P. Brody 
of Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Filing 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/17/2015 01 :30 AM) Motion for 
reconsideration of entry of Summary Judgment etc. 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk action 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Motion for expeidited ruling on motion to stay proceedings on petition for Jonathan P. Brody 
fees 
Motion to stay proceedings on petition for fees pending reconsideration of Jonathan P. Brody 
entry of summary judgment and rulings on motion to withdraw 
Memorandum in support of motion to stay proceedings on petition for fees Jonathan P. Brody 
pending reconsideration of entry of summary judgmetn and rulings on 
motion to withdraw 
Affidavit of James R. Donoval in support of plaintiffs motion to stay petition Jonathan P. Brody 
for fees 
Notice of filing Jonathan P. Brody 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Stay and Motion to Expedite Jonathan P. Brody 
Memorandum Decision on Motion to Stay Proceedings on Petition for Stay Jonathan P. Brody 
and Motion to Expedite 
Order on Motion to Stay Proceedings on Petition for Stay and Motion to Jonathan P. Brody 
Expedite 
Reply in Support of Motion to Stay Proceedings on Petition for Fees Jonathan P. Brody 
Pending Reconsideration of Entry of Summary Judgment and Rulings on 
Motion to Withdraw 
Court Minutes Jonathan P. Brody 
District Court Hearing Held (Status 2/10/2015 at 1 :30pm in Minidoka Jonathan P. Brody 
County) 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100 
Scheduling Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/03/2015 03:30 PM) Call into Conf. Call 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid 
by: Donoval, James R (attorney for Hammer, Sharon R) Receipt number: 
0001117 Dated: 2/25/2015 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Hammer, 
Sharon R (plaintiff) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1118 Dated 2/25/2015 for 100.00) 
Notice Of Appeal 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 11 
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Plaintiff's Objection to Motion to Disallow, Defendants' Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorney Fees 
Judge 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to Motion to Disallow, Jonathan P. Brody 
Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
Court Minutes Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing type: Motion to Withdraw 
Hearing date: 3/3/2015 
Time: 2:24 pm 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Party: City of Sun Valley, Idaho, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Sharon Hammer, Attorney: Eric Swartz 
Hearing result for Motion to Withdraw scheduled on 03/03/2015 03:30 PM: Jonathan P. Brody 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: Call into Conf. Call 
less 100 
Hearing resultfor Motion scheduled on 03/17/2015 01:30 AM: Hearing 
Vacated Motion for reconsideration of entry of Summary Judgment etc. 
Order Modifying Automatice Stay 
Order Permitting Jones & Swartz PLLC to Withdraw as Attorneys for 
Plaintiff 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 04/07/2015 04:00 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Notice Of Service of Order Permitting Jones & Swartz PLLC to Withdraw 
as Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Defendant-Respondents' Request for Additional Transcript and Record 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Miscellaneous Payment: Copies Of Transcript For Appeals Per Page Paid Jonathan P. Brody 
by: JDIDAHOLAW, PLLC Receipt number: 0001534 Dated: 3/16/2015 
Amount: $2,557.50 (Check) 
Plaintiff: Hammer, Sharon R Appearance Wyatt Johnson 
Continued (Status 04/07/2015 02:30 PM) 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Motion to Supplement Objection to and Motion to Disallow Defendants Jonathan P. Brody 
Fees and Costs 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Supplement Objection and Motion to Jonathan P. Brody 
Disallow Fees and Costs 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to, and Jonathan P. Brody 
Motion to Disallow, Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
Affidavit of Sharon R. Hammer in Opposition to Sun Valley's Memorandum Jonathan P. Brody 
of Costs and Fees 
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Hearing type: Status 
Hearing date: 4/7/2015 
Time: 3:40 pm 
Other Claims 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Party: City of Sun Valley, Idaho, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Sharon Hammer, Attorney: James Donoval 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 04/07/2015 02:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Susan Israel 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/02/2015 01 :30 PM) 
Notice of Hearing and Scheduling Order on Motions 
Defendants' Notice of Non-Opposition 
Judge 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Sun Valley's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Summary Jonathan P. Brody 
Judgment 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees Jonathan P. Brody 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Jonathan P. Brody 
Entry of Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of James R. Donoval in Response to Allegations of Conflict of 
Interest with Attorney Eric Swartz(Under Seal) 
Document sealed 
Notice Of Filing 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees 
Defendants' Motion to Strike or in the Alternative to Order Production 
Motion to Shorten Time 
Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendants' Motion to Strike 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Declaration of Tyler D. Williams in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike Jonathan P. Brody 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike or in the 
Alternative to Order Production 
Order Shortening Time 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Notice Of Service of affidavit filed under seal, response to motion to strike, Jonathan P. Brody 
and request that affidavit remain under seal 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 6/2/2015 
Time: 2:08 pm 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: DC 
Party: City of Sun Valley, Idaho, Attorney: Kirtlan Naylor 
Party: Sharon Hammer, Attorney: James Donoval 
Jonathan P. Brody 
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Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/02/2015 01 :30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Maureen Newton 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: Mot. to 
Strike-Defendants less 100 
Order on Motion to Reconsider Entry of Summary Judgment 
Order on Motion to Seal Affidavit 
Order On Motion to Seal Affidavit 
Notice of Transcript Lodged 
Plaintiff's First Request to Supplement the Record on Appeal 
Plaintiffs Second Request to Supplement the Record on Appeal 
Certificate Of Service 




Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Jonathan P. Brody 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Naylor & Hales PC Receipt number: 0003775 
Dated: 7/2/2015 Amount: $2.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For Jonathan P. Brody 
Certificate And Seal Paid by: Naylor & Hales PC Receipt number: 0003775 
Dated: 7/2/2015 Amount: $1.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Naylor & Hales Jonathan P. Brody 
PC Receipt number: 0003775 Dated: 7/2/2015 Amount: $3.00 (Credit 
card) 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 08/04/2015 01 :30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Jonathan P. Brody 
Stipulation of parties for inclusion of additional transcripts and record Jonathan P. Brody 
Order Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 08/04/2015 01 :30 PM: Jonathan P. Brody 
Hearing Vacated 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 






CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RISI; 
and DeWAYNE BRISCOE, 






MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE 
SUBPOENA AND COMPEL 
Sharon Hammer ("Plaintiff'') brought a Motion to Enforce Subpoena against non-party 
Patricia Ball and to compel production of docwnents withheld from production in discovery and 
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in response to subpoena. Ms. Ball and the Defendants, City of Sun Valley ("Sun Valley") are 
opposing the Motion claiming that attorney-client privilege and attorney work product 
protections apply. Oral argument was heard on this matter on December 1 7, 2013. Because this 
Court finds that the materials sought in the subpoena are protected by the work product doctrine, 
the Plaintiff's Motion is denied. 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
The dispute at issue involves the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer, and the Defendant, the 
City of Sun Valley. The dispute is centered on the Plaintiffs treatment while an employee for the 
City of Sun Valley. The Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendant for retaliatory discharge in 
violation of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act ("IPPEA"). 
This Motion raises similar issues to this Court's decision in the Non-party City of Sun 
Valley's Motion to Quash Subpoena in the Ribi v. Donoval, in Blaine County Case No. CV-
2011-1040. There, this Court quashed a subpoena seeking Ms. Ball's investigation material and 
the communications that coincided with the investigation into the Plaintiffs activities as an 
employee for the City of Sun Valley, finding that the requested information was work product. 
Here, the Plaintiff has presented additional affidavits that contradict some of the findings in this 
Court's Memorandum Decision Granting Non-Party City of Sun Valley's Motion to Quash 
Subpoena. 
Facts similar to the above mentioned subpoena are presented here. On November 10, 
2011, following allegations of improper misuse of public funds and equipment by the Plaintiff, 
Sun Valley conducted a special executive City Council session on November 11, 2011, to 
evaluate the allegations. On or about November 12, 2011, the Plaintiffs then-attorney, James R. 
Donoval, sent Mr. Wayne Willich, then Sun Valley mayor, a letter with intention to pursue 
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litigation against Sun Valley and other officials in connection with Plaintiff's allegations of 
harassment and the City's potential disciplinary action against her. Similar letters were also sent 
by Mr. Donoval on November 15 and 16, 2011, following another special executive session on 
November 14, 2011. There were three letters sent by Mr. Donoval to the mayor and members of 
the Sun Valley City Council between November 12, 2011 and November 17, 2011. All three of 
these letters either explicitly or implicitly threatened litigation against Sun Valley or members of 
its government. On November 21, 2011, Mr. Donoval, on behalf of Sharon Hammer, filed a 
lawsuit against Sun Valley and members of its government in Idaho's Fifth District Court, Blaine 
County. 
On November 17, 2011, Adam King, the Sun Valley City Attorney, contacted Ms. Ball 
about the possibility ofretaining her services for a fact-finding investigation regarding various 
allegations that could be the subject oflitigation. On November 21, 2011, Sun Valley retained 
Ms. Ball for the purpose of conducting an investigation into alleged violations of City policy. On 
November 22, 2011, Kirtlan Naylor was assigned by Sun Valley's insurance carrier to provide 
legal defense to Sun Valley, and Mr. Naylor was to appointed as Ms. Ball's primary legal contact 
on November 28, 2011. The scope of Ms. Ball's investigation included allegations concerning 
violations of city policy made against Ms. Hammer, as well as allegations made by Ms. Hammer 
against Nils Ribi in her November 21, 2011 lawsuit. On November 30, 2011, Ms. Ball was 
informed that the scope of the investigation was to be expanded into additional allegations. In 
conducting this investigation, Ms. Ball interviewed witnesses, reviewed information, and drafted 
a report. Ms. Ball completed the factual basis of her report on December 9, 2011, and presented a 
draft of the report to Mr. Willich, Mr. Briscoe, the City Council, Mr. King and Mr. Naylor on 
December 12, 2011. Following corrections, the report was concluded on December 20, 2011 by 
MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA AND 
COMPEL Page 3 of 11 
17 
Sun Valley; however the Plaintiff asserts that the investigation was completed on December 12, 
2011. Portions of this report were later provided to the Blaine County Prosecutor for review as to 
any criminal conduct. 
On May 6, 2013, the Plaintiff issued a subpoena to Ms. Ball seeking to produce all audio 
tapes of interviews, documents, communications, agreements, and reports obtained or produced 
in connection with Ms. Ball's investigation for Sun Valley, also referred to as the Hammer 
Disciplinary Investigation. Ms. Ball informed Sun Valley of the subpoena, and Sun Valley 
responded to the subpoena on June 24, 2013 and provided what they considered non-privileged 
documents and lodged objections as to privileged information. Plaintiff then began attempts to 
meet and confer to seek production of those privileged documents. On November 151, 2013, 
Plaintiff filed the Motion to Enforce Subpoena. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l) permits broad discovery of any matter that is not privileged, even if it is 
inadmissible, so long as it is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence." I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l). The burden of showing information is privileged, and therefore 
exempt from discovery, is on the party asserting the privilege. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 
697, 703-04, 116 P.3d 27, 33-34 (2005) citing Ex parte Niday, 15 Idaho 559, 98 P. 845 (1908). 
I.R.E. 502(b) states: "A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client which were made (1) between the client or 
the client's representative and the client's lawyer or the lawyer's representative, (2) between the 
client's lawyer and the lawyer's representative, (3) among clients, their representatives, their 
lawyers, or their lawyer's representatives, in any combination, concerning a matter of common 
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interest, but not including communications solely among clients or their representatives when no 
lawyer is a party to the communication, ( 4) between representatives of the client or between the 
client and a representative of the client, or (5) among lawyers and their representatives 
representing the same client". I.R.E. 502(b ). A communication is confidential where it is not 
intended to be disclosed to third parties, other than those third parties who are furthering the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client or who are necessary to transmit the 
confidential communication. I.R.E. 502(a)(5). 
Furthermore, work product is generally immune from discovery. See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3). 
Work product is considered "documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable ... prepared 
in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's 
representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or 
agent) ... " Id. Work product can only become discoverable "upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and 
that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the 
materials by other means." Id. Additionally, "[i]n ordering discovery of such materials when 
the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a 
party concerning the litigation, including communications between the attorney and client, 
whether written or oral." Id. 
DISCUSSION 
Sun Valley argues that the Motion to enforce the Plaintiffs subpoena should be denied 
because the subpoena seeks protected work product and material protected by the attorney-client 
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privilege. The Plaintiff argues that the material sought is not protected by the attorney-client 
privilege and should not be considered work product. 
A party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation 
of litigation "by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative ... only upon a 
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials ... and that the 
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by 
other means." I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3). If discovery of such material is ordered, "the court shall protect 
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an 
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." Id. 
There is ample support in the record that Ms. Ball was retained by Sun Valley in 
anticipation of litigation, and that her investigation was substantially focused on issues that 
appeared ripe for impending litigation. Aff. Ball, 1 5; Aff. King, 114. Ms. Ball was consulted 
after Mr. Donoval had threatened litigation, was retained on the same day Mr. Donoval initiated 
litigation, and conducted an investigation squarely related to that and other potential litigation. 
Aff. King, Ex. A, p. 5, Aff. King, 115, Aff. Ball, 15,7. Therefore, Ms. Ball's report was 
prepared in large part for Sun Valley in anticipation of, or in conjunction with pending and 
anticipated litigation. There have been new affidavits produced that create inconsistencies as to 
when the investigation was completed. This Court's previous finding is that the investigation was 
completed on December 20th, 2011. Plaintiff now argues, and relies on Mr. Willi ch' s new 
affidavits, that by December 12, 2011, Ms. Ball's investigation and work was complete, and that 
anything beyond this point was no longer authorized work product. However, there is not enough 
evidence that shows that this Court's previous finding that the investigation was completed on 
December 201\ 2011, was incorrect. In fact, e-mail communications provided in camera 
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contradict Mr. Willich's assertion that he gave Ms. Ball no authority or direction to modify the 
"Final Ball Report" in any manner after December 12, 2011. K. Naylor Aff., Ex. B, SV IN 
CAMERA 57; Ex. L,, 14. Furthermore, Plaintiffs affidavit states that Mr. Willich stated to her 
on December 16, 2011, "that the report of Special Investigator Ball was close to being completed 
and that disciplinary charges against me, if any, would be determined in a few days." Aff. K. 
Naylor, Ex. G, 15. This further shows that Mr. Willich did not see the investigation as complete 
on December 12, 2011. This Court continues to find that for the purposes of this motion, Ms. 
Ball's investigation was complete on December 20, 2011. 
Moreover, if Sun Valley retained Ms. Ball in substantial part to conduct her investigation 
in anticipation of litigation, as this Court finds it did, the materials produced as part of that 
investigation are protected under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3). It is irrelevant whether Mr. Naylor was her 
primary contact, or whether Ms. Ball was retained as an attorney or merely an investigator. 
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3) protects material produced in anticipation oflitigation either for a party or for 
that party's representative. 
The work product doctrine protects disclosure of communications. Upjohn Co. v. US., 
449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981 ). "Communications" are precisely what the Plaintiff seeks in the 
subpoena, essentially all documents generated in connection with Ms. Ball's disciplinary 
investigation. The Plaintiff is free to depose any of the individuals interviewed by Ms. Ball in the 
course of her investigation in order to discover underlying facts which may be related to this 
case. However, the Plaintiff is not entitled to copies, however recorded, of Ms. Ball's interviews 
with witnesses or communications with Sun Valley representatives engaged in pursuant to Ms. 
Ball's duty as an investigator. Furthermore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to the e-mails produced in 
accordance with the investigation. The Plaintiff can obtain the underlying facts obtained by Ms. 
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Ball in these interviews through other discovery methods. Notably, the report itself became 
publically available and Plaintiff has it. 
It is possible under certain circumstances to waive the work product doctrine. If work 
product is disclosed, and that disclosure is to an adversary, the protection is lost. Trustees of 
Elec. Workers No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 14-15 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In this case, part of Ms. Ball's report was disclosed to the 
Blaine County Prosecutor. Blaine County and Sun Valley are not adversaries; rather they share a 
common interest. Disclosure to the Blaine County Prosecutor is consistent with maintaining 
secrecy from Sun Valley's adversaries. See US. v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(MCI's disclosure of work product to the government, for the purpose of aiding in the 
investigation of MCI's opponent did not waive work product immunity). "While the mere 
showing of a voluntary disclosure to a third person will generally suffice to show waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege, it should not suffice in itself [to waive protection of work product]." Id. 
at 1299. Since there has been no showing that Sun Valley disclosed its work product to an 
adversary, it has not waived protection of its work product. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff has not shown that Sun Valley has waived work product 
protection. The Plaintiff argues that Sun Valley has waived its attorney-client and work product 
privilege. While there is no direct Idaho case law on the issue, the Plaintiff cites to federal case 
law which analyzes a similar work product rule. Under the federal rule, work product protection 
is only waived when fairness requires, and is limited to the subject matter of the related 
disclosure, and does not create a blanket waiver of the work product privilege in the entire case. 
Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2010). "[V]oluntary disclosure of the 
content of a privileged attorney communication constitutes waiver of the privilege as to all other 
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such communications on the same subject." Weil v. Investment.Indicators, Research & Mgmt., 
Inc., 64 7 F. 2d 12, 23 (91h Cir. 1981 ). The Plaintiff attempts to argue that the voluntary waiver of 
a single document waives all communications presented in a case. However, this is not the case. 
Even a case cited by the Plaintiff states "[ w]e conclude, then, that while the mere showing of a 
voluntary disclosure to a third person will generally suffice to show waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege, it should not suffice in itself for waiver of the work product privilege." Permian Corp. 
v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981) citing United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 
1285, 1299 (D.C.Cir.1980). Because Ms. Ball's findings were disclosed to the Blaine County 
Prosecutor does not mean that waiver should be applied to all of Ms. Ball's other 
communications. Furthermore, there has been no evidence produced by the Plaintiff that the 
Defendant has voluntarily disclosed any attorney-client communications between Mr. King and 
Mr. Naylor nor any of the work product currently not being disclosed. Therefore, the privileges 
remain. Lastly, Plaintiffs argument that Mr. Naylor and Mr. King we unauthorized to participate 
in Ms. Ball's investigation is not supported by the evidence in the record. 
The Plaintiff has not shown that she cannot obtain the underlying facts through 
depositions, interrogatories, requests for production, or other discovery methods, nor has the 
Plaintiff shown either a substantial need for Ms. Ball's materials, nor an undue hardship in 
attaining the substantial equivalent of these materials by other means, and again, the Plaintiff has 
the report itself. Because the Plaintiff has not met the burden under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3), and this 
Court finds that Ms. Ball was retained in anticipation of litigation, and the materials she prepared 
were prepared in anticipation of litigation, those materials are protected. Because of this, there is 
no need to analyze whether those materials are protected from disclosure under the attorney-
client privilege. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Subpoena and Compel is 
hereby DENIED. As to fees and expenses, I.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) may require further argument. Fees 
and costs are denied without prejudice at this time and the issue will be discussed at the next 
hearing. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated: 
Jonat 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that on the 
'l,'2- day of January, 2014, I filed the original and caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document: MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE SUBPOENA AND COMPEL to each of the persons 
as listed below: 
Kirtlan Naylor 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Eric B. Swartz 
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 7808 
Boise, ID 83707 
/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Overnight Mail 
Via Facsimile 
/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Overnight Mail 
Via Facsimile 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY: ~~ 
Crystal Rigby .. ~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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On April 15, 2014, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Permissive Appeal from this 
Court's January 21, 2014, Memorandum Decision Granting Defendants Motion to 
Dismiss and the corresponding Memorandum Decision Denying Motion to Reconsider. 
The motion was heard on April 15, 2014, and taken under advisement. This Court, 
pursuant to I.A.R. 12, now DENIES the Motion for Permissive Appeal and enters this 
order on the following grounds. 
I.A.R 12 authorizes a party to appeal an interlocutory order that is not otherwise 
appealable under Rule 11, but only when certain criteria are satisfied. The issue must 
"involveO a controlling question oflaw as to which there is substantial grounds for 
difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may 
materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." I.AR. 12(a). Permissive 
appeals under Rule 12 are only for exceptional cases. Budell v. Todd, 105Idaho 2, 4, 
(1983). 
This Court dismissed two parties from this action, Mr. Ribi and Mr. Briscoe, 
because they cannot be held individually liable under the Idaho Public Protection of 
Employees Act, "IPPEA," statute. While there was no direct Idaho case law on the issue 
in the Motion to Dismiss, this Court did a thorough analysis of the law found in the 
statute and applied similar legal frameworks on the same from other states courts. 
Therefore, there is no controlling question of law which there is substantial grounds for a 
difference of opinion. · 
Allowing an appeal now would increase the likelihood of a second appeal after 
final judgment has been entered. An appeal now would only prolong litigation. For those 
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reasons, it is this Court's opinion that an appeal from that order will not materially 
advance the orderly resolution of this litigation. As such, pursuant to I.A.R. 12, the 
Motion for Permissive Appeal is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated: q~:z» 'i 
Si~d: ~~~ 1o rodf.isctiu 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and DeWA YNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES R. 
DONOV AL IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
I, James R. Donoval, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and if called upon to 
·· testify about the same, I could do so competently. 
2. I am submitting this Affidavit to correct the Court's misunderstanding of the 
facts, circumstances and intent of myself and Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer") related to Ms. 
Hammer's entry into a contractual relationship with the City Of Sun Valley ("Sun Valley") by 
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• 
signing the City Administrator Employment Agreement in June of 2008 (the ''Employment 
Agreement) (attached as Ex. A herein and as Ex. A of the Affidavit Of Susan Robertson in 
Support Of Sun Valley's Motion For Summary Judgment), and the submission of the 
Supplemental Hammer Release (attached as Ex. B herein and as Ex. C of the Affidavit Of Susan 
Robertson in Support Of Sun Valley's Motion For Summary Judgment) to Sun Valley on January 
23, 2012, when the Court entered Summary Judgment against Ms. Hammers claims herein on or 
aboutJanuary 12, 2015. 
3. I am married to Ms. Hammer, who from June 2008 to January 19, 2012, was the 
City Administrator of Sun Valley 
4. I am a licensed attorney in Idaho, having been sworn-in to the Idaho State Bar in 
October 2009, and am still licensed to practice law in Illinois, having practiced law in Illinois 
since 1988. 
5. In May of 2008, Ms. Hammer was provided a draft Employment Agreement Sun 
Valley which was drafted by former Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles. 
6. When Ms. Hammer was provided the already drafted Employment Agreement by 
Sun Valley, I provided legal advice to Ms. Hammer related to the terms and conditions of the 
Employment Agreement. 
7. I was a former Certified Public Accountant, having been licensed in Illinois for 
several years during the l 990's, but gave up my CPA license to focus on practicing law. Based on 
my experience as a CPA, I am well aware that''severance pay'is defined by the Internal Revenue 
Service as wages for income and employment tax purposes and for income and employment tax 
withholding purposes. 
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8. In rev1ewmg Section 3.A. of the Employment Agreement (the "Severance 
Clause"), and in particular the multiple use of the phraseology of "severance pay" or "severance 
payment" and "all claims and damages of any kind arising from a termination", both Ms. 
Hammer and I agreed that such phraseology clearly meant that any payments Ms. Hammer 
would receive should she ever be terminated by Sun Valley "without cause" pu.rsuan.t to the 
Severance Clause, was intended to compensate Ms. Hammer for past services rendered, and did 
not include that Ms. Hammer would be barred from thereafter bringing any non performance, 
service, wage or employee benefit related causes of action against Sun Valley or its officials, 
should they arise, including any claims against Sun Valley and its officials related to the IPPEA. 
9. Because both Ms. Hammer and I agreed that the phrases "severance pay", 
"severance payments" and "all claims and damages of any kind arising from a termination" in 
the Severance Clause only included payment for past services rendered to Sun Valley by Ms. 
Hammer as the Sun Valley City Administrator, or any employee benefits accrued by Ms. 
Hammer through that date such as vacation pay, and that such phraseology did not bar any 
claims unrelated to Ms. Hammer's performance, services, wages or employee benefits, including 
any potential future claims under the IPPEA, neither Ms. Hammer nor I requested that Sun 
Valley further define what was meant by the phrases "severance pay", "severance payments", or 
"all claims and damages of any kind arising from a termination" in the Severance Clause, when 
Ms. Hammer formally signed the Employment Agreement and entered into a contractual 
relationship with Sun Valley in June of 2008. 
10. Beginning in November 2011, I also represented Ms. Hammer in various matters 
associated with legal disputes between Ms. Hammer, Sun Valley, and various Sun Valley 
officials and employees, and in particular in regards to Ms. Hammer's termination as the Sun 
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Valley City Administrator "without cause" pursuant to the Severance Clause on January 19, 
2012, and in regards to the negotiations of payment of the "severance" Ms. Hammer was entitled 
to pursuant to the Severance Clause. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of an email I sent to Mr. 
Naylor on January 13, 2012. 
12. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of an email I sent to Mr. 
Naylor on January 14, 2012. 
13. Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and accurate copy of an email I sent to Mr. Naylor 
on January 16, 2012. 
14. On January 18, 2012, I held a telephone conversation with Mr. Naylor. My 
memory of the telephone conversation is that Mr. Naylor specifically told me that Sun Valley 
would never let Ms. Hammer return as the Sun Valley City Administrator because she had sued 
Sun Valley City Council Member Nils Ribi and Sun Valley. My memory of the telephone 
conversation is that I told Mr. Naylor that even if Sun Valley terminates Ms. Hammer "without 
cause" that she was not required to waive any of her non service or wage types of claims against 
Sun Valley, including the IPPEA claims, even if she was paid her severance pay under the 
Employment Agreement. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of an email I sent to 
Mr. Naylor immediately after the telephone conversation of January 18, 2012. On information 
and belief, as Mr. Naylor recorded all conversations between he and myself, Mr. Naylor 
possesses a recording or transcript of the January 18, 2012 telephone conversation, but refuses to 
turn the recording or transcript over to Ms. Hammer, myself or Ms. Hammer's counsel Eric 
Swartz. 
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15. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of an email and letter I sent 
to Mr. Naylor on January 18, 2012. 
16. On January 19, 2012, Ms. Hammer was terminated "without cause" by Sun 
Valley pursuant to the Severance Clause. 
17. On January 20, 2012, Ms. Hammer signed a "Release Pursua.11t To City 
Administrator Employment Agreement" ("Original Hammer Release") which I drafted and 
witnessed, and which I personally served on Sun Valley on January 20, 2012, along with a letter 
I assisted Ms. Hammer draft of the same date. Attached as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of 
the letter and the Original Conditional Release which I served on Sun Valley On January 20, 
2012. 
18. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of an email I received from Mr. 
Naylor on January 20, 2012. 
19. Attached as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of an email I received from Mr. 
Naylor on January 21, 2012. 
20. Attached as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of a second email I received from 
Mr. Naylor on January 21, 2012, which included a "Release Pursuant To City Administrator 
Employment Agreement" that Mr. Naylor had drafted (the "Proposed Sun Valley Release"), 
which was attached to the email. 
21. Attached as Exhibit 10 is a true and accurate copy of an email string between 
myself and Mr. Naylor on January 21, 2012. 
22. Upon receipt of the January 21, 2012 email from Mr. Naylor and the Proposed 
Sun Valley Release from Mr. Naylor, I discussed the matter with Ms. Hammer. We both agreed 
that because the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement referred to "severance" 
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payments, and that "severance" payments were "wages" which applied to past services that Ms. 
Hammer had rendered to Sun Valley as the Sun Valley City Administrator, that Ms. Hammer 
was entitled to receive the full amount of "severance" payments described in the Severance 
Clause, without being required to waive any other claims that Ms. Hammer possessed against 
Sun Valley and its officials, including in regards to the IPPEA, as had been demanded by Mr. 
Naylor in his emails of January 20, 2012 and January 21, 2012 and as was described in the 
Proposed Sun Valley Release. 
23. Even though Sun Valley has asserted that Ms. Hammer only possessed two 
options, namely, to sign the Proposed Sun Valley Release and receive the "severance" described 
in the Severance Clause, or not sign the Proposed Sun Valley Release and not receive the 
"severance" Ms. Hammer was entitled to under the Severance Clause - both I and Ms. Hammer 
rejected that assertion by Mr. Naylor and Sun Valley. Instead, both Ms. Hammer and I agreed 
that the third option was that Ms. Hammer was legally entitled to submit a release to Sun Valley 
which did not waive "all" claims, but only claims that Ms. Hammer had foreseen being waived 
should Ms. Hammer ever be terminated by Sun Valley when she entered into the Employment 
Agreement in June of 2008, which did not include the IPPEA claim, and still be entitled to 
receive her "severance" pay. 
24. Attached as Exhibit 11 is a true and correct copy of an email I sent to Mr. 
Naylor on January 23, 2012. 
25. During January 22, 2012 and January 23, 2012, I drafted the Supplemental 
Hammer Release and discussed the matter with Ms. Hammer. 
26. The phrase in the Supplemental Hammer Release which asserts that Ms. Hammer 
was only releasing claims that were "intended when the City Administrator Agreement was 
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entered into on June 1, 2008" (the "Conditional Clause"), was specifically placed in the 
Supplemental Hammer Release to provide notice to Sun Valley that Ms. Hammer was refusing 
to enter the unconditional language of "I release all claims against the City Of Sun Valley" that 
had been demanded by Mr. Naylor, in any release Ms. Hammer would be submitting, and to 
indicate that Ms. Hammer was not agreeing to releasing any non performance, service, wage or 
employee benefit related claims in return for receiving the "severance" under the Severance 
Clause, including any claims under the IPPEA, as Mr. Naylor had already been adequately 
informed of. 
27. On January 23, 2012, Ms. Hammer signed the Supplemental Hammer Release in 
my presence. 
28. Attached as Exhibit 12 is a true and correct copy of the email I submitted to Mr. 
Naylor and former Sun Valley Treasurer Michelle Frostenson ("Former Treasurer Frostenson") 
on January 23, 2012, which included the Supplemental Hammer Release. 
29. On January 23, 2012, I personally appeared at Sun Valley City hall intending to 
serve the Supplemental Hammer Release upon Sun Valley Mayor De Wayne Briscoe. Sun Valley 
Mayor DeWayne Briscoe was not present in Sun Valley City Hall when I appeared. The only 
person who was present at Sun Valley City Hall at the time was Former Treasurer Frostenson, 
who I personally served the original Supplemental Hammer Release upon, at which time I also 
explained to Ms. Frostenson what the document was. 
30. On January 23, 2012, when I met with Former Treasurer Frostenson at Sun Valley 
City Hall, Former Treasurer Frostenson presented me with a proposed final Payroll Direct 
Deposit Voucher (the "Severance Pay Voucher") for Ms. Hammer, which I reviewed and 
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approved as to the withholdings. Attached as Exhibit 13 is a true and correct copy of the 
Severance Pay Voucher. 
31. Based on my experience as a former Certified Public Accountant, I was well 
aware that "severance pay" is defined by the IRS as "wages" for income tax purposes, and is 
subject to withholding for income and employment taxes. Based on my experience as a former 
Certified Public Accountant, I was well aware that "liquidated damages" or other civil damages 
are not subject to income and employment tax withholdings pursuant to IRS guidelines. 
32. At the time I approved the withholdings and signed the Severance Pay Voucher, I 
considered all of the "severance pay" that Ms. Hammer was to receive as taxable "wages" 
pursuant to the Severance Clause for past services Ms. Hammer had rendered to Sun Valley, and 
not payment as settlement for any non payroll related claims that Ms. Hammer still possessed 
against Sun Valley, including any claims pursuant to the IPPEA, and certainly not "liquidated 
damages" of any sort. At the time, Former Treasurer Frostenson agreed with me that all of the 
"severance" payments that Ms. Hammer was to receive pursuant to the Severance Clause of the 
Employment Agreement and listed in the Severance Pay Voucher were "wages" subject to 
employment and income tax withholdings, and not "liquidated damages" or other damages. Had 
I believed that any of the "severance" payments were not wages, but instead liquidated or other 
damages, or had Former Treasurer Frostenson indicated that some of the "severance" Ms. 
Hammer was receiving was payment for claims other than for past services and wages or 
employee benefits, I would have required that Sun Valley not withhold any income or 
employment taxes from that portion of the "severance" that was being considered as "liquidated 
damages" or other non wage related payments. 
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33. On January 24, 2012, Ms. Hammer's and my checking account at Chase Bank 
received a direct deposit from Sun Valley for the "severance" balance due to Ms. Hammer 
pursuant to the Severance Clause in the sum of $66,935.53, which is the amount that had been 
agreed to and indicated on the Severance Pay Voucher. Attached as Exhibit 14 is a true and 
accurate copy of Ms. Hammer and my checking account statement for the period ending January 
27, 2012, indicating that the direct deposit of the $66,935.53 of funds indicated in the Severance 
Pay Voucher was made on January 24, 2012. 
34. As all of the "severance" Ms. Hammer received had been fully withheld for both 
income and employment tax purposes, I took that to be conclusive evidence that Sun Valley had 
agreed with Ms. Hammer and myself that all of the "severance" was for past services Ms. 
Hammer had performed for Sun Valley, and not liquidated or other damages for any of the other 
claims that Ms. Hammer asserted that she was entitled to proceed with, including the IPPEA 
claims, which would have then been exempt from any income or employment tax withholdings. 
35. Between my submission of the Supplemental Hammer Release to Former 
Treasurer Frostenson and Mr. Naylor on January 23, 2012 and the deposit of the "severance" pay 
balance paid to Ms. Hammer on January 24, 2012 by direct deposit into our bank account, I 
received no communications from Mr. Naylor or any other Sun Valley employee or official, 
seeking to clarify or amend the language in the Supplemental Hammer Release, or placing any 
other further conditions upon Ms. Hammer receiving the "severance pay" provided for in the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement, before Ms. Hammer was paid the "severance" 
pay due to Ms. Hammer pursuant to the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement on 
January 24, 2012. 
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36. Based on the prior communications between myself and Mr. Naylor, and the 
notice to Mr. Naylor of the rejection that Ms. Hammer agree that the unconditional language of 
"I release all claims against the City of Sun Valley" be placed in a written release before Sun 
Valley would pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" pay she was entitled to pursuant to the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement, I believed that Mr. Naylor and Sun Valley had 
accepted Ms. Hammer's conditions that she was entitled to the "severance pay" pursuant to the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement without having to release any claims associated 
with the IPPEA, and thereafter paid her pursuant to such condition. 
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. ' . 
FURTHER AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
IL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 810-t""- day of January, 2015. 
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TillS CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT hereinafter 
"Agreement''. effective the 1st day of June 2008, by and between the CITY OF SUN 
VALLEY. &-..ate of Idaho, a municipai corporation. hereinafter called ''Employer... and 
SHARON R. HAMMER hereinafter called ''Employee .. is made in contemplation of the 
following: 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Employer desires to employ the services of said Employee as 
City Administrator of the City of Sun Valley ( .. City"); and 
WHEREAS, Employee desires to accept employment as City Administrator of 
City pursuant to the terms and conditions hereof. 
NOW. THEREFORE. in consideration of the mutual covenants and promises 
herein contained, and the above Recitals which are incorporated herein, the parties agree as 
follows: 
SECTION!. DUTIES 
Employer hereby agrees to employ Employee as City Administrator of the City 
of Sun VaUey to perform the duties customarily performed by City Administrators and which 
Employer, through the Mayor, shall from time to time assign. Employee shall perform such 
duties thoroughly. competently and with the highest level of professionalism as would be 
expected of a city admmistrator with Employee's background. qualifications and experience. 
SECITONl. EMPWYMENT 
A Employee's Employment shall commence June 1, 2008. Employee 
shall report to work no later than June 23, 2008. 
B. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent, limit or otherwise interfere 
with the right of the Employer to terminate the services of Employee under the applicable 
provisions of Section 3 below. 
C. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent, limit or otherwise interfere 
with the right of the Employee to resign at any time from her position with Employer, subject 
only to the notice provision set forth in Section 3, Subsection C, of this Agreement 
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SECTION 3. TERMINATION AND SEVERANCE PAY 
A. Employer, acting through the Mayor, may tenninate Employee's 
employment, without cause, for any reason or no reason. ·Any such decision to terminate 
shall occur only after the Mayor consults with each member of the City Council. Upon such 
termination, Employer shall pay Employee, as severance pay, a lump sum cash payment equal 
to six (6) months,. base salary described in Section 5, Subsection A 
The severance payment herein is intended to be Employee• s sole exclusive 
remedy for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination without 
cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by 
both parties to this Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waives her right to bring a claim of 
any kind for damages against Employer arising from a termination without cause. 
Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all 
claims against the City of Sun Valley. A tennination without cause shall not entitle 
Employee to an informal review under any section of the City of Sun Valley Personnel 
manual ('ci>ersonnel Manual"). 
B. In the event Employee is terminated for "cause", then Employer shall 
not be obligated to make any severance payment to Employee. "Cause'' is defined as (i) a 
material breach of this Agreement; (ii) repeated neglect of Employee's duties as City 
Administrator. or (iii) misconduct such as theft. dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation, 
embezzlement or other acts of willful misconduct, moral turpitude or criminal conduct. 
C. Unless the parties otherwise agree, if Employee voluntarily resigns her 
position with Employer, then Employee shall give Employer three (3) months notice in 
advance; provided Employer may waive such three month advance notice in its discretion. In 
the event of a voluntary resignation, Employee shall not be entitled to any severance payment 
unless the Mayor shall decide otherwise in his sole discretion. 
If Employee applies for employment elsewhere, and during the term of her 
employment hereunder is included in a list of ten or fewer candidates still under consideration 
for such employment, then, upon learning of her inclusion in such a list, Employee shall 
promptly inform the Mayor and each member of the City Council, which shall be confidential 
insofar as is permitted by applicable law. 
D. In the event Employee is terminated by Employer, acting through the 
Mayor, for any reason, then Employer shall pay Employee, at the rate of compensation then 
being earned by Employee, all accrned and unused vacation entitlement in accordance with 
the then cwrent policy for City Department Heads. 
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SECTION 4. DISABILITY 
Unless otherwise required by law, if employee is permanently disabled or is 
otherwise unable to perform her duties because of sickness, accident, injuty, mental 
incapacity or health for a period of four (4) successive weeks beyond any accrued sick leave, 
Employer shall have the option to terminate this Agreement, subject to the severa..'1ce pay 
requirements of Section 3, Subsection A However, Employee shall be compensated for any 
sick leave, vacation, holidays, compensatory time and other benefits accrued at the time 
Employee became disabled in accordance with Personnel Manual provisions which are 
applicable to management employees, AND reduced by the Disability payments received for 
the preceding twelve (12) months. If Employee suffers any permanent disability or is 
otherwise unable to perform her duties then sick leave, vacation, holidays, compensatory 
time, and other benefits shall cease to accrue at that time. 
SECTIONS. COMPENSATION 
A. Employer agrees to pay Employee for her services a salary (hereinafter 
"Base Salary") at the rate of One Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars ($110,000.00), per year, 
payable in equal installments at the same time as other employees of the Employer are paid. 
B. Employer shall match, not to exceed to five percent (5%) of 
Employee's base salary of Section A, contributions made by Employee to a 457 Plan. 
C. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, Employee 
shall receive the general employment benefits, including medical plan coverage, in the same 
amount and to the same extent as Employer grants to Department Heads. 
D. During the course of Employee's term of employment, Employer will 
pay into the Public Employees' Retirement System of Idaho ("PERSf'), for the account of 
Employee, in accordance with the policy established by Employer for all employees of 
Employer generally. 
E. Employer shall provide Employee a housing allowance of $1,000.00 
per month. 
SECTION 6. SICK LEA VE AND VACATION 
A. Upon commencement of employment, Employee shall have credited to 
her personal account forty ( 40) hours of sick leave and thereafter shall accrue sick leave at the 
same rate as City Department Heads employed by the City. 
B. The leave entitlement granted to Employee pursuant to Subsection A of 
this Section 6 shall be used by Employee for time attributable to recovery from an illness or 
injury only and not as additional vacation time. If such sick leave is not used, it shall continue 
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to accrue, except that such entitlement shall not accrue beyond the maximum accrual limits 
established for City Department Heads in respect to the same entitlement. Upon termination 
of this Agreement Employee shall not be entitled to be paid for any accrued but unused leave 
time. 
C. Upon commencement of employment, Employee shall have credited to 
her personal account forty (40) hours paid vacation leave and thereafter shall accrue vacation 
leave at the rate of one hundred-sixty (160) hours per year. Vacation accrual and use shall 
follow the procedures set forth in the Personnel Manual. 
SECTION 7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A The Mayor shall review and evaluate the performance of the Employee 
at least once annually for consideration of a compensation increase. Further, the Mayor shall 
provide the Employee with a summary written statement of the evaluation. 
B. Annually, the Mayor and Employee shall define such goals and 
performance objectives which they determine necessary for the proper operation of the City 
and in the attainment of the Employers policy objectives and shall further establish a relative 
priority among those various goals and objectives. Said goals and objectives shall be in 
writing. and shall generally be attainable within the time limitations as specified and the 
annual operating and capital budgets. 
SECTION 8. GENERAL EXPENSES AND MEMBERSHIPS 
A Employer recognizes that certain expenses of a non-personal and 
generally job-affiliated nature may be incurred by Employee from time to time, and hereby 
agrees to reimbmse or to pay actual expenses in accordance with the travel and other policies 
of the Employer. 
B. Employer shall pay the membership fees to the International City 
Management Association on behalf of Employee. 
C. Employer shall reimburse Employee's direct expenses for relocating to 
the Wood River Valley, as substantiated by receipts, up to $15,000.00. 
SECTION 9. INDEMNIFICATION 
Consistent with Idaho Code § 6-903, City agrees to indemnify and hold 
harmless Employee from claims, liabilities, or causes of action brought against Employee 
which are related to the course and scope of Employee's employment or which arise out of 
any act or omission within the course and scope of Employee's employment; provided, the 
City may refuse a defense or disavow and refuse to pay any judgment for Employee if it is 
CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT - 4 
5/14/2008 4:01 PM 
32064.0101.1206900.8 
--- .. 
determined that such act or omission of the Employee was not within the course and scope of 
her employment or included malice or criminal intent 
SECTION 10. OTHERTERMSANDCONDITIONSOFEMPLOYMENT 
A. The Mayor, in consultation with the Employee, shall fix such other 
terms and conditions of employmen~ as he may determine from time to time to be 
appropriate, relating to the performance of Employee. provided such terms and conditions are 
not inconsistept with or in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement. 
B. Except as herein specifically provided, all provisions of the Personnel 
Manual and regulations and rules of the Employer relating to vacation and sick leave, 
retirement contributions, holidays and other benefits which now exist or hereafter may be 
amended. also shall apply to Employee as they would to other employees of Employer. 
SECTION 11. NOTICES 
Notices pursuant to this Agreement shall be given by deposit in the custody of 
the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, addressed as follows or to such other 





City of Sun Valley 
P.O. Box416 
Sun Valley, ID 83353 
360 W. Illinois St. 
#3F 
Chicago, IL 60610 
Alternatively, notices required pursuant to this Agreement may be personally 
served by hand delivery. Notice shall be deemed given as of the date of personal service or as 






The text herein shall constitute the entire agreement between the 
B. If any provision, or any portion thereof, in this Agreement is held 
unconstitutional, invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement. or portion 




thereof: shall be deemed severable, shall not be affected and shall remain in full force and 
effect 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the City of Sun Valley has caused this Agreement 
to be signed and executed in its behalf by its Mayor. and duly attested by its City Clerk. and 
the Empioyee has signed and executed this Agreement, as of the date and year first above 
written. 
EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY, a 
municipal c_o .. rporation ~ 
/, 7 /,~ . '// 
By: ati~efZ/4; 
Wayntillich, Mayor Sharon R Hammer 
ATTEST: 
City Clerk 
CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREE1v.IBNT - 6 
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SUPPLEMENTAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to Section 3.A. of the Oty Administrator 
Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the aty Of Sun Valley for any claims defined in 
Section 3.A. of the dministrator Employment Agreement as were intended when the City 
~lt()t:J;RttJlt~~nt Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008 • 
• L-. /
1
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From: jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.com> 
To: kilt <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
Subject: Re: City Adninistrator Contract 
Date: Fri, Jan 13, 201210:14am 
Kirt 
http://mail.aol.com'3S 138-211/aol-6/en-us/mail/PrintMessage.asp 
If the City is goillJ to terminate Sharon without cause her contract does not require her to waive any tort or any 
other non contract c-!aims she may have with the C.it-;. So if tha Cit"f is going to terminate her without cause, we 
should work on a separation agreement that has the correct waiver language in it, and get It over with. 
If the City is goillJ to try to teminate her with cause, especially without any hearings or a~hq;J. you know that is 
going to face contillJ8d litigation regarding that issue alone. 
As to your other email, Sharon and I have given you several settlement offers that you have dismissed outright, 
especially di.ling Mayor Willich's terue, and I have asked on sewral occasions to sit with you and yOIJ" client and 
you have refused - so we did not bel'l8Y8 we were incorrect in filing the pleading. 
I would nu::h rather have you pn::Nide me the settlement terms rather than the other way aroc.n:I, as thus far you 
have rejected anything we have pli before you and have not c:otnered. Please note that if you want a settlement of 
aH matters, including any tort or IPPEA claims Sharon has, we are e,cpectillJ that it also includes a dismissal of Mr. 
Ribrs and Ms. Ribrs claims against me. And regardless of the language, we thought that dismissing the suit first 
was a good faith effort to settle the issues. 
Finally Kirt, there have been assertions all over the place of everyone doing bad acts. I am sorry for that And you 
have probably not 8Y8n been privy to some of the tti'lgs that I have been subject to from Mr. Roark. However, the 
community here thinks this is a travesty and a waste of money and not what gownments are st4)POS8d to be doing. 
-. However, if we are goilg to get to some resolution to this, it needs to give Sharon back her reputation. No one is 
going to win on eve,y issue and we need to discuss the matters to get it resolved. I don't care if you record OLI' 
conversations. But as much as we do not see eye to eye - we both need to get to some corrmon ground otherwise 
this is golf'G to go on forever. 
Best Regards 
JIM 





te: Resolution follow up 
From: jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.com> 
To: kirt <kirt@naytorhales.COR'P' 
Subject Re: Resolution follow up 
- Date: Sat, Jan 14, 2012 7:30 am 
Toe Nils Ribi law suit is not an Issue - I wHI fight that myself. 
http://mail.ao1. S 138-211/aol-6/en-us/mail/PrintMessage.asp, 
If the City Council teminates Sharon on Ttusday, we will be in Court inmediately to see whether yol.l" theory of no 
contract e>Ctension flies. Anet regardless of whether you terminate her "without cause• - she has a property interest in 
her employmert which we will Immediately seek to enforce. Anet of course I wU irrmediately re-file the IPPEA claims. 
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iammer v. SlDl Vctlley http://mail.ao1. 138-211/aol-6/en-us/mail/PrintMessage.aspx 
l ofl 
From: jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.com> 
To: kirt <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
Subject Hanmer v. Sun Valley 
Date: Mon, Jan 16, 2012 7:49 pm 
Kirt: 
I assume that you are also cognitive of the fact that if you lose the argument that Sharon is not entitled to the six 
month severance payment that under 45-615 you may be subjecting the City Of Sun Valley to treble damages, and it 
may eventually cost Sun Valley about $200,000 in contract damages alone. 
JIM 
1/18/2012 12:36 PM 
55 
· EXHIBIT· 4. 
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.ooays 1..-onversanon http://mail.ao1.c 138-211/aol-6/en-us/mai 1/PrintMessage.asp: 
,f I 
From: jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.com> 
To: kirt <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
Subject Today's Conversation 
Date: Wed, Jan 18, 2012 2:03 pm 
Kirt: 
I will forward your offer to Ms. Hammer. 
In the meanwhile, I am requesting that you retain the recording of today's COOYerSation as I believe that you 
mentioned that one, if not the only, reason that the City is contemplating termination action against Ms. Hammer is 
because she filed a iaw suit. As the oniy two actions are the IPPEA iaw suit (which she had a right to file and has a 
right to re-file) and the Human Rights complaint (which is stUI pending), that evidence lends credence to the question 
of whether she is being terminated in retaliation for making valid claims against the City or Mr. Ribi. I do not want to 
"parse words" and therefore want to be sure of exactly what you said today in that conversation. Could you please 
provide me with a copy the transcript of today's telephone call. 
Best Regards and Thank You 
JIMDONOVAL 





fammet "5sues http:! /mail .aol.co 478-211/aol-6/en-m/mail/PrintMessage.asp, 
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From: jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.com> 
To: kirt <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
Subject: Hanmer Issues 
Date: Wed, Jan 18, 2012 3:46 pm 
Attachments: 1-18_Letter_Pg_1_001.tif (645K), 1~18_Letter_Pg_2_001.tif (375K) 
Kirt: 
Ms. Hammer rejects the offer of earlier today. Please read the attached letter as wen. 
Vve continue to believe that the only non=p=...11,iti'le and reta!i.atory coLirse for the City Of Sun valley to take is to leave 
Ms. Hamner on administrative leave arx:l let the external investigation be completed and then hold an internal 
investigation (if necessary}, which will provide Ms. Hamner with au the due process protections that the City Of Sun 
Valley as heretofore failed to allow, before the City Of Sun valley contemplates arr, further adverse actions of arr, 
type related to Ms. Hammer or her employment contract and/or status. I am requesting that you forward this email 
and the attached letter to your client(s) for review and contemplation before tomorrow's Soo Valley City Council 
meeting. 
Best Regards 
JIM DONOVAL . 




JAMES R. DONOVAL 
January 18, 2012 
Mr. Kirtlan Naylor 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney At Law 
4325 Fairway Nine Condos 
POBox1499 
Sun Valley, ID 83353 
(3U) 859-2029; (208) m-7383 
Jdonoval@aol.com 
Re: Sharon R. Hammer Contract And Termination 
Dear Mr. Naylor: 
I want to reiterate and add to some of the things that we mentioned in our just completed 
discussion. 
First, should the City Of Sun Valley seek to terminate Ms. Hammer's contract without cause, and 
pay her the severance payment described therein, the lansuage related to such states : "The severance 
payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exclusive remedy for any and all claims of 
damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause and such severance payment is hereby 
agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by both parties to this Agreement. Accordingly, Employee 
waives her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages against Employer arising from a termination 
without cause. Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all 
claims against the City Of Sun Valley." Please note that this language was drafted by then Sun Valley City 
Attorney Rand Peebles. As I have stated, the causes of action Ms. Hammer possesses for tort, including 
the underlying harassment allegations against Council Member Ribi and several other claims, do not 
arise "from a termination", they arise out of separate incidents. Nor is it rational to assert that Ms. 
Hammer would have waived any non-contract damage claims she would have prospectively been 
entitled to (i.e. personal injury claims) when she signed the agreement. So as I have stated, if the City Of 
Sun Valley proposes to terminate Ms. Hammer without cause and pay her the severance payment In the 
contract, she will only sign a waiver that states the exact language in the contract cited above and 
nothing more. 
I also want to remind you that on at least two separate occasions (to Patti Ball and to Mayor 
Willlch and the Sun Valley City Council), Ms. Hammer has provided notice that Ms. Frostenson has 
---
... .-
shorted her retirement account by $1,642 and that Ms. Frostenson has failed to accrue 120 hours of 
sabbatical vacation Ms. Hammer was entitled to (and was charged for) in June of 2011 equaling $6,832. 
Please ensure that if the Oty Of sun Valley terminates Ms. Hammer that those errors are corrected as 
part of Ms. Hammer's final termination payment. 
If the City Of Sun Valley terminates Ms. Hammer with cause, or asserts that the contract is 
invalid or expired, then of course she does not waive any claims of any sort, including in regards to the 
contract itself. 
Again, I want to remind you that should Ms. Hammer be required to litigate any matters related 
to Ms. Hammer's severance, then there is the potential that she would be entitled to treble damages 
and attorney's fees for the unpaid amounts pursuant to Idaho Statutes 45-615. Also, please note that 
should Ms. Hammer be terminated, she is making demand for payment of all compensation due within 
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January 20, 2012 
City Of Sun Valley 
c/o City Clerk Kelly Ek 
Sun Valley City Hall 
Sun Valley, ID 83353 
SHARON R. HAMMER 
4325 Fairway Nine Condos 
PO Box1499 
Sun Valley, ID 83353 
(312) 985-0245 
sharonihalillll8l'@aol.co111 
Via Hand Delivery 
Sharon R. Hammer- 48 Hour Severance Payment Demand Pursuant To Idaho Statute 45--606 
City Of Sun Valley: 
At approximately 5:30 p.m. on Thursday, January 19, 20U, the Sun Valley City Council, at the 
request of Mayor Dewayne Briscoe, terminated the existing City Administrator Employment Agreement 
::, Is~ 
(the "Agreement") between me and the Oty Of Sun Valley, pursuant to Section 3A of such Agreement. 
Therefore, I am requesting payment of all wages and compensation due within 48 hours, or by 10:00 
a.m. Tuesday, January 24, 2012, as Is required by Idaho Statutes 45-606. 
Wages and compensation are as follows: 
a} Pursuant to Section 3A of the Agreement, I am demanding payment for six months of 
compensation; 
b) I am demanding payment of four days of salary for the period of January 16, 2012 through 
January 19, 2012, the date of termination of the Agreement, or the equivalent of $1,858.88, at my 
current pay rate of $58.09 per hour; 
c} I am demanding payment of 188.88 hours of accrued vacation, as Is detailed on my payroll 
records, equaling $10,9n.04, at my current pay rate of $58.09 per hour; 
d) I am demanding payment for 40 hours of vacation time I was mandated to request during the 
pay period ending December 18, 2011, because Mayor Willlch instructed me to submit a request for 
vacation during the "administrative leave" period. The amount for this 40 hours equals $2,323.60 at my 
current pay rate of $58.09 per hour; 
• 
e) I am demanding payment for 120 hours of sabbatical vacation time I earned in June 2011. The 
sabbatical time was never reflected in my vacation accrual by Ms. Frostenson. On at least two separate 
occasions (to Patti Ball and to Mayor Wlllich and the Sun Valley City Council), I have provided notice that 
Ms. Frostenson shorted my vacation account by the UO hours, and my vacation accrual account has not 
been corrected. I am demanding payment of $6,907.80 for the UO hours of non-accrued sabbatical 
vacation time at my current pay rate of $58.09 per hour; 
f) I am demanding payment for $1,642 that Ms. Frostenson shorted my ICMA-RC retirement 
account in January 2010 when the initial deposit was made. On at least two separate occasions (to Patti 
Ball and to Mayor Wllllch and the Sun Valley Oty Council), I have provided a detailed accounting of the 
amounts withheld from my pay and not deposited into my ICMA-RC retirement account totaling $1,642. 
I have not been paid this shortage or been provided an explanation as to why the shortage occurred. I 
am demanding payment of the $1,642 retirement fund shortage. 
I am demanding that all funds described herein be made by direct deposit in my Chase Bank 
Account No. (1110019465024) (see attached void check) as has been the practice of payment for wages, 
by 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, January 24, 2012. If such is not done, I consider the City Of Sun Valley to be in 
violation of the 48 hour payment requirement of Idaho Statutes 45-606. Should the Oty Of Sun Valley 
not make the payment demanded, or at least full payment of any non-disputed balances due pursuant 
to Idaho Statutes 45-611, then the City Of Sun Valley shall be subject to payment for treble damages, 
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Statutes 45-615. Should the City Of Sun Valley dispute the 
balances demanded, I demand a written explanation for each categor, q_(compensation the City Of Sun 
Valley is disputing and a detail of the basis of the calculation of any undisputed balances actually paid. 
I am demanding that all payments be In "'gross"', without any withholding for taxes, or any other 
employee related withholdings, as the payments are a "lump sum" payment related to the termination 
of the Agreement. Should any withholdings be made, they are specifically being done without my 
authority or approval, and I consider those to also be done in violation of Idaho Statute 45-606. The City 
Of Sun Valley will have then made a unilateral determination of withholdings from my separation 
without my approval. I certify that I will take responsibility for any and all taxes or employment related 
obligations associated with the payments demanded. 
Finally, I have attached a Release Pursuant To City Administrator Employment Agreement 
which complies with the specific language of the Agreement. Should the City Of Sun Valley fail to make 
payment of the balances demanded by 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, January 24, 2012 due to any matters related 




RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISJRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
The City Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008 between the City Of Sun Valley and 
Sharon R. Hammer, prepared by then Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles, states as follows:. 
"The severance payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exclusive remedy for any 
and all claims of damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause and such 
severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by both parties to this 
Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waives her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages 
against Employer arising from a termination without cause." 
Therefore, pursuant to the language of the City Administrator Employment Agreement, I state as 
follows: 
"I release all claims of damages of any kind arising from the termination of the Oty 
t ent by the C-rty Of Sun Valley on January 19, 2011 and for any 










- From: KirUan Naylor <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
To: jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.com> 
Subject: RE: Lu.,.:> Sum payment 
Date: Fri, Jan 20, 201211:34 am 
hUp://mail.aol.com'3547S-2 l l/aol-6/en-us/mail/PrintMessage.a 
That won't do. If our accountants tell us this should be considered salary, the only way we will 1099 is if 
there Is an indemnification by your dient of all taxes and penalties (including the to the City), if the IRS 
deems it to be salary. 
Also, I just received the signed urelease" and demand. 
The release language you propose is not adequate. It needs to be identical to the Agreement, which 
states: "Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims 
against the City of Sun Valley." 
Please revise your release agreement to replace the last paragraph with this language, in order for 
payment to be made: 
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E: Lump Sam payn,em ., 
From: Kirtlan Naylor <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
To: jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.com> 
Subject RE: lJ.lql Sum payment 
Data: Sat, Jan 21, 2012 3:08 pm 
http://llllil.aol.com'35478-211/aol-61en-us/mail/PrintMessage.aspx 
Add that sentence to the release, or we will not consider that she has complied with the agreement. 
There is no reason to delay this now. But you hold the "$$$" in your hands. 
The lump sum payment is the consideration for the release. 
The other demanded wages deal with her termination. They are not affected by this issue. 
Please know that in order forth ls to be paid direct deposit, the City must file with the bank paperwork 
no later than the day before at 3:00pm. So, I encourage you to send the signed revised release soon. 
Kirt/an G. Naylor 
Direct 208 947-2070 
"
. Ji NAYLOR&.. HALES. P.C. 
( •• } 950WEST~ST,S1UE6108(1fS£,0113702 ~· 
This emaU Is a canftdeatfal cormulicatlon. 
If It was sent to you mlsttlcenly, 
please notify me and destlU¥ yocr copy. 
,. 
EX:ff1BIT9 . ··· 
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From: Kirtlan Naylor <kirt@naylorhale.com> 
To: Kirtlan Naylor <ldrt@naylorhalecom>; jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.com> 
Subject: RE: lull1) Sum payment 
Data: Sat. Jan 21, 2012 4:03 pm 
Attachments: Release.pdf (42K) 
Jim, 
Also, the limiting language is part of the agreement she signed. So, when it says, "receipt of the 
severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley," in 
essence, the lump sum isn't due until that condition has been met. 
You quoted the rest of the paragraph, it seems that to quote the rest is exactly what should be done. 
I have attached the acceptable release. If it is not received by 1:00pm Monday, payment will not be 
able to be made by direct deposit. 






RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
The City Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008 between the City of Sun 
Valley and Sharon R. Hammer, and as extended by the Extension dated September 17, 2009, 
states as follows: 
The severance payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exclusive 
remedy for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination 
without cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair 
and equitable by both parties tot bis Agreement Accordingly, Employee waives 
her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages against Employer arising from a 
termination without cause. Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is 
subject to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley. 
Therefore, pursuant to the language of the City Administrator Employment Agreement, I state as 
follows: 
"I release all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause on January 
19, 2012, and all claims against the City of Sun Valley.'' 
Dated this __ of January, 2012. 
Sharon R. Hammer 
James Donoval, Witness 




. On Jan 21, 2012, at 4:03 PM, "jdonoval@aol.com" <jdonoval@aol.com> wrote: 
After 48 hotrS treble damages and attorney fees. You need to deposit al 1.11disputed afflOlDS within 48 hours. 
Have a good weekend. 
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBeny 
From: Klrtlan Naylor <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2012 15:35:46 -0700 
To: jdonoval@aot.com<jdonoval@aol.com> 
Subject: RE: Lll11P Sl.m paymert 




From: jdonoval@aol.com [mailto:jdonoyal@aol.comJ 
Sent: Saturday, January 21, 2012 3:34 PM 
To: Klrtlan Naylor 
Subject: Re: Lump sum payment 
I'm thinking treble damages and attorney fees. Read the statutes. You can't put limiting language on 
payments. She will sign your release on wednesday specifically under duress. Talk to you on 
wednesday. 
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry 
From: Kirtlan Naylor <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
Date: Sat, 21 Jan 201215:05:54 -0700 
To: jdonoval@aol.com<jdonoval@aol.com> 
Subject: RE: Lump Sum payment 
Add that sentence to the release, or we will not consider that she has complied with the agreement. 
There is no reason to delay this now. But you hold the "$$$• in your hands. 
The lump sum payment is the consideration for the release. 
The other demanded wages deal with her termination. They are not affected by this issue. 









From: jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.a>m> 
To: kirt <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
Subject: New Release 
Date: Mon, Jan 23, 2012 9:29 am 
At Ms. Hammer's direction, I am preparing a supplemerul release that we belieVe wHI conform to your request of 
Saturday. I will drop it off at the City Hall with the W-9 and emaU you a copy later today once she appro\leS it. 
JIM 
001)610 2/I0/2012 7:59 AM 76 
.. 
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levised W-4; Supplemental Release 
:?. 
• · • From: jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.com> 
To: mfrostenson <mf'rostenson@sviadho.org> 
Cc: kirt <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
Subject Revised W-4; Supplemental Release 
Date: Mon, Jan 23, 20121:48 pm 
http://mail.ao 
Attachments: Revised_ W-4_001.tif (571 K), Supplemental_Release_001.tif (2661<) 
ofl 
Please see attached. Thank You. 
JIM OONOVAL 
35478-211/aol-6/en-us/mail/PrintMessage.asJ 
IJ [){)615 ~t 0/2012 8:02 AM 
• 
SUPPLEMENTAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to Section 3.A. of the City Administrator 
Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the City Of Sun Valley for any claims defined in 
dministrator Employment Agreement as were intended when the City 










City of Sun Va y 
Payroii Direct Deposit Voucher 
Sharon R Hammer 
PO Box 1499 
Sun Valley ID 83353 
Hammer, Sharon R ( 20011 ) 
EARNINGS 
PERIOD 
TITLE HOURS RATE AMOUNT 
Regular 32.00 58.0900 1,858.88 
Overtime .00 .0000 
Vacation 348.88 58.0900 20,266.44 
Sick Pay .00 58.0900 
ON-CALL .00 .0000 
Misc Pay .00 .0000 60,412.13 
Comp Time .00 .0000 
Allow/Exp .00 .0000 
Deductible .00 .0000 
TOTAL GROSS 380.88 82,537.45 
TOTAL OED 15,601.92 -
NET PAY 66,935.53 
BENEFITS 
PERIOD Y-T-D 
TITLE AMOUNT AMOUNT 
Soc Sec 5,117.32 5,917.73 
Medicare 1,196.79 1,383.98 
PERS! Ret 193.14 1,208.91 
Health Ins 910.00 
Dental Ins 67.73 
Life Insur 
TOTAL BEN 7,505.95 10,648.03 
Routing# 
071000013 








PAY PERIOD ENDING 01/29/2012 
DEDUCTIONS 












AMOUNT TITLE AMOUNT AMOUNT 
11,153.28 FICA 4,663.36- 5,392.77 -
FWT' 8,253.70- 10,352.02 -
22,590.04 SWT 2,476.11 - 3,275.11 -
Annuity 
32.00 PERSI Ret 115.81- 724.88-
60,862.13 401K& Vol 
ICMARETIR 92.94- 559.26 -
1,125.00 Cr Union 
Other Ins 84.30-
95,762.45 Flex Plans 230.76 -
20,619.10 - MiscDed 
75,143.35 TOTALDED 15,601.92 - 20,619.10-
BEGINNING ACCRUED USED REMAINING 
Vacation 188.88 .00 .00 188.88 
Sick Leave 376.10 .00 .00 376.10 
Comp Time .00 .00 .00 .00 









SHARON R HAMMER 
OR JAMES R OONOVAL 
I CHECKING SUMMARY I 
Beginning Balance 
Deposits and Additions 
Checks Paid 
ATM & Debit Card Withdrawals 
Electronic Withdrawals 
Fees and Other Withdrawals 
Ending Balance 
December 28, 2011 through January 27, 2012 









Account Number: 001110019465024 
This message confirms that you have overdraft protection on your checking account. 







Cash Back From Debit Card Bonus Otters 
City of Sun Vall Payroll PPD ID: 1820294056 
City of Sun Vall Payroll PPD ID: 1820294056 
. City of Sun Vall Payroll PPD ID: 1820294056 
Total Deposits and Additions 









Total Checks Paid 
DESCRIPTION 

























If you see a description in the Checks Paid section, it means that we received only electronic information about the check, 
not the original or an image of the check. As a result, we're not able to return the check to you or show you an image. 
• All of your recent checks may not be on this statement, either because they haven't cleared yet or they were listed on 
one of your previous statements. 
" An image of this check may be available for you to view on Chase.com. 
Page 3of 6 
83 
James R. Donoval 
4110 Eaton Ave., Suite D 
Caldwell, ID 83607 
Ph: (312) 859-2029 
Fax: (208) 649-1603 
IdahoAttyNo. 8142 
jdonoval@aol.com 
JAN 3 0 2015 
~Yflfl,,.i?f'flltl, Clerk District 
vOUrt ol8Jfl9 Coun Idaho 
Associated Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and De WAYNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON R. 
HAMMER IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
I, Sharon R. Hammer, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am the named Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and if called upon to 
testify about the same, I could do so competently. 
3. I am submitting this Affidavit to correct the Court's misunderstanding of the 
facts, circumstances and my intent related to my entry into a contractual relationship with the 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON R. HAMMER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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City Of Sun Valley ("Sun Valley") by signing the City Administrator Employment Agreement 
(the "Employment Agreement") in June of 2008 (attached as Ex. A herein and as Ex. A of the 
Affidavit Of Susan Robertson in Support of Sun Valley's Motion For Summary Judgment), and 
the submission of a Supplemental Release (the "Supplemental Hammer Release") (attached as 
Ex. B herein and as Ex, C of the Affidavit Of Susan Robertson in Support of Sun Valley's 
Motion For Summary Judgment) to Sun Valley on January 23, 2012, when the Court entered 
Summary Judgment against my claims herein on or about January 12, 2015. 
4. From June 2008 to January 19, 2012, I was the City Administrator of Sun Valley 
5. I am married to James R. Donoval ("Mr. Donoval"), a licensed attorney in Idaho, 
having been sworn-in to the Idaho State Bar in October 2009, and who is still licensed to practice 
law in Illinois, having practiced law in Illinois since 1988. 
6. In May of 2008, I was provided a draft Employment Agreement by Sun Valley 
which was drafted by former Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles. 
7. When I was provided the already drafted Employment Agreement by Sun Valley, 
I sought and received legal advice from Mr. Donoval related to the terms and conditions of the 
Employment Agreement. 
8. During my tenure as a municipal attorney and as a local government manager in 
Illinois, which is where I was still located when I was negotiating the Employment Agreement, I 
was made aware of various statutes and regulations, one of which was Illinois Regulation 
Section 2950.45 related to whether an employee who receives "severance" benefits is entitled to 
collect unemployment benefits, which defined "severance pay" as remuneration for past service 
rendered to an employer. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a copy of Regulation 2950.45 to which I am 
referring. Therefore I did not consider the phrase "severance pay" as described in Section 3.A. of 
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the Employment Agreement (the "Severance Clause") to be considered as anything other than as 
settlement for any past services rendered or wages or employee benefits that may be due. I 
certainly did not consider "severance" to in any way be payment in resolution of any non wage 
or employee benefit claims, including claims I may have under the IPPEA, I may have had 
against Sun Valley should I ever be terminated "without cause". 
9. In reviewing the Severance Clause, and in particular the phraseology of 
"severance pay", "severance payments" and "all claims and damages of any kind arising from a 
termination", both Mr. Donoval and I agreed that such phraseology clearly meant that any 
payments I would receive should I ever be terminated by Sun Valley "without cause" pursuant to 
the Severance Clause, was intended to compensate me for past services rendered, and did not 
include that I would be barred from thereafter bringing any non performance, service, wage or 
employee benefit related causes of action against Sun Valley or its officials, should they arise, 
including any claims against Sun Valley and its officials related to the IPPEA. 
10. Because both Mr. Donoval and I agreed that the phrase "severance pay", 
"severance payments" and "all claims and damages of any kind arising from a termination" in 
the Severance Clause only included payment for past services I rendered to Sun Valley as the 
Sun Valley City Administrator, or any employee benefits I had accrued by that date such as 
vacation pay, and that such phraseology did not bar any claims unrelated to my performance, 
services, wages or employee benefits, including any potential future claims under the IPPEA, 
neither Mr. Donoval nor I requested that Sun Valley further define what was meant by the 
phrases "severance pay", "severance payments" or "all claims arising from a termination", when 
I formally signed the Employment Agreement and entered into a contractual relationship with 
Sun Valley in June of 2008. 
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11. Had there been any question at the time the Employment Agreement was entered 
into that I would be barred from bringing any non service, performance, wage or employee 
benefit claims against Sun Valley and its officials, should I be terminated "without cause" by 
Sun Valley, including in particular any claims pursuant to the IPPEA, I would have demanded 
such limiting language be added to the Employment Agreement before I signed the Employment 
Agreement. 
12. There is no question in my mind that when I entered into the Employment 
Agreement with Sun Valley in June of 2008, that former Sun Valley Mayor Wayne Willich and 
I had a clear meeting of the minds that the phrases "severance pay, "severance payments" or "all 
claims and damages of any kind arising from a termination" only related to past services, 
performance, wages and employee benefits, and that such phraseology did not bar me from 
bringing any non performance, service, wage or employee benefit claims against Sun Valley or 
its officials, including claims under the IPPEA, if I was ever to be terminated by Sun Valley 
"without cause". Any finding by the Court otherwise is simply a replacement of the Court's 
intent for what mine and former Sun Valley Mayor Wayne Willich's intent was at the time the 
Employment Agreement was entered into. 
13. Beginning in November 2011, Mr. Donoval also represented me in vanous 
matters associated with legal disputes between myself, Sun Valley, and various Sun Valley 
officials and employees, and in particular in regards to my termination as the Sun Valley City 
Administrator "without cause" pursuant to the Severance Clause on January 19, 2012, and in 
regards to negotiations of payment of the "severance pay" I was entitled to pursuant to the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement. 
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14. Prior to my termination by Sun Valley "without cause" pursuant to the Severance 
Clause of the Employment Agreement on January 19, 2012, at my direction and with my 
knowledge, Mr. Donoval submitted at least three separate communications to Sun Valley's 
attorney Kirtlan Naylor ("Mr. Naylor"), specifically confirming that should Sun Valley terminate 
me, as had been threatened, that I would not be releasing any non performance, service, wage or 
employee benefit related claims against Sun Valley and its officials, including any constitutional 
or retaliation related types of claims, including specifically any claims under the IPPEA, even if 
Sun Valley paid the "severance pay" I was entitled to the Severance Clause of the Employment 
Agreement. 
15. On January 19, 2012, I was terminated "without cause" by Sun Valley pursuant to 
the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement. 
16. On January 20, 2012, I signed a "Release Pursuant To City Administrator 
Employment Agreement" (the "Original Hammer Release") which Mr. Donoval drafted and 
witnessed, and which Mr. Donoval served on Sun Valley on January 20, 2015, along with a letter 
I drafted with Mr. Donoval's assistance of the same date. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and 
correct copy of the letter and the Original Hammer Release which Mr. Donoval served on Sun 
Valley on January 20, 2012. 
17. Attached as Exhibit 3 if a true and correct copy of an email and a "Release 
Pursuant To City Administrator Agreement" that Mr. Naylor had provided to Mr. Donoval on 
January 21, 2012 (the "Proposed Sun Valley Release") which included unconditional language 
that Mr. Naylor was demanding that I include in any release I needed to sign in order to receive 
the "severance pay" under the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement, namely, "I 
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release all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause on January 
19, 2012, and all claims against the City Of Sun Valley." 
18. Upon receipt of the January 21, 2012 email and the Proposed Sun Valley Release 
from Mr. Naylor, I discussed the matter with Mr. Donoval, and we both agreed that because the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement referred to "severance" payments, and that 
"severance" payments only applied to past services that I had rendered to Sun Valley as the Sun 
Valley City Administrator, that I was entitled to receive the full amount of "severance" payments 
pursuant to the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement, without being required to 
waive any other claims that I possessed against Sun Valley and its officials, including in regards 
to the IPPEA, as had been demanded by Mr. Naylor in his emails and as was described in the 
Proposed Sun Valley Release. 
19. Even though Sun Valley has asserted that I only possessed two options, namely, 
to sign the Proposed Sun Valley Release and receive the "severance pay" described in the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement, or not sign the Proposed Sun Valley Release 
and not receive the "severance pay" I was entitled to under the Severance Clause of the 
Employment Agreement - both I and Mr. Donoval rejected that assertion by Mr. Naylor and Sun 
Valley. Instead, both I and Mr. Donoval agreed that the third option was that I was legally 
entitled to submit a release to Sun Valley which did not waive "all" claims, but only claims that I 
had foreseen as being waived should I be terminated when I entered into the Employment 
Agreement in June of 2008, which did not include the IPPEA claim, and still be entitled to 
receive the "severance" pay. 
20. In my prior Affidavit, when I stated that "In order to secure my immediate 
security, I was forced to sign release of claims that was acceptable to the City.", as is quoted in 
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the Court's Summary Judgment Decision, I was merely reflecting the two options that Sun 
Valley was asserting that I was facing at that time. The Court should note that I rejected Mr. 
Naylor's and Sun Valley's demands and did not sign the Proposed Sun Valley Release as Sun 
Valley was demanding. I assert that I selected a third option, by notifying Sun Valley that I was 
demanding that I be paid the "severance" payment that I was entitled to for past performance, 
service, wage and employee benefits, and that I was still retaining any other claims against Sun 
Valley and its officials, including any IP PEA claims. 
21. On January 22, I directed Mr. Donoval to notify Mr. Naylor and Sun Valley that I 
was refusing to sign the Proposed Sun Valley Release submitted to me by Mr. Naylor, and 
instead that I would be submitting a separate release of my choosing to Sun Valley. 
22. During January 22, 2012 and January 23, 2012, Mr. Donoval drafted the 
Supplemental Hammer Release and discussed the matter with me. 
23. The phrase in the Supplemental Hammer Release which asserts that I was only 
releasing claims that were "intended when the City Administrator Agreement was entered into 
on June 1, 2008" (the "Conditional Clause"), was specifically placed in the Supplemental 
Hammer Release to provide notice to Sun Valley that I was refusing to enter the unconditional 
language of "I release all claims against the City Of Sun Valley" that had been demanded by Mr. 
Naylor, into any release I would sign, and to indicate that I was not agreeing to release any non 
performance, service, wage or employee benefit related claims in return for receiving the 
"severance pay" under the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement, including any 
claims under the IPPEA, as Mr. Naylor had already been adequately informed of. 
24. On January 23, 2012, I signed the Supplemental Hammer Release m Mr. 
Donoval' s presence. 
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25. On January 24, 2012, Mr. Donoval's and my checking account at Chase Bank 
received a direct deposit from Sun Valley for the "severance" balance due to me pursuant to the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement in the sum of $66,935.53. 
26. Between my signing of the Supplemental Hammer Release on January 23, 2012 
and the deposit of the "severance" balance paid to myself on January 24, 2012 by direct deposit 
into our bank account, I received no communications from Mr. Naylor or any other Sun Valley 
employee or official, seeking to clarify or amend the language in the Supplemental Hammer 
Release, or placing any other further conditions upon my receiving the "severance pay" due to 
me pursuant to Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement on January 24, 2012. 
27. Based on the prior communications between Mr. Donoval, myself, Mr. Naylor 
and Sun Valley, and the notice to Mr. Naylor that I was rejecting the unconditional language of 
"I release all claims against the city Of Sun Valley" in any written release I would be submitting 
before Sun Valley would pay me the "severance pay" I was entitled to pursuant to the Severance 
Clause of the Employment Agreement, I believe that Mr. Naylor and Sun Valley had accepted 
my conditions that I was entitle to "severance" pay pursuant to the Severance Clause of the 
Employment Agreement without having to release any claims associated with the IPPEA, and 
thereafter paid pursuant to such condition. 
28. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a true and accurate copy of the Form W-2 I received from 
Sun Valley at the end of 2012, which indicates that the entire amount of "severance" pay I 
received from Sun Valley was considered by Sun Valley to be taxable "wages" and had been 
withheld on for both income and employment tax purposes. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J.(o 4'- day of January, 2015. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON R. HAMMER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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TIIlS CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT hereinafter 
"Agreement,,, effeotive the 1st day of June 2008, by and between the CITY OF SUN 
VALLEY, State of Idaho, a municipal corporation, hereinafter called "Employer", and 
SHARON R HAMMER hereinafter called ":Employee" is made in contemplation of the 
following: 
RECITAIS 
WHEREAS, Employer desires to employ the services of said Employee as 
City Administrator of the City of Sun Valley ("Cit:Y"); and 
WHEREAS, Employee desires to accept employment as City Administrator of 
City pursuant to the terms and conditions hereof 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and promises 
herein contained, and the above Recitals which are incorporated herein. the parties agree as 
follows: 
SECTION 1. DUTIES 
Employer hereby agrees 1o employ Employee as City Administra1or of the City 
of Sun Valley to perfmm the duties customarily performed by City Administrators and which 
Employer, through. the Mayor, shall from time to time assign. Employee shall perform such 
duties thoroughly, competently and with the highest level of professionalism as would be 
expected of a city admmistrator with Employee's background, qualifications and experience. 
SECTION2. EMPWYMENT 
A Employee's Employment shall commence June l, 2008. Employee 
shall report to work no later than June 23, 2008. 
B. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent, limit or otherwise :interfere 
with the right of the Employer to terminate the services of Employee under the applicable 
provisions of Section 3 below. 
C. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent, limit or otherwise interfere 
with the right of the Employee to resign at any time from her position with Employer, subject 
only to the notice provision set forth in Section 3, Subsection C, of this Agreement 
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SECTION 3. TERMINATION AND SEVERANCE PAY 
A Employer, acting through the Mayor, may terminate Employee's 
employment, without cause, for any reason or no reason. ·Any such decision to terminate 
shall occur only after the Ma.yor consults with each member of the City Council. Upon such 
~ Employer shall pay Employee, as severance pay, a lump sum cash payment equal 
to six (6) months, base salary descn'bed in Section 5, Subsection A 
The severance payment herein is intended to be Employee's sole exclusive 
remedy for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a tennination without 
cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by 
both parties to this Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waives her right to bring a claim of 
any kind for damages against Employer arising from a termination without cause. 
Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all 
clahns against the City of Sun Valley. A termination without cause shall not entitle 
Employee to an informal review under any section of the City of Sun Valley Personnel 
manual f'Personnel Manual .. ). 
B. In the event Employee is terminated for "cause", then Employer shall 
not be obligated to make any severance payment to Employee. ..Cause" is defined as (i) a 
material breach of this Agreement; (ii) repeated neglect of Employee's duties as City 
Administrator; or (iii) misconduct such as theft, dishonesty, fraud. misrepresentation, 
embezzlement or other acts of willful misconduct, moral turpitude or criminal conduct 
C. Unless the parties otherwise agree, if Employee voluntarily resigns her 
position with Employer, then Employee shall give Employer three (3) months notice in 
advance; provided Employer may waive such three month advance notice in its discretion. In 
the event of a voluntary resignatio~ Employee shall not be entitled to any severance payment 
unless the Mayor shall decide otherwise in his sole discretion. 
If Employee applies for employment elsewhere. and during the term of her 
employment hereunder is included in a list of ten or fewer candidates still under consideration 
for such employment, the~ upon learning of her inclusion in such a list, Employee shall 
promptly inform the Mayor and each member of the City Council, which shall be confidential 
insom as is permitted by applicable law. 
D. In the event Employee is terminated by Employer. acting through the 
Mayor, for any reason, then Employer shall pay Employee, at the rate of compensation then 
being earned by Employee, all accrued and unused vacation entitlement in accordance with 
the then cummt policy for City Department Heads. 
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SECTION 4. DISABILITY 
Unless otherwise required by law, if employee is permanently disabled or is 
otherwise unable to perform her duties because of sickness, accident, injwy, mental 
incapacity or health for a period of four (4) successive weeks beyond any accrued sick leave, 
Employer shall have the option to terminate this Agreement, subject to the severance pay 
requirements of Section 3, Subsection A However, Employee shall be compensated for any 
sick leave, vacation, holidays, compensatory time and other benefits accrued at the time 
Employee became disabled in accordance \vith Personnel Manual provisions which are 
applicable to management employees, AND reduced by the Disability payments received for 
the preceding twelve (12) months. If Employee suffers any permanent disability or is 
otherwise unable to perform her duties then sick leave, vacation, holidays, compensatory 
time, and other benefits shall cease to accrue at that time. 
SECTIONS. COMPENSATION 
A. Employer agrees to pay Employee for her services a salary (hereinafter 
"Base Salary") at the rate of One Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars ($110,000.00), per year, 
payable in equal installments at the same time as other employees of the Employer are paid. 
B. Employer shall match, not to exceed to five percent (5%) of 
Employee's base salary of Section A, contributions made by Employee to a 457 Plan. 
C. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, }::mployee 
shall receive the general employment benefits, including medical plan coverage, in the same 
amount and to the same extent as Employer grants to Department Heads. 
D. During the course of Employee's term of employment, Employer will 
pay into the Public Employees' Retirement System of Idaho ("PERSf'), for the account of 
Employee, in accordance with the policy established by Employer for an employees of 
Employer generally. 
E. Employer shall provide Employee a housing allowance of $1,000.00 
per month. 
SECTION 6. SICK LEA VE AND VACATION 
A. Upon commencement of employment, Employee shall have credited to 
her personal account forty ( 40) hours of sick leave and thereafter shall accrue sick leave at the 
same rate as City Department Heads employed by the City. 
B. The leave entitlement granted to Employee pursuant to Subsection A of 
this Section 6 shall be used by Employee for time attnbutable to recovery from an illness or 
injury only and not as additional vacation time. If such sick leave is not used, it shall continue 
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to accrue, except tbat such entitlement shall not accrue beyond the maximum accrual limits 
established for City Department Heads in respect to the same entitlement Upon termination 
of this Agreement Employee shall not be entitled to be paid for any accrued but unused leave 
time. 
C. Upon commencement of employment. Employee shall have credited to 
her personal account forty (40) hows paid vacation leave and thereafter shall accrue vacation 
leave at the rate of one hundred-sixty (160) hours per year. Vacation accrual and use shall 
follow the procedures set forth in the Personnel Manual. 
SECT10N7. PEBFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A The Mayor shall review and evaluate the performance of the Employee 
at least once ammally for consideration of a compensation increase. Further, the Mayor shall. 
provide the Employee with. a summary written statement of the evaluation. 
B. Annually, the Mayor and Employee shall define such goals and 
performance objectives which they determine necessary for the proper operation of the City 
and in the attainment of the Employer's policy objectives and shall further establish a :relative 
priority among those various goals and objectives. Said goals and objectives shall be in 
writing. and shall generally be attainable within the time limitations as specified and the 
annual operating and capital budgets. 
SECTIONS. GENERAL EXPENSES AND MEMBERSHIPS 
A Employer recognizes that certain expenses of a non-personal and 
generally job--affiliated nature may be incurred by Employee from time to time, and hereby 
agrees to reimburse or to pay actual expenses in accordance with. the travel and other policies 
of the Employer. 
. 
B. Employer shall pay the membership fees to the International City 
Management .Association on behalf of Employee. 
C. Employer shall reimbmse Employee's direct expenses for relocating to 
the Wood River Valley. as substantiated by receipts, up to $15,000.00. 
SECTION 9. INDEMNJFICATION 
Consistent with Idaho Code § 6-903, City agrees to indemnify and hold 
hmnless Employee from claims, liabilities, or causes of action brought against Employee 
which are related to the course and scope of Employee's employment or which arise out of 
any act or omission within the course Slid scope of Employee's employment; provided, the 
City may refuse a defense or disavow and refuse to pay any judgment for Employee if it is 





detennined that such act or omission of the Employee was not within the comse and scope of 
her employment or included malice or criminal intent 
SECTIONlO. OTHER TERMS AND CONDmONS OF EMPWYMENT 
A The Mayor, in consultation with the Employee, shall fix such other 
terms and conditions of employment. as he may determine from time to time to be 
appropriate. relating to the performance of Employee, provided such terms and conditions are 
not~ with or in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement 
B. Except as herein specifically provided, all provisions of the Personnel 
Manual and regulations and rules of the Employer relating to vacation and sick leave, 
retirement contnl>utions, holidays and other benefits which now exist or hereafter may be 
am~ also shall apply to Employee as they would to other employees of Employer. 
SECllON11. NOTICES 
Notices pursuant to this Agreement shall be given by deposit in the custody of 
the Uni1ed States Postal Service. postage prepaid, addressed as follows or to such other 





City of Sun Valley 
P.0.Box416 
Sun Valley, ID 83353 
360 W. Illinois St. 
#3F 
Chicago, IL 60610 
Alternatively. notices required pursuant to this Agreement may be personally 
served by band delivery. Notice shall be deemed given as of the date of personal servi~ or as 






The text herein shall constitute the entire agreement between the 
B. If any provision, or any portion thereof, in this Agreement is held 
unconstitutional, invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement, or portion 
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effect 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the City of Sun Valley has caused this Agreement 
to be signed and executed in its behalf by its Mayor. and duly attested by its City Clerk, and 
the Employee has signed and executed 1his Agreement, as of the date and year first above 
written. 
EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE 
CITY OF SUN V AILEY. a 
~corpomnon~~ 
Waym, illich, Mayor Sharon R Hammer 
ATTEST: 
City Clerk 
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SUPPLEMENTAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO OTY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to Section 3A of the Oty Administrator 
Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the City Of Sun Valley for any claims defined in 
Section 3.A. of the dministrator Employment Agreement as were intended when the City 
i~atq~ft;tb¥1j'1!nt Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008. 
#t 
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a) Amounts paid or payable to an individual for past services rendered by the individual 
to an employer or amounts paid or payable to an individual for pension or seniority 
rights lost upon separation or layoff shall be considered severance pay. Such pay 
shall not be considered wages payable or attributable with respect to the period 
subsequent to the individual's separation or layoff. Amounts paid or payable to the 
individual as severance pay shall not render the individual ineligible to receive 
benefits under Section 2920.5. The nature and purpose of such payments, rather 
than their characterization, shall determine whether or not such payments are 
considered severance pay under this Section. 
b) For the purpose of this Section, the status of payments as severance pay is not 
altered by the fact that: 
1) Such payments are voluntary; or that, 
2) Such payments are made periodically rather than in the form of a lump sum. 
A) Example 1: An employer's separation pay program provides for a 
lump sum payment based on the length of service. The purpose of 
the payment is to allow the individual to maintain his standard of living 
while he seeks other work. The individual performs no services after 
his date of separation. This lump sum payment constitutes 
severance pay under this Section and hence is not disqualifying. 
B) Example 2: The individual was notified that he was to be terminated 
from employment on April 17. The individual worked on the 
employer's premises until April 6 but performed incidental services "to 
the employer from April 6 through April 17 by telephone in training a 
replacement The wages received from April 6 through April 17 are 
not severance pay. Because the individual performed some services 
and received wages for the period April 6 through April 17, he was 
not unemployed under Section 239 of the Act. and hence not eligible 
for benefits under the Act.. 103 





E. x·H1e·1t· 2 
. . . :; . -· . .. · · .. . . . ,' . . . . · ... · .·. . I i. .. ,' .· . .. . . .. .. · . 
. . . . 
. ' 
"' . 
. ~. . . . ... . . 
. . . 
·, 
. . 
- ·. : · 104 · 
., . 
. . 




\ ... . 
January 20, 2012 
City Of Sun Valley 
c/o City Oerk Kelly Ek 
Sun Valley City Hall 
Sun Valley, ID 83353 
SHARON R. HAMMER 
4325 Fairway Nine Condos 
PO 8ox1499 
San Valley, ID 83353 
(312) 98S-0245 
ahanNl ............... .com 
Via Hand Delivery 
Sharon R. Hammer-48 Hour Severance Payment Demand Pursuant To Idaho Statute 45-606 
City Of Sun Valley: 
At approximately 5:30 p.m. on Thursday, January 19, 2012, the Sun Valley City Council, at the 
request of Mayor OeWayne Briscoe, terminated the existing City Adm~nl5ts:ator Employment Agreement 
(the 0 Agreement") between me and the City Of Sun Valley, pursuant~ ~on 3A of such Agreement. 
Therefore, I am requesting payment of all wages and compensation due within 48 hours, or by 10:00 
a.m. Tuesday, January 24, 2012, as Is required by Idaho Statutes 45-606. 
Wages and compensation are as follows: 
a) Pursuant to Section 3A of the Agreement, I am demanding payment for six months of 
compensation; 
b) I am demanding payment of four days of salary for the period of January 16, 2012 through 
January 19, 2012, the date of termination of the Agreement, or the equivalent of $1,858.88, at my 
current pay rate of $58.09 per hour; 
c} I am demanding payment of 188.88 hours of accrued vacation, as is detailed on my payroll 
records, equaling $10,9n.04, at my current pay rate of $58.09 per hour; 
d) I am demanding payment for 40 hours of vacation time I was mandated to request during the 
pay period ending December 18, 2011, because Mayor Willlch Instructed me to submit a request for 
vacation during the "administrative leave" period. The amount for this 40 hours equals $2,323.60 at my 
current pay rate of $58.o9 per hour; 
OrJIJ61/J 10s 
.. 
e) I am demanding payment for 120 hours of sabbatical vacation time I earned in June 2011. The 
sabbatical time was never reflected in my vacation accrual by Ms. Frostenson. On at least two separate 
occasions (to Patti Ball and to Mayor Wlllich and the Sun Valley City Council), I have provided notice that 
Ms. Frostenson shorted my vacation account by the 120 hours, and my vacation accrual account has not 
been corrected. I am demanding payment of $6.,907.80 for the UO hours of non-accrued sabbatical 
vacation time at my current pay rate of $58.09 per hour; 
f) I am demanding payment for $1,642 that "'1.s. Frostenson shorted my ICMA-RC retirement 
account in January 2010 when the Initial deposit was made. On at least two separate occasions (to Patti 
Ball and to Mayor Willich and the Sun Valley City Council), I have provided a detailed accounting of the 
amounts withheld from my pay and not deposited into my ICMA-RC retirement account totaling $1,642. 
I have not been paid this shortage or been provided an explanation as to why the shortage occurred. I 
am demanding payment of the $1,642 retirement fund shortage. 
I am demanding that all funds described herein be made by direct deposit in my Chase Bank 
Account No. (1110019465024) {see attached void check) as has been the practice of payment for wages, 
by 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, January 24, 2012. If such is not done, I consider the City Of Sun Valley to be in 
violation of the 48 hour payment requirement of Idaho Statutes 45-606. Should the City Of Sun Valley 
not make the payment demanded, or at least full payment of any non-disputed balances due pursuant 
to Idaho Statutes 45-611, then the City Of Sun Valley shall be subject to payment for treble damages, 
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Statutes 45-615. Should the City Of Sun Valley dispute the 
balances demanded, I demand a written explanation for each categorv q_f~compensation the Cty Of Sun 
Valley is disputing and a detail of the basis of the calculation of any undisputed balances actually paid. 
I am demanding that all payments be In •gross", without any withholding for taxes, or any other 
employee related withholdings, as the payments are a "lump sum" payment related to the termination 
of the Agreement. Should any withholdinss be made, they are specifically being done without my 
authority or approval, and I consider those to also be done in violation of Idaho Statute 45-606. The City 
Of Sun Valley will have then made a unilateral determination of withholdinss from my separation 
without my approval. I certify that I will take responsibility for any and all taxes or employment related 
obligations associated with the payments demanded. 
Finally, I have attached a Release Pursuant To City Administrator Employment Agreement 
which compiles with the specific language of the Agreement. Should the City Of Sun Valley fall to make 
payment of the balances demanded by 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, January 24, 2012 due to any matters related 
to signing a release, I will consider the Oty Of Sun Valley to be in violation of Idaho Statutes 45-606. 
• 
RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
The City Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008 between the City Of Sun Valley and 
Sharon R. Hammer, prepared by then Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles, states as follows:. 
"The severance payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exclusive remedy for any 
and all claims of damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause and such 
severance payment Is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by both parties to this 
Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waives her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages 
against Employer arising from a termination without cause.• 
Therefore, pursuant to the language of the City Administrator Employment Agreement, I state as 
follows: 
"I release all claims of damages of any kind arising from the termination of the City 
a.~1m,ent by the City Of Sun Valley on January 19, 2011 and for any 
V lley arising from a termination without cause". 
.. . 
EXHIBIT 3 ·. · 
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------ -------- -·····----·--------·-- ·---. 
hUp://mail.aol.conv'JS478-211/aol-6/en-us/mail/PrintMessage. 
-,{ . 
Fram: Klrtlan Naylor <kfr@naylol'hale.com> 
To: Kiltlan Naylor <klrt@naylorhalcorrP; jdonoval <jdonoval@aol.c.om> 
Subjact: RE: lun1) Swn payment 
Dal8: Sat, Jan 21, 2012 4:03 pm 
Attachments: Release.pdf (42K) 
Jim, 
Also, the limiting language is part of the agreement she signed. So, when it says, "receipt of the 
severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley," in 
essence, the lump sum isn't due until that condition has been met. 
You quoted the rest of the paragraph, it seems that to quote the rest is exactly what should be done. 
I have attached the acceptable release. If it Is not received by 1:()()pm Monday, payment will not be 
able to be made by direct deposit 





RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
The City Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008 between the City of Sun 
Valley and Sharon R. Hammer, and as extended by the Extension dated September 17, 2009, 
states as follows: 
The severance payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exclusive 
remedy for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination 
without cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair 
and equitable by both parties tot his Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waives 
her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages against Employer arising from a 
termination without cause. Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is 
subject to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley. 
Therefore, pursuant to the language of the City Administrator Employment Agreement, I state as 
follows: 
"I release all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause on January 
19, 2012, and all claims against the City of Sun Valley." 
Dated this __ of January, 2012. 
Sharon R. Hammer 
James Donoval, Witness 
.. , 
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b Employer identification number (EIN) 
82-0294056 
c Employer's name, address, and ZIP code 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY 
POBOX416 
SUN VALLEY ID 83353 
d Control number 
20011 
e Employee's name, address, and ZIP code 
SHARON R HAMMER 
PO BOX 1499 
SUN VALLEY ID 83353 
1 Wages, tips, other compensation 2 Federal income tax withheld 
94163.25 10352.02 
3 Social security wages 4 Social security tax withheld 
95447.39 4008.79 
5 Medicare wages and tips 6 Medicare tax wilhheld 
95447.39 1383.98 
7 Social sec-Jrit-7 tips e Allccated tips 
9 1 o Dependent care benefits 
11 Nonquallfied plans 




12a See instructions for box 12 









15 Slate Employer's slate ID number 16 Slate wages, lips, etc. 17 State income tax 18 Local wages, tips, etc. 19 Local income tax 20 Locality name 
__ ID _j000059844-W ............................ 94163.25_ .......... 3275.11 __ ···-··-················· ................................... . 
W 2 WageandTax Fonn - Statement 
Copy C-For EMPLOYEE'S RECORDS (See Notice to 
Employee on the back of Copy B.) 
2012 Depanment of the Treasury-lntemal Revenue Service Safe, accurate, 
FAST! Use 
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James R Donoval 
4110 Eaton Ave., Suite D 
Caldwell, ID 83607 
Ph: (312) 859-2029 
Fax: (208) 649-1603 
Idaho Atty No. 8142 
jdonoval@aoi.com 
JAN 3 0 2015 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk Distrlcl 
Court Blaine Coun Idaho 
Associated Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer 
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and De WAYNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County ofB1aine ) 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE WILLICH 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
I, Wayne Willich, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and if called upon to 
testify about the same, I could do so competently. 
2. From January of2008 until January 3, 2012, I was the duly elected Mayor of Sun 
Valley, Idaho. 
AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE WILLICH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - I 
3. I am submitting this Affidavit to correct the Court's misunderstanding of the 
facts, circumstances and my intent related to my entering into a contractual relationship with 
Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer") as the former Mayor Of Sun Valley by signing the City 
Administrator Employment Agreement (the "Employment Agreement") in June of 2008 
(attached as Ex. A herein). 
4. In May of 2008, Sun Valley forwarded to Ms. Hammer a draft Employment 
Agreement, which was drafted by former Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles, which I 
reviewed. 
5. In reviewing Section 3.A of the Employment Agreement, and in particular the 
phraseology of "severance" and "in regards to termination", I believed that such phraseology 
clearly meant that any payments Ms. Hammer would receive should she ever be terminated by 
Sun Valley ''without cause" pursuant to section 3.A of the Employment Agreement, was 
intended to compensate Ms. Hammer for past services rendered, and did not include that Ms. 
Hammer would be barred from thereafter bringing any non performance, service, wage or 
employee benefit related causes of action against Sun Valley or its officials, should they arise, 
including any claims against Sun Valley and its officials related to claims pursuant to the IPPEA. 
6. I believed that the phrase "severance" and "in regards to termination" in Section 
3.A of the Employment Agreement only included payment for past services Ms. Hammer 
rendered to Sun Valley as the Sun Valley City Administrator, or any employee benefits Ms. 
Hammer had accrued, and that such phraseology did not bar any claims unrelated to Ms. 
Hammer's performance, services, wages or employee benefits, including any potential future 
claims under the IPPEA, which was my clear intent in entering into the Employment Agreement 
with Ms. Hammer. Therefore, I did not request that the Employment Agreement be further 
AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE WILLICH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2 
CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT- 4 
5114/200&-4:01 PM 
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modified to defme what was meant by "severance" or "in regards to termination", when I 
formally signed the Employment Agreement and entered into a contractual relationship with Ms. 
Hammer on behalf of Sun Valley in June of 2008. 
7. Had there been any question at the time the Employment Agreement was entered 
into that Ms. Hammer would be barred from bringing any non service, performance, wage or 
employee benefit claims against Sun Valley and its officials, should she be terminated ''without 
cause", including in particular any claims pursuant to the IPPEA, I would have added such 
language to the Employment Agreement to ensure that Ms. Hammer would not be barred from 
bringing such non wage related claims should she ever be terminated and seek and obtain the 
"severance". 
8. The Court's finding in its recent ruling that because I stated in a prior Affidavit 
that Ms. Hammer and I did not specifically discuss the intent of what the phrase "severance" and 
"in regards to termination" in Section 3.A. of the Employment Agreement meant that Ms. 
Hammer was barred from making further non performance, service, wage or employee benefit 
claims against Sun Valley or Sun Valley officials should Ms. Hammer be terminated ''without 
cause", is a total misunderstanding of what I meant in the Affidavit, and is taken out of context, 
as the phrase "severance" so clearly only meant to me to define service or performance related 
compensation, that it need not be further defined by myself or Ms. Hammer, and therefore did 
not need to be discussed. 
9. There is no question in my mind that when I entered into the Employment 
Agreement with Ms. Hammer in June of 2008 on behalf of Sun Valley, that I and Ms. Hammer 
had a clear meeting of the minds that the phrases "severance" and "in regards to termination" 
only related to past services, performance, wages and employee benefits, and that such 
AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE WILLICH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3 
phraseology did not bar Ms. Hammer from bringing any non performance, service, wage or 
employee benefit claims against Sun Valley or its officials, including claims under the IPPEA, if 
she would ever be terminated by Sun Valley ''without cause". 
10. During my thirty (30) or so years as a fairly high level executive with the The 
Boeing Company, it was weli understood by myself and within The Boeing Company as a whole 
that any "severance" pay that was included in a separation agreement with an employee was 
limited to performance related compensation. In my experience, it was set up that way 
specifically to prevent a corporation with great resources from holding employees hostage in 
paying compensation owed to terminated employees by pressuring them into dropping serious 
charges against management. One particular instance which was on my mind, at the time I 
entered into the Employment Agreement with Ms. Hammer, and affected my perspective of the 
issue, involved a female Boeing Company employee who had alleged that she was sexually 
harassed by a Boeing Company manager. She was provided her "severance" by The Boeing 
Company when she left the company, and was still entitled to pursue civil charges against The 
Boeing Company manager. 
11. Any finding by the Court that I or Ms. Hammer believed that Ms. Hammer's 
"severance" described in Section 3.A. of the Employment Agreement was anything other than 
compensation described for her past performance should she ever be terminated by Sun Valley 
"without cause" is simply a replacement of the Court's intent for what mine and Ms. Hammer's 
intent was at the time the Employment Agreement was entered into. 
AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE WILLICH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4 
116 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
rEWILLICH 
,.-,R'( 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2.3 day of January, 2015. 
, 'd ,,_,,,,,, ,C't,: 
~ ;; r ~ 'tr ;.i,, ,I '.: ;,,. 
- . ......,- / i./, ! V . 
Noug,y Public for Idaho 
My'Commtssion expires Cc:! 21· '(01, X, 
- - ..... -
GARY W. BROWER 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF fDAHO 
AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE WILLICH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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CITY ADMINISTRATOR 
EMPWYMENT AGREEMENT 
11IlS CITY ADM1NIS1RATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT hereinafter 
"Agreement", effective the 1st day of June 2008, by and between the CITY OF SUN 
VALLEY. State of Idaho, a municipal corporation, hereinafter called "Employer". and 
SHARON R HAMMER hereinafter called "Employee" is made in contemplation of the 
following: 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Employer desires to employ the services of said Employee as 
City Administrator of the City of Sun Valley ("City"); and 
WHEREAS, Employee desires to accept employment as City Administrator of 
City pursuant to the terms and conditions hereof. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and promises 
herein contained, and the above Recitals which are incorporated herein, the parties agree as 
follows: 
SECTION 1. DUTIES 
Employer hereby agrees to employ Employee as City Administrator of the City 
of Sun Va11ey to perform the duties customarily performed by City Administrators and which 
Employer, through the Mayor, shall from time to time assign. Employee shall perform such 
duties thoroughly, competently and with. the highest level of professionalism as would be 
expected of a city administrator with Employee's background, qualifications and experience. 
SECf10N2. EMPWYMENT 
A. Employee's Employment shall commence June 1, 2008. Employee 
shall report to work no later than June 23, 2008. 
B. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent limit or otherwise interfere 
with the right of the Employer to terminate the services of Employee under the applicable 
provisions of Section 3 below. 
C. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent, limit or otherwise interfere 
with the right of the Employee to resign at any time from her position with Employer, subject 
only to the notice provision set forth. in Section 3. Subsection C, of this Agreement 
CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT- l 
5114/2008 4.-()1 PM 
32084.0101.1208900.8 
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SECTION 3. TERMINATION AND SEVERANCE PAY 
A Employer, acting through the Mayor, may terminate Employee's 
employment, without cause, for any reason or no reason. ·Any such decision to terminate 
shall OCCW' only after the Mayor consults with each member of the City Council. Upon such 
termination, Empioyer shall pay Employee, as severance pay, a lump sum cash payment equal 
to six (6) months. base salary descnoed in Section 5, Subsection A 
The severance payment herein is intended to be Employee's sole exclusive 
remedy for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination without 
cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by 
both parties to this Agreement Accordingly, Employee waives her right to bring a claim of 
any kind for damages against Employer arising from a termination without cause. 
Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all 
claims against the City of Sun Valley. A termination without cause shall not entitle 
Employee to an infonnal review under any section of the City of Sun Valley Personnel 
manual ("Personnel Manual"). 
B. In the event Employee is terminated for "cause", then Employer shall 
not be obligated to make any severance payment to Employee. "Cause" is defined as (i) a 
material breach of this Agreement; (ii) repeated neglect of Employee's duties as City 
Administrator; or (iii) misconduct such as theft, dishonesty, fraud. misrepresentation, 
embezzlement or other acts of willful misconduct, moral turpitude or criminal conduct 
C. Unless the parties otherwise agree, if Employee voluntarily resigns her 
position with Employer, 'then Employee shall give Employer three (3) months notice in 
advance; provided Employer may waive such three month advance notice in its discretion. In 
the event of a voluntary resignation, Employee shall not be entitled to any severance payment 
unless the Mayor shall decide otherwise in his sole discretion. 
If Employee applies for employment elsewhere, and during the term of her 
employment hereunder is included in a list of ten or fewer candidates still under consideration 
for such employment, then, upon lea.ming of her inclusion in such a lisi Employee shall 
promptly inform the Mayor and each member of the City Council, which shall be confidential 
insom as is permitted by applicable law. 
D. In the event Employee is terminated by Employer, acting through the 
Mayor, for any reason, then Employer shall pay Employee, at the rate of compensation then 
being earned by Employee, all accrued and unused vacation entitlement in accordance with 
the then cummt policy for City Department Heads. 
CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT· 2 
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SECTION 4. DISABILITY 
Unless otherwise required by law. if employee is permanently disabled or is 
otherwise unable to perform her duties because of sickness, accident. irtjwy, mental 
incapacity or health for a period of four (4) successive weeks beyond any accrued sick leave, 
Employer shall have the option to terminate this Agreement, subject to the severance pay 
requirements of Section 3, Subsection A However, Employee shall be compensated for any 
sick leave. vacation. holidays, compensatory time and other benefits accrued at the time 
Employee became disabled in accordance with Personnel Manual provisions which are 
applicable to management employees, AND reduced by the Disability payments received for 
the preceding twelve (12) months. If Employee suffers any permanent disability or is 
otherwise unable to perform her duties then sick leave, vacation, holidays, compensatory 
time, and other benefits shall cease to accrue at that time. 
SECTION 5. COMPENSATION 
A. Employer agrees to pay Employee for her services a salary (hereinafter 
"Base Salary") at the rate of One Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars ($110,000.00), per year, 
payable in equal installments at the same time as other employees of the Employer are paid. 
B. Employer shall match, not to exceed to five percent ( 5%) of 
Employee's base salary of Section A, contributions made by Employee to a 457 Plan. 
C. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, Employee 
shall receive the general employment benefits, including medical plan coverage, in the same 
amount and to the same extent as Employer grants to Department Heads. 
D. During the course of Employee's term of employment, Employer will 
pay into the Public Employees' Retirement System of Idaho ("PERSf'), for the account of 
Employee, in accordance with the policy established by Employer for all employees of 
Employer generally. 
E. Employer shall provide Employee a housing allowance of $1,000.00 
per month. 
SECTION 6. SICK LEAVE AND VACATION 
A Upon commencement of employment, Employee shall have credited to 
her personal account forty ( 40) hours of sick leave and thereafter shall accrue sick leave at the 
same rate as City Department Heads employed by the City. 
B. The leave entitlement granted to Employee pursuant to Subsection A of 
this Section 6 shall be used by Employee for time attributable to recovery from an illness or 
injury only and not as additional vacation time. If such sick leave is not used, it shall continue 
CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT - 3 
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to accrue. except that such entitlement shall not accrue beyond the maximum accmal limits 
established for City Department Heads in respect to the same entitlement Upon termination 
of 1his Agreement Employee shall not be entitled to be paid for any accrued but unused leave 
time. 
C. Upon commencement of employment, Employee shall have credited to 
her personal account forty ( 40) hours paid vacation leave and thereafter shall accrue vacation 
leave at the rate of one hundred-sixty (160) homs per year. Vacation accrual and use shall 
follow the procedures set forth in the Personnel Manual. 
SECTION 7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A The Mayor shall review and evaluate the performance of the Employee 
at least once ann1.181ly for consideration of a compensation increase. Further. the Mayor shalt· 
provide the Employee with a summary written statement of the evaluation. 
B. Annually, the Mayor and Employee shall define such goals and 
performance objectives which they determine necessary for the proper operation of the City 
and in the attainment of the Employer's policy objectives and shall further establish a relative 
priority among those various goals and objectives. Said goals and objectives shall be in 
writing. and shall generally be attainable within the time limitations as specified and the 
annual operating and capital budgets. 
SECTION 8. GENERAL EXPENSES AND MEMBERSHIPS 
A Employer recognizes that certain expenses of a non-personal and 
generally job-affiliated nature may be incurred by Employee from time to time, and hereby 
agrees to reimburse or to pay actual expenses in accordance with the travel and other policies 
of the Employer. 
B. Employer shall pay the membership fees to the International City 
Management Association on behalf of Employee. 
C. Employer shall reimburse Employee's direct expenses for relocating to 
the Wood River Valley, as substantiated by receipts, up to $15,000.00. 
SECTION 9. INDEMNIFICATION 
Consistent with Idaho Code § 6-903, City agrees to indemnify and hold 
hannless Employee from claims, liabilities, or causes of action brought against Employee 
which are related to the course and scope of Employee's employment or which arise out of 
any act or omission within the course and scope of Employee's employment~ provided, the 
City may refuse a defense or disavow and refuse to pay any judgment for Employee if it is 
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determined that such act or omission of the Employee was not within the course and scope of 
her employment or included malice or criminal intent 
SECTION 10. OTHER TERMS AND CONDIDONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
A. r-ne Mayor, in consultation with the Employee, shall fix such other 
tenns and conditions of employment. as he may determine from time to time to be 
appropriate, relating to the perfomiance of Employee, provided such terms and conditions are 
not inconsiste¢ with or in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement 
B. Except as herein specifically provided, all provisions of the Personnel 
Manual and regulations and rules of the Employer relating to vacation and sick leave, 
retirement contributions, holidays and other benefits which now exist or hereafter may be 
amendecls also shall apply to Employee as they would to other employees of Employer. 
SECTION 11. NOTICES 
Notices pursuant to this Agreement shall be given by deposit in the custody of 
the United States Postal Service, postage prepai~ addressed as follows or to such other 





City of Sun Valley 
P.O. Box416 
Sun Valley, ID 83353 
360 W. Illinois St. 
#3F 
Chicago, IL 60610 
Alternatively, notices required pursuant to this Agreement may be personally 
served by hand delivery. Notice shall be deemed given as of the date of personal service or as 






The text herein shall constitute the entire agreement between the 
B. If any provision, or any portion thereof, in this Agreement is held 
unconstitutional. invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement, or portion 
CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT- 5 
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thereof. shall be deemed severable, sball not be affected and shall remain in full force and 
effect 
1N WITNESS WHEREOF, the City of Sun Valley has caused this Agreement 
to be signed and executed in its behalf by its Mayor, and duly attested by its City Clerk, and 
the Employee has signed and executed this Agreement, as of the date and year first above 
written. 
EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY, a 
:um;;~~ 
Wa~yor Sharon R Hammer 
ATTEST: 
City Clerk 




James R. Donoval 
4110 Eaton Ave., Suite D 
Caldwell, ID 83607 
Ph: (312) 859-2029 
Fax: (208) 649-1603 




JAN 3 0 2015 
Associated Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R HAMMER, 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS R.IBI; 
and DeWA YNE BRISCOE, 
ASSOCIATED APPEARANCE OF 
ATIORNEY JAMES R. DONOV AL FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ENTRY OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURPOSES 
ONLY 
Defendants. 
NOW COMES James R. Donoval, and on behalf of the Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer, 
enters his Associated Appearance For Reconsideration Of Entry Of Summary Judgment 
Purposes Only. 
James . Donoval 
Asso ated Counsel For Ms. Hammer 
Sol y For Summary Ju ent Reconsideration Purposes 
1 
Associated Appearance Of James R. Donoval 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ENTRY OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and De WAYNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
A) THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT AND THE DEFINITION OF "SEVERANCE" 
The relevant section of the City Administrator Employment Agreement that Plaintiff 
Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer") and Defendant The City Of Sun Valley ("Sun Valley") 
entered into in June of2008 (the "Employment Agreement") (Hammer Rehearing Aff., Ex. A) 
related to the "severance" payments Ms. Hammer would be entitled to receive should she ever be 
terminated ''without cause" by Sun Valley (the "Severance Clause"), is as follows: 
SECTION 3. TERMINATION AND SEVERANCE PAY (emphasis added) 
A. Employer acting through the Mayor, may terminate Employee's employment, 
without cause, for any reason or no reason. Any such decision to terminate shall occur 
only after the Mayor consults with each member of the City Council. Upon such 
termination, Employer shall pay Employee, as severance pay (emphasis added), a lump 
sum cash payment equal to six (6) months, base salary described in Section 5, Subsection 
A. 
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The severance payment ( emphasis added) herein is intended to be the 
Employee's sole exclusive remedy for any and all claims and damages of any kind 
arising from a termination ( emphasis added) without cause and such severance 
payment ( emphasis added) is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by both 
parties to this Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waivers her right to bring a claim of 
any kind for damages against Employee arising from a termination without cause. 
Consequently, receipt of the severance payment (emphasis added) is subject to the 
execution of a release4 of all claims against the City of Sun Valley. A termination without 
cause shall not entitle Employee to an informal review under any section of the City of 
Sun Valley Personnel manual ("Personnel Manual"). (see Hammer Rehearing Aff., Ex. 
A) 
a) Ms. Hammer's Interpretation Of What The Severance Clause Meant 
In May of 2008, Ms. Hammer was provided the draft of the Employment Agreement that 
had been prepared by then Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles. (Hammer Rehearing Aff. 
Para. 7) 
During Ms. Hammer's tenure as a municipal attorney and as a local government manager 
in Illinois, which is where Ms. Hammer was still located when Ms. Hammer negotiated the 
Employment Agreement, Ms. Hammer was aware of various statutes and regulations, which 
define the common meaning of "severance" as being related to "wages" for "services rendered", 
one of which is Illinois Regulation Section 2950.45 related to whether an employee who receives 
"severance" benefits is entitled to collect unemployment benefits, and which defines "severance 
pay" as remuneration for past service rendered to an employer. (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 8) 
Mr. Donoval provided legal advice to Ms. Hammer related to the terms and conditions of 
the Employment Agreement. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 6) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 7) 
Besides being an attorney, Mr. Donoval is also a former Certified Public Accountant, having 
been licensed as a CPA in Illinois for several years during the 1990s. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. 
4 It is not inconsequential that there was no sample "release" attached to the Employment Agreement drafted by 
then Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles by which Ms. Hammer could have known exactly what it was that she 
was required to waive should she ever be terminated by Sun Valley "without cause» in order for Ms. Hammer to 
receive the "severance" described in the Severance Clause. 
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Para. 7) Based on his experience as a CPA, at the time the Employment Agreement was entered 
into, Mr. Donoval was well aware that "severance pay" is specifically defined by the Internal 
Revenue Service as "wages" for income and employment tax purposes6• (Donoval Rehearing 
Aff. Para 7) 
In reviewing the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement in May of 2008, and in 
particular the multiple use of the phraseology of "severance pay" or "severance payment" and 
"all claims and damages of any kind arising from a termination", both Ms. Hammer and Mr. 
Donoval agreed that such phraseology clearly meant that any payments Ms. Hammer would 
receive should she ever be terminated by Sun Valley "without cause" pursuant to the Severance 
Clause of the Employment Agreement, was intended to compensate Ms. Hammer for past 
services rendered, and did not include that Ms. Hammer would be barred from thereafter 
bringing any non performance, service, wage or employee benefit related causes of action 
against Sun Valley or its officials, should they arise, including any claims against Sun Valley and 
its officials which may have been related to the IPPEA. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 8) 
(Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 9) In particular, because of her prior experience as a municipal 
attorney and a local government administrator, and her understanding of the common definition 
of "severance" as referring to "wages" only, Ms. Hammer did not consider the phrase 
"severance" pay as described in the Severance Clause to be considered as anything other than as 
settlement for any past services rendered or wages or employee benefits that may be due. 
(Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 8) Ms. Hammer certainly did not consider "severance" to in any 
way be considered payment in resolution of any non wage or employee benefit claims, including 
6 In U.S. v. Quality Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1395 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2014), the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed what the IRS 
had been asserting for an extended period of time against tax payers, namely, that "severance" pay was defined as 
"wages" for past performance of services for both income and employment tax purposes. 
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claims Ms. Hammer may have ever had under the IPPEA, against Sun Valley, should Ms. 
Hammer ever be terminated "without cause". (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 8) 
In analyzing the Employment Agreement terms, both Ms. Hammer and Mr. Donoval 
agreed that the phrases "severance pay", "severance payments" and "all claims and damages of 
any kind arising from a termination" in the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement 
only included payment for past services rendered to Sun Valley by Ms. Hammer as the Sun 
Valley City Administrator, or any employee benefits accrued by Ms. Hammer through that date 
such as vacation pay, and that such phraseology did not bar any claims unrelated to Ms. 
Hammer's performance, services, wages or employee benefits, including any potential future 
claims under the IPPEA. Therefore, neither Ms. Hammer nor Mr. Donoval requested that Sun 
Valley further define what was meant by the phrases "severance pay", "severance payments", or 
"all claims and damages of any kind arising from a termination", when Ms. Hammer formally 
signed the Employment Agreement and entered into a contractual relationship with Sun Valley 
in June of 2008. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 9) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 10) Had there 
been any question at the time the Employment Agreement was entered into that Ms. Hammer 
would be barred from bringing any non service, performance, wage or employee benefit claims 
against Sun Valley and its officials, should Ms. Hammer be terminated "without cause" by Sun 
Valley, including in particular any claims pursuant to the IP PEA, Ms. Hammer certifies that she 
would have demanded such limiting language be added to the Employment Agreement before 
Ms. Hammer signed the Employment Agreement. (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 11) 
b) Former Mayor Willich's Interpretation Of What The Severance Clause Meant 
Former Mayor Willich has confirmed that in reviewing the Severance Clause of the 
Employment Agreement, and in particular the phraseology of "severance" and "in regards to 
4 
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termination", Former Mayor Willich also believed that such phraseology clearly meant that any 
payments Ms. Hammer would receive should she ever be terminated by Sun Valley "without 
cause" pursuant to the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement, was intended to 
compensate Ms. Hammer for past services rendered, and did not include that Ms. Hammer would 
be barred from thereafter bringing any non performance, service, wage or employee benefit 
related causes of action against Sun Valley or its officials, should they arise, including any 
claims against Sun Valley and its officials related to claims pursuant to the IPPEA. (Willich 
Rehearing Aft. Para. 5) 
Former Mayor Willich's perception of the definition of "severance" was shaped by his 
thirty (30) or so years of experience as a fairly high level executive with the Boeing Company 
where it was well understood by both himself and within the Boeing Company that any 
"severance" pay that was included in an employee's separation agreement was limited to 
performance related compensation. (Willich Rehearing Aft. Para. 10) 7 
In responding to the Court's questioning in the Summary Judgment Decision of Former 
Mayor Willich's admission in his prior Affidavit that he did not specifically discuss with Ms. 
Hammer the intent of what the phrase "severance" and "in regards to termination" in the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement meant, Former Mayor Willich responds that 
the Court's findings in the Summary Judgment Decision are a total misunderstanding of what 
Former Mayor Willich meant in the prior Affidavit, and is taken out of context, because to 
7 Former Mayor Willich goes on to state in his Affidavit in regards to his history as a Boeing Company executive 
that "In my experience, it was set up that way specifically to prevent a corporation with great resources from 
holding employees hostage in paying compensation owed to terminated employees by pressuring them into 
dropping serious charges against management. One particular instance which was on my mind, at the time I 
entered into the Employment Agreement with Ms. Hammer, and affected my perspective of the issue, involved a 
female Boeing Company employee who had alleged that she was sexually harassed by a Boeing Company 
manager. She was provided her "severance" by Boeing Company when she left the company, and was still entitled 
to pursue civil charges against the Boeing Company manager. (Willich Rehearing Aff. Para. 10) 
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Former Mayor Willich the phrase "severance" so clearly only meant to define service or 
performance related compensation, that it needed not to be further defined by Former Mayor 
Willich or Ms. Hammer, and therefore did not need to be discussed. (Willich Rehearing Aff. 
Para. 8) Ultimately, Former Mayor Willich states that because Former Mayor Willich agreed that 
the phrase "severance" and "in regards to termination" in the Severance Clause of the 
Employment Agreement only included payments for past services Ms. Hammer rendered to Sun 
Valley as the Sun Valley City Administrator, or any employee benefits Ms. Hammer had 
accrued, and that such phraseology did not bar any claims unrelated to Ms. Hammer's 
performance, services, wages or employee benefits, including any potential future claims.under 
the IPPEA, which was Former Mayor Willich's clear intent in entering into the Employment 
Agreement with Ms. Hammer on behalf of Sun Valley, Former Mayor Willich did not request 
that the Employment Agreement be further modified to define what was meant by "severance" or 
"in regards to termination", when Former Mayor Willich formally signed the Employment 
Agreement and entered into a contractual relationship on behalf of Sun Valley with Ms. Hammer 
in June of 2008. (Willich Rehearing Aff. Para. 6) 
As was the case with Ms. Hammer, Former Mayor Willich asserts that had there been any 
questions at the time the Employment Agreement was entered into that Ms. Hammer would be 
barred from bringing any non service, performance, wage or employee benefit claims against 
Sun Valley and its officials, should Ms. Hammer ever be terminated "without cause", including 
in particular any claims pursuant to the IPPEA, Former Mayor Willich would have added such 
language to the Employment Agreement to ensure that Ms. Hammer would not be barred from 
bringing IPPEA claims if she was ever terminated ''without cause" and accepted the "severance" 
pay. (Willich Rehearing Aff. Para. 7) 
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c) At The Time The Employment Agreement Was Entered Into. Ms. Hammer And Former 
Mayor Willich Had A Meeting Of The Minds As To What the Parameters Of The Severance 
Clause Were 
There is no question in either Ms. Hammer's or Former Mayor Willich's minds that when 
they jointly entered into the Employment Agreement in June of 2008, that both Ms. Hammer and 
Former Mayor Willich had a clear meeting of the minds that the phrases "severance pay", 
"severance payments" or "all claims and damages of any kind arising from a termination" in the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement only related to past services, performance, 
wages and employee benefits, and that such phraseology did not bar Ms. Hammer from bringing 
any non performance, service, wage or employee benefit claims against Sun Valley or its 
officials, including claims under the IPPEA, if Ms. Hammer was ever to be terminated by Sun 
Valley ''without cause". (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 12) (Willich Rehearing Aff. Para. 9) 
Both Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor Willich assert that any finding by the Court in its 
Summary Judgment Decision otherwise is simply a replacement of the Court's intent for what 
Ms. Hammer's and Former Mayor Willich's mutual intent was at the time the Employment 
Agreement was entered into. (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 12) (Willich Rehearing Aff. Para. 
11) 
7 
Facts In Support Of Motion For Reconsideration Of Entry Of Summary Judgment 
132 
B) THE SUPPLEMENT AL RELEASE 
On January 23, 2012, Ms. Hammer provided the Supplemental Hammer Release
11 
at 
issue to Sun Valley (Hammer Rehearing Aff., Ex. B). The Supplemental Hammer Release states 
as follows: 
SUPPLEMENT AL RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to section 3.A of the City 
Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the City Of Sun 
Valley for any claims defined in Section 3.A of the City Administrator Employment 
Agreement as were intended when the City Administrator Agreement was entered 
into on June 1, 2008 (emphasis added). (see Hammer Rehearing Aff., Ex. B) 
a) The Pre-Termination Communications 
Ms. Hammer and Mr. Donoval are married. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 3) (Hammer 
Rehearing Aff. Para. 4) Mr. Donoval is a licensed attorney in Idaho. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. 
Para. 4) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para 5). 
Beginning in November 2011, Mr. Donoval began representing Ms. Hammer in various 
matters associated with legal disputes between Ms. Hammer, Sun Valley, and various Sun Valley 
officials and employees, and in particular in regards to Ms. Hammer's termination as the Sun 
Valley City Administrator "without cause" pursuant to the Severance Clause of the Employment 
Agreement on January 19, 2012, and in regards to the negotiations of payment of the 
"severance" Ms. Hammer was entitled to pursuant to the Severance Clause. (Donoval Rehearing 
Aff. Para. 10) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 13) 
11 The Supplemental Release is described herein as the "Supplemental Hammer Release", as it is actually the final 
of three drafted written releases that were passed back and forth between Ms. Hammer and Sun Valley, and is the 
conditional release eventually accepted by Sun Valley after extensive negotiations. 
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On January 13, 2012, less than a week before Ms. Hammer was actually terminated, as 
had been made clear Sun Valley was about to do, Mr. Donoval sent Mr. Naylor an email, 
specifically clarifying that, if Sun Valley terminated Ms. Hammer pursuant to the "without 
cause" provisions of the Severance Clause that, ·'her contract does not require her to waive any 
tort or any other non contract claims she may have with the City", and informing Mr. Naylor that 
if Sun Valley was going to terminate Ms. Hammer "without cause" that Mr. Naylor and Mr. 
Donoval should be '-Working on a separation agreement that has the correct waiver language in 
it." (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 11) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 14) 
The next day, on January 14, 2012, Mr. Donoval sent Mr. Naylor another email which 
specifically stated that "regardless of whether you terminate her '"without cause" - she has a 
property interest in her employment which we will immediately seek to enforce. And of course I 
will immediately re-file the IPPEA claims." (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 12) (Hammer 
Rehearing Aff. Para. 14) 
On January 18, 2012, the day before Ms. Hammer was terminated, Mr. Donoval and Mr. 
Naylor held a telephone conversation in which Mr. Naylor told Mr. Donoval that Sun Valley 
would never let Ms. Hammer return as the Sun Valley City Administrator because she had sued 
Sun Valley City Council Member Nils Ribi and Sun Valley. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 14) 
In that conversation, Mr. Donoval remembers telling Mr. Naylor that even if Sun Valley 
terminates Ms. Hammer '"without cause" that she was not required to waive any of her non 
service or wage types of claims against Sun Valley, including the IPPEA claims, even if she was 
paid her severance pay under the Severance Clause. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 14) 
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Immediately after the telephone call on January 18, 2012, Mr. Donoval also sent a letter 
to Mr. Naylor (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 15) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 14) which 
repeated what Mr. Donoval had told Mr. Naylor on the telephone, and again, specifically stated: 
"the causes of action Ms. Hammer possesses for tort, including the underlying 
harassment allegations against Council Member Ribi and several other claims, do not 
arise "from a termination", they arise out of separate incidents. Nor is it rational to assert 
that Ms. Hammer would have waived any non-contract damage claims she would have 
prospectively been entitled to (i.e. personal injury claims) when she signed the 
agreement. So as I have stated, if the City Of Sun Valley proposes to terminate Ms. 
Hammer without cause and pay her the severance payment in the contract, she will only 
sign a waiver that states the exact language in the contract cited above and nothing 
more." 
b) The Post Termination Communications 
On January 20, 2012, the day after Ms. Hammer was terminated, Ms. Hammer signed a 
"Release Pursuant To City Administrator Employment Agreement" (the "Original Hammer 
Release") which Mr. Donoval drafted and witnessed, and which Mr. Donoval personally served 
on Sun Valley the same day (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 17) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 
16). The Original Hammer Release merely repeated the language that was in the Severance 
Clause regarding Ms. Hammer's termination "without cause", which Mr. Donoval had explicitly 
told Mr. Naylor it would in the January 18, 2012 letter to Mr. Naylor. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. 
Para. 17) In addition, on the same day, Mr. Donoval served a letter Mr. Donoval assisted Ms. 
Hammer draft of the same date, (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 17) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. 
Para. 16), which demanded that Ms. Hammer be paid the full amount of "severance" and other 
employee benefits she was due within forty eight (48) hours of receipt of Sun Valley's receipt of 
the letter, as is required by Idaho Statute 45-606. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 17) (Hammer 
Rehearing Aff. Para. 16) 
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Later the same day, Mr. Donoval received an email from Mr. Naylor, rejecting the 
Original Hammer Release, and demanding that Ms. Hammer sign a release which specifically 
included the phrase "I release all claims against the City of Sun Valley" before Sun Valley would 
pay Ms. Hammer the "severance pay" provided for in the Severance Clause of the Employment 
Agreement. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 18) The next day, on January 21, 2012, Mr. Naylor 
sent another email to Mr. Donoval, which again mandated that Ms. Hammer provide Sun Valley 
a release that stated specifically stated "I release all claims against the City Of Sun Valley" or 
"we will not consider that she has complied with the agreement." (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para 
19) Finally, later in the day on January 21, 2012, Mr. Naylor sent Mr. Donoval another email, 
which demanded that Ms. Hammer sign a "Release Pursuant To City Administrator Employment 
Agreement" that Mr. Naylor had drafted (the "Proposed Sun Valley Release"), which was 
attached to the email. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 20) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para 17) The 
Proposed Sun Valley Release included the unconditional language that Mr. Naylor had been 
demanding that Ms. Hammer include in any release she needed to sign in order to receive her 
"severance pay" under the Severance Clause, namely, "I release all claims for damages of any 
kind arising from a termination without cause on January 19, 2012, and all claims against the 
City of Sun Valley." (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 20) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 17) 
That same afternoon, Mr. Donoval confirmed to Mr. Naylor that if Ms. Hammer did sign 
a release with any releasing language, she would only be doing so "under duress", because Sun 
Valley was improperly withholding her rightful "severance" pay. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 
21) 
Upon receipt of the January 21, 2012 email from Mr. Naylor and the Proposed Sun 
Valley Release from Mr. Naylor, Mr. Donoval and Ms. Hammer discussed the demands being 
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made by Mr. Naylor. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 22) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 18) Mr. 
Donoval and Ms. Hammer both agreed that because the Severance Clause referred to 
"severance" payments, and that "severance" payments were ''wages" which applied to past 
services that Ms. Hammer had rendered to Sun Valley as the Sun Valley City Administrator, that 
Ms. Hammer was entitled to receive the full amount of "severance" payments described in 
Severance Clause, without being required to waive any other claims that Ms. Hammer possessed 
against Sun Valley and its officials, including in regards to the IPPEA, as had been demanded by 
Mr. Naylor in his emails of January 20, 2012 and January 21, 2012 and as was described in the 
Proposed Sun Valley Release. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 22) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 
18) 
Ms. Hammer and Mr. Donoval agreed that Ms. Hammer was legally entitled to submit a 
release to Sun Valley which did not waive "all" claims, but only the wage and employee benefit 
related claims that Ms. Hammer had foreseen being waived should Ms. Hammer ever be 
terminated by Sun Valley when she entered into the Employment Agreement in June of 2008, 
which did not include the IPPEA claim, and still be entitled to receive her "severance" pay. 
(Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 23) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 19) 
On January 22, 2012, Ms. Hammer directed that Mr. Donoval reject Mr. Naylor's 
demands (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 21) for an unconditional waiver of all claims in order to 
receive her "severance" under the Severance Clause. On January 23, 2012, Mr. Donoval sent Mr. 
Naylor an email, indicating that Ms. Hammer was refusing to sign the unconditional Proposed 
Sun Valley Release, and that Ms. Hammer would instead be submitting a release of her own 
drafting. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 24) 
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During January 22, 2012 and January 23, 2012, Mr. Donoval drafted the Supplemental 
Hammer Release and discussed the matter with Ms. Hammer. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 25) 
(Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 22) The Conditional Clause stating that Ms. Hammer was only 
releasing claims that were "intended when the City Administrator Agreement was entered into 
on June 1, 2008", was specifically placed in the Supplemental Hammer Release to provide notice 
to Sun Valley that Ms. Hammer was refusing to enter the unconditional language of "I release all 
claims against the City Of Sun Valley" that had been demanded by Mr. Naylor, and to indicate to 
Sun Valley that Ms. Hammer was not agreeing to releasing any non performance, service, wage 
or employee benefit related claims in return for receiving the "severance" under the Severance 
Clause, including any claims under the IPPEA, as Mr. Naylor had already been adequately 
informed of on several occasions. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para 26) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. 
Para. 23) On January 23, 2012, Ms. Hammer signed the Supplemental Hammer Release in Mr. 
Donoval's presence. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para 27) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para. 24) On 
January 23, 2012, Mr. Donoval submitted an email to Mr. Naylor and former Sun Valley 
Treasurer Michelle Frostenson ("Former Treasurer Frostenson") which included the 
Supplemental Hammer Release. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 28) 
On January 23, 2012, Mr. Donoval also personally appeared at Sun Valley City Hall 
intending to serve the Supplemental Hammer Release upon Sun Valley Mayor DeWayne 
Briscoe, who was not present in Sun Valley City Hall when Mr. Donoval appeared. (Donoval 
Rehearing Aff. Para 29) The only person who was present at Sun Valley City Hall at the time 
was Former Treasurer Frostenson, who Mr. Donoval personally served the original Supplemental 
Hammer Release upon, at which time Mr. Donoval also explained to Former Treasurer 
Frostenson what the document was. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 29) 
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When Mr. Donoval met with Former Treasurer Frostenson at Sun Valley City Hall on 
January 23, 2012, Former Treasurer Frostenson presented Mr. Donoval with a proposed final 
Payroll Direct Deposit Voucher (the "Severance Pay Voucher") for Ms. Hammer, which Mr. 
Donoval reviewed and approved as to the withholdings. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 30) The 
Payroll Direct Deposit Voucher indicated that Sun Valley would be withholding income and 
employment taxes on the entire "severance" payment (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 30), which 
Former Treasurer Frostenson indicated at the time was because the entire "severance" payment 
was "wages" and not settlement of other non wage related claims (Donoval Rehearing Mf. Para. 
32) 
On January 24, 2012, Ms. Hammer's checking account at Chase Bank received a direct 
deposit from Sun Valley for the "severance" balance due to Ms. Hammer pursuant to the 
Severance Clause in the sum of $66,935.53, which is the amount that had been agreed to and 
indicated on the Severance Pay Voucher. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 33) (Hammer 
Rehearing Aff. Para. 25) Eventually, after the end of 2012, Ms. Hammer received a Form W-2 
confirming that Sun Valley had withheld income and employment taxes on the entire 
"severance" balance that had been paid to Ms. Hammer by Sun Valley (Hammer Rehearing Aff. 
Para. 28). 
Between the submission of the Supplemental Release to Former Treasurer Frostenson 
and Mr. Naylor on January 23, 2012 and the deposit of the "severance pay" balance paid to Ms. 
Hammer on January 24, 2012 by direct deposit into her bank account, neither Mr. Donoval or 
Ms. Hammer received any communications from Mr. Naylor or any other Sun Valley employee 
or official, seeking to clarify or amend the language in the Supplemental Hammer Release, or 
placing any other further conditions upon Ms. Hammer receiving the "severance" pay provided 
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for in the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement, before Ms. Hammer was paid the 
"severance" pay due to Ms. Hammer pursuant to the Severance Clause of the Employment 
Agreement on January 24, 2012. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para 32) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. 
Para. 26) 
c) The Wage Claim Issues 
On January 16, 2012, even before Ms. Hammer was terminated, Mr. Donoval sent Mr. 
Naylor an email, which described that if Sun Valley terminates Ms. Hammer and did not pay the 
"severance" payment Ms. Hammer was entitled to under the Severance Clause, as Mr. Naylor 
and Sun Valley had threatened, that pursuant to Idaho Statute 45-615 Sun Valley would be liable 
to Ms. Hammer for treble damages, which considering how much Ms. Hammer was entitled to, 
could have resulted in payment to Ms. Hammer of $200,000, rather than the $65,000 or so in 
"severance" Ms. Hammer was otherwise entitled to. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 13) 
On the day after Ms. Hammer was terminated, Mr. Donoval served a letter Mr. Donoval 
assisted Ms. Hammer draft of the same date, which demanded that Ms. Hammer be paid the full 
amount of "severance" and other wages she was due within forty eight ( 48) hours of receipt of 
Sun Valley's receipt of the letter, as is required by Idaho Statute 45-606. (Donoval Rehearing 
Aff. Para. 17) (Hammer Rehearing Aff. Para 16) 
On January 21, 2012, Mr. Donoval and Mr. Naylor entered into a string of emails in 
which Mr. Donoval reminded Mr. Naylor that if Sun Valley did not pay Ms. Hammer the 
"severance" she was entitled to pursuant to the Severance Clause within forty eight ( 48) hours, as 
was required by Idaho Statute 45-606, Sun Valley would be subject to treble damages and 
attorneys' fees for not doing so. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para 21) 
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d) The Withholding Issues 
Because Mr. Donoval is a former Certified Public Accountant, he has a heightened 
understanding that "severance pay" is defined as "wages" for income and employment tax 
purposes, and is also subject to withholding for income and employment taxes when paid. 
(Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 7 and 31) 12 Based on his experience as a former Certified Public 
Accountant, Mr. Donoval was also well aware that "liquidated damages" or other civil damages 
are not "wages" subject to income and employment tax withholdings. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. 
Para. 31 and 32)13 
At the time Mr. Donoval approved the withholdings described in the Severance Pay 
Voucher and signed the Severance Pay Voucher, Mr. Donoval considered all of the "severance" 
pay that Ms. Hammer was to receive as taxable ''wages" pursuant to the Severance Clause for 
past services to Sun Valley, and not payment as settlement for any non wage related claims that 
Ms. Hammer still possessed against Sun Valley, including any claims pursuant to the IPPEA, 
and certainly was not liquidated damages of any sort. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 32) At the 
time, Former Treasurer Frostenson agreed with Mr. Donoval that all of the "severance" 
payments that Ms. Hammer was to receive pursuant to the Severance Clause and described in the 
Severance Pay Voucher were ''wages" subject to employment and income tax withholdings, and 
that none of the "severance" was exempt from income tax or employment tax withholding as 
"liquidated" or other non wage related damages. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 32) Had Mr. 
Donoval believed that any of the "severance" payments were not being considered "wages" for 
past services rendered by Ms. Hammer, but instead "liquidated damages" or other non wage 
u As has been previously described, in U.S. v. Quality Stores, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that 
"severance" pay was defined as uwages" for past performance of services for both income and employment tax 
purposes. 
13 In Rev. Rule 72-268 regarding liquidated damages, the IRS confirmed that 0 1iquidated damages" are not uwages" 
subject to withholding for either income or employment tax purposes. 
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related damages (as the Court has now asserted in the Summary Judgment Decision), Mr. 
Donoval would have required that Sun Valley not withhold any income or employment taxes 
from that portion of the "severance" that was considered "liquidated damages" or other non wage 
damages as part of the Severance Pay Voucher, as Ms. Hammer was entitled to demand pursuant 
to the IRS guidelines. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 32) 
e) Ms. Hammer And Mr. Donoval Relied On Sun Valley's And Mr. Naylor's Actions And 
Inactions In Acce,pting The Conditional Nature Of The Supplemental Hammer Release And 
Classifying The Entire "Severance" Payments As "Wages" As Having Accepted That Ms. 
Hammer Had Not Waived Her IPPEA Claims 
As all of the "severance" Ms. Hammer received had been fully withheld for both ip.come 
and employment tax purposes, Mr. Donoval took that to be conclusive evidence that Sun Valley 
had agreed with Ms. Hammer and Mr. Donoval that all of the "severance" was defined as 
"wages" for past services Ms. Hammer had performed for Sun Valley, and not "liquidated 
damages" or other non wage related damages for any of the other claims that Ms. Hammer 
asserted that she was entitled to proceed with, including the IPPEA claims, which would have 
then been exempt from any income or employment tax withholdings. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. 
34) 
Based on the extensive communications between Mr. Donoval, Ms. Hammer, Mr. Naylor 
and Sun Valley, during the week before and after Ms. Hammer's termination, and the explicit 
notifications to Mr. Naylor and Sun Valley of the rejection that Ms. Hammer would ever agree 
that the unconditional language of"I release all claims against the City of Sun Valley" be placed 
in a written release she would be giving Sun Valley in return for receiving the "severance" pay 
she was entitled to pursuant to the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement, Ms. 
Hammer and Mr. Donoval had the right to, and did, believe that Mr. Naylor and Sun Valley had 
accepted Ms. Hammer's conditions that she was entitled to the "severance" pay pursuant to the 
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Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement without having to release any claims associated 
with the IP PEA, when Sun Valley accepted the "conditional" terms in the Conditional Clause of 
the Supplemental Hammer Release and thereafter paid Ms. Hammer the "severance" by direct 
deposit pursuant to such condition. (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para. 36) 
Jame . . Donoval 
Assopiated Counsel For Ms. Hammer 
So14y For Summary Judgment Reconsideration Purposes 
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Associated Attorney for Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and DeWA YNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ENTRY OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I) INTRODUCTION 
The relevant section of the City Administrator Employment Agreement that Plaintiff 
Sharon R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer") and Defendant The City Of Sun Valley ("Sun Valley") 
entered into in June of 2008 (the "Employment Agreement") (Hammer Rehearing Aff., Ex. A) 
related to the "severance" payments Ms. Hammer would be entitled to receive should she ever be 
terminated ''without cause" by Sun Valley (the "Severance Clause"), is as follows: 
SECTION 3. TERMINATION AND SEVERANCE PAY (emphasis added) 
A. Employer acting through the Mayor, may terminate Employee's employment, 
without cause, for any reason or no reason. Any such decision to terminate shall occur 
only after the Mayor consults with each member of the City Council. Upon such 
termination, Employer shall pay Employee, as severance pay ( emphasis added), a lump 
sum cash payment equal to six (6) months, base salary described in Section 5, Subsection 
A. 
The severance payment ( emphasis added) herein is intended to be the 
Employee's sole exclusive remedy for any and all claims and damages of any kind 
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arising from a termination ( emphasis added) without cause and such severance 
payment ( emphasis added) is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by both 
parties to this Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waivers her right to bring a claim of 
any kind for damages against Employee arising from a termination without cause. 
Consequently, receipt of the severance payment ( emphasis added) is subject to the 
execution of a release1 of all claims against the City of Sun Valley. A termination without 
cause shall not entitle Employee to an informal review under any section of the City of 
Sun Valley Personnel manual ("Personnel Manual"). (see Hammer Rehearing Aff., Ex. 
A) 
Ms. Hammer has emphasized the phrase "severance pay" and "severance payments" in 
the Severance Clause above, because such phrase is specifically defined in multiple cases, 
statutes and regulations, including by the U.S. Supreme Court, as being "wages" in remuneration 
for past services, and not related to the settlement of other non wage related claims or as 
liquidated damages, as the Court found in the Memorandum Decision On Motions For Summary 
Judgment entered by the Court on January 12, 2015 (the "Summary Judgment Decision"). Both 
Ms. Hammer and former Sun Valley Mayor Wayne Willich ("Former Mayor Willich") have 
confirmed that when the Employment Agreement was entered into in June of 2008, they both 
considered that the phrase "severance" in the Severance Clause was defined by its common 
definition as ''wages" for services Ms. Hammer rendered to Sun Valley should Sun Valley ever 
terminate Ms. Hammer at some time in the future, and not for anything else, including for the 
release of any non wage and benefit related claims, such as Ms. Hammer's IP PEA claims. As is 
further described herein, Ms. Hammer asserts that the Court erred by not following federal and 
Idaho legal precedent that defines "severance" as being for wages for services rendered and not 
for non-wage related claims, and by failing to accept the intent of what the "severance" related to 
1 It is not inconsequential that there was no sample "release" attached to the Employment Agreement drafted by 
then Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles by which Ms. Hammer could have known exactly what it was that she 
was required to waive should she ever be terminated by Sun Valley "without cause" in order for Ms. Hammer to 
receive the "severance" described in the Severance Clause. 
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when Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor Willich ( on behalf of Sun Valley) entered into the 
Employment Agreement in June of 2008. 
As to the circumstance related to the Supplemental Release2, eventually, after multiple 
communications between Ms. Hammer and Sun Valley officials, and several drafts, Ms. Hammer 
provided the Supplemental Hammer Release at issue (Hammer Rehearing Aff., Ex. B), which 
states as follows: 
SUPPLEMENTAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to section 3.A of the City 
Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the City Of Sun 
Valley for any claims defined in Section 3.A of the City Administrator Employment 
Agreement as were intended when the City Administrator Agreement was entered 
into on June 1, 2008 (emphasis added). (see Hammer Rehearing AfI., Ex. B) 
In entering its Summary Judgment Decision, the Court only looked at the language in the 
Supplemental Hammer Release that Ms. Hammer would "release the City Of Sun Valley for any 
claims defined in Section 3.A of the City Administrator Employment Agreement", and then 
failed to recognize that the remaining portion of the same sentence added the conditional 
language that such release only applied to claims "as were intended when the City 
Administrator Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008" (the "Conditional Clause")3. 
Instead, the Court found that, notwithstanding the language of the Conditional Clause, that Ms. 
Hammer had knowingly waived "all" claims anyway. 
2 The Supplemental Release is described herein as the "Supplemental Hammer Release", as it is actually the final of 
three drafted written releases that were passed back and forth between Ms. Hammer and Sun Valley, and is the 
conditional release eventually accepted by Sun Valley after extensive negotiations. 
3 See Pg. 5 of the Summary Judgment Decision in which the Court only quotes the first half of the sentence to 
assert that Ms. Hammer "clearly absolves defendant of any liability for claims the plaintiff had at the time of her 
termination" and ignores the entire second half of the sentence (i.e. the Conditional Clause) which directly 
contradicts this finding. 
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In finding that Ms. Hammer waived "all claims", Ms. Hammer asserts that the Court 
failed to recognize that the Conditional Clause was inserted into the Supplemental Hammer 
Release by Ms. Hammer for a purpose, namely, that Ms. Hammer was indicating to Sun Valley 
that she was reserving her right to proceed on claims that she had not intended to waive back in 
2008 when the Employment Agreement was entered into, which included the IPPEA claims. If 
Ms. Hammer did not intend to reserve some claims, including the IPPEA claim, when she 
prepared and submitted the Supplemental Hammer Release, but instead understood that "all" 
claims were being waived under the Supplemental Hammer Release, then there was no need for 
her to even include the Conditional Clause in the Supplemental Hammer Release. As the Court 
found that the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement waived "all" claims, then there 
was no need for Ms. Hammer to include the Conditional Clause in the Supplemental Hammer 
Release, if it was not somehow meant to clarify what was meant by the language of the 
Severance Clause. As the Court is required to presume that all language in a document is there 
for a reason, the Court erred by ignoring that Ms. Hammer intended that the Conditional Clause 
was included in the Supplemental Hammer Release to ensure that some claims, including Ms. 
Hammer's IPPEA claims, were excluded from being waived in return for payment of the 
"severance". 
This is especially important because Ms. Hammer had rejected Sun Valley's demands 
that Ms. Hammer instead sign a separate, unconditional release drafted by Sun Valley Attorney 
Kirtlan Naylor ("Mr. Naylor"), releasing any and all claims, immediately before Ms. Hammer 
submitted the conditional Supplement Hammer Release to Sun Valley. Ms. Hammer's refusal to 
release any non-wage related claims had been extensively explained to both Mr. Naylor and Sun 
Valley officials in multiple correspondences both before, and after, Ms. Hammer's termination 
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from Sun Valley on January 19, 2012. The Court decision effectively turned what was intended 
by Ms. Hammer to be a "conditional" release, which was communicated to Sun Valley as being a 
"conditional" release, into the "unconditional" release that Ms. Hammer had explicitly refused to 
sign. If Ms. Hammer knew she was waiving "all" claims, as the Court determined, then she 
would have merely signed the unconditional release that Sun Valley had provided her, rather 
than submitting a new, conditional release. 
In the Summary Judgment Decision, in discussing estoppel, the Court inferred that Ms. 
Hammer had somehow lead Sun Valley into believing that Ms. Hammer was unconditionally 
releasing all claims she may have had against Sun Valley, not just wage and benefit related 
claims, when she submitted the Supplemental Hammer Release to Sun Valley on January 23, 
2012. Apparently the Court believed that Sun Valley simply submitted a release to Ms. Hammer, 
which she then signed without any further discussions. That assertion is far from what actually 
happened. There were multiple correspondences and at least three versions of a release bantered 
back and forth between Ms. Hammer, her counsel James Donoval ("Mr. Donoval") and Mr. 
Naylor, before Sun Valley eventually accepted the Supplemental Hammer Release with the 
explicit "conditional" language included and direct deposited into Ms. Hammer's bank account 
the wage related "severance" she was entitled to pursuant to the Severance Clause. The 
correspondences, as are described herein, made clear to Mr. Naylor and Sun Valley officials that 
under no circumstances, whether Sun Valley paid Ms. Hammer the "severance" benefits 
described in the Severance Clause or not, was Ms. Hammer going to waive any non wage and 
benefit claims, including claims under the IPPEA. 
The additional facts provided herein by Ms. Hammer, Mr. Donoval and Former Mayor 
Willich, and in particular facts related to the estoppel findings of the Court that were not 
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previously brought before the Court, negate any assertion that Ms. Hammer was somehow 
waiving any non-wage related claims in submitting the Supplemental Hammer Release, or that 
Ms. Hammer had somehow otherwise lead Sun Valley on in any way. 
For convenience of the Court, Ms. Hammer has provided new Affidavits of herself, Mr. 
Donoval and Fonner Mayor Willich, and has attached to those Affidavits the relevant documents 
at issue, and the communications between Mr. Donoval, Ms. Hammer, Mr. Naylor and Sun 
Valley, related to the negotiations of the "severance" payments in the Employment Agreement 
and the submission of the Supplemental Hammer Release by Ms. Hammer to Sun Valley. In 
addition, Ms. Hammer has supplied the Court with a Facts In Support Of Motion For 
Reconsideration (the "Facts"), which provides the Court with a chronological description of the 
facts associated with the Employment Agreement, and the submission of the Supplemental 
Release to Sun Valley. Ms. Hammer incorporates the Facts into this Memorandum. The 
Memorandum is intended to focus solely on the legal arguments. The Facts and the chronology 
of events related to the Employment Agreement and the Supplemental Hammer Release, are a 
significant part of the Memorandum, and should be read prior to the Memorandum, as there are 
minimum references to the Affidavits and documents in the Memorandum itself. 
II) RECONSIDERATION STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I.R.C.P. Rule 11 ( a)(2)(B) provides that a motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory 
order of the Court, may be filed up until fourteen (14) days after entry of a final judgment. Other 
than that description, there is little in the way of a description of what basis is required for a 
litigant to seek reconsideration of the findings of the Court. As the Idaho Supreme Court has just 
recently stated in December of 2014 in International Real Estate Solutions v. Arave, 2014 WL 
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7384199, 3 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2014), when considering a motion for reconsideration, ''the trial court 
should take into account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the 
correctness of the interlocutory order." Certainly, when the litigant believes that there are new 
facts that were not presented to the Court, the litigant has a basis for submitting those facts in 
support of reconsideration, which is clearly the case here, based on the Affidavits of Ms. 
Hammer, Mr. Donoval and Fonner Mayor Willich in support of reconsideration. 
As is further described, the Court raised the estoppel issues sua sponte at the hearings in 
the matter, and made estoppel a significant basis for its findings in the Summary Judgment 
Decision. As is further described, the Idaho Supreme Court has described that reconsideration is 
appropriate where the court raises sua sponte matters in entering a summary judgment finding 
(see Sales v. Peabody, 157 Idaho 195,335 P.3d 40, 46 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2014)) or where the litigant 
has not had the opportunity to adequately respond to issues which have been made part of a 
ruling by the court (see Massey v. Conagra Foods, 156 Idaho 476,328 P.3d 456 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 
2014). Ms. Hammer did not have an opportunity to respond to the Court's sua sponte estoppel 
concerns and findings regarding Ms. Hammer's purportedly leading Sun Valley into believing 
that Ms. Hammer had waived "all" claims when she submitted the Supplemental Hammer 
Release, or as to whether Ms. Hammer was duplicative in asserting that she was both terminated 
''without cause" or "with cause". Therefore, the findings of the Court are ripe for 
reconsideration. 
Finally, in regards to reconsideration of the entry of summary judgment, in 2014, in Shea 
v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540,545,328 P.3d 520,525 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2014), the Idaho Supreme 
Court has recently described that on reconsideration of a summary judgment finding, the 
standard is still simply whether there remains any genuine issues of material fact that should 
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have resulted in the defeat of swnmary judgment. As Ms. Hammer asserts that there remain 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Severance Clause in the Employment 
Agreement was ever intended to waive any non-wage claims upon payment of"severance" to 
Ms. Hammer, and whether Ms. Hammer intended to, or actually did, waive any non-wage claims 
by submission of the Supplemental Hammer Release to Sun Valley, Ms. Hammer is entitled to 
seek reconsideration of the findings in the Swnmary Judgment Decision. 
III} THE SEVERANCE CLAUSE IN THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT AND THE 
INTENT OF MS. HAMMER AND FORMER MAYOR WILLICH AS TO WHAT IT MEANT 
1) The Court Was Required To Read The Supplemental Release And The Employment 
Agreement Together To Make Its Determination Of What The Supplemental Hammer Release 
Meant, Including That It Was Ms. Hammer's Intent That Was The Primary Factor In 
Determining What Claims She Was Releasing By Accepting The Severance Payment 
Multiple Idaho cases stand for the proposition that when a document has an ambiguity in 
it, that the court must look to extrinsic evidence to determine its meaning, (see Brown v. 
Gearheart, 157 Idaho 156,335 P.3d 1, 11 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2014); Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 
151 Idaho 449,455,259 P.3d 595 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2011); Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824,828, 
11 P.3d 20 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2000)). 
In addition, when one document refers to another document, namely, it incorporates by 
reference the second document, the Court must also look outside the first document for guidance, 
and interpret the two documents together (see Opportunity v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602,607, 38 
P.3d 1258 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2002)). 
In the Swnmary Judgment Decision, the Court did not describe whether it looked outside 
the four comers of the Supplemental Hammer Release because it was ambiguous, or because the 
Supplemental Hammer Release incorporated by reference the Employment Agreement. None the 
less, the Court looked outside the four comers of the Supplemental Hammer Release to the 
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Employment Agreement, but failed to acknowledge that it was Ms. Hammer's "intent" 
phraseology in the Supplemental Hammer Release that should have been the determining factor 
in its decision. Instead the Court looked at the Severance Clause alone, in what Ms. Hammer 
believes was error. 
The Court obviously looked outside the four corners of the Supplemental Hammer 
Release to the Employment Agreement in entering summary judgment. The Court therefore, 
either found the Supplemental Hammer Release to be ambiguous 4, or that the Supplemental 
Hammer Release and the Supplemental Hammer Release needed to be read together, as is 
required under Opportunity v. Ossewarde. If the Court is going to interpret the two documents 
together, the Court must include that the phrase "intent" in the Supplemental Hammer Release 
relates to the Employment Agreement. Since the Supplemental Hammer Release clearly required 
that Ms. Hammer's "intent" was the controlling factor regarding what Ms. Hammer intended to 
prospectively release under the Severance Clause, it was error for the Court not to analyze what 
Ms. Hammer's intent was when entering into the Employment Agreement. As Ms. Hammer has 
sworn to, it was never Ms. Hammer's intent when she entered into the Employment Agreement 
to waive any non-wage related claims, including any prospective IPPEA related claims. 
Ms. Hammer asserts that in interpreting the Hammer Supplemental Release and the 
Employment Agreement together, there still remains genuine issues of material fact related to 
what Ms. Hammer's intent was regarding what claims would be waived should she be terminated 
"without cause", which prohibits the entry of summary judgment in Sun Valley's favor. 
4 It should be noted that from Ms. Hammer's perspective, the Supplemental Hammer Release is not an ambiguous 
document in that it clearly reflects that Ms. Hammer was not waiving any claims she did not intend when she 
entered into the Employment Agreement in June of 2008, of which her IPPEA claims were one claim she was not 
waiving. 
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2) The Court Must Look To The Intent Of Ms. Hammer And Mayor Willich At The Time They 
Entered Into The Employment Agreement, To Interpret What Was Meant By The Severance 
Clause 
a) Idaho Law Requires That The Court Accept The Intent Of What The Terms Of The 
Employment Agreement Meant When Ms. Hammer And Former Mayor Willich Entered Into 
The Employment Agreement In 2008 
In Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602; 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 
2002), in regards to interpreting provisions of a contract, the Idaho Supreme Court directed lower 
courts as follows: 
"When a subsequent executed document specifically references and relies on a former 
agreement, the two are to be interpreted together if possible ... The primary aim in the 
interpretation of all contracts is to ascertain the mutual intent of the parties at the time the 
contract was made ( emphasis added). If possible, the intent of the parties should be 
ascertained from the language of the agreement as the best indication of their intent. 
Where the parties' intent cannot be understood from the language employed in the 
writing, intent becomes a question of fact to be determined in light of extrinsic evidence. 
Further, when the purpose or objective of the parties is ascertainable, the trier of fact may 
accord it great weight." 
The Court's findings in the Summary Judgment Decision, ignored what Ms. Hammer and 
Former Mayor Willich have certified under oath was their intent when they entered into the 
Employment Agreement in June of 2008. This finding directly contradicts the directions of the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Opportunity v. Ossewarde that the Court must accept the intent of the 
parties (i.e. Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor Willich in this case), when they entered into an 
agreement, when subsequently interpreting provisions of the agreement. 
In addition, in Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754 (2007), in referencing 
Opportunity v. Ossewarde, the Idaho Supreme Court has mandated that when there is a dispute 
as to the intentions of the parties to a contract, "We construe the contract against the person who 
prepared the contract." (see Straub v. Smith, 69) Therefore, even if the Court continues to 
choose to ignore Fonner Mayor Willich's testimony on the issue, the Court was obligated to 
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interpret the phrase "severance" and the intent of the Severance Clause, against the current 
administration of Sun Valley, because Sun Valley was the drafter of the Employment Agreement 
in 2008, and, did not clearly and adequately define what was meant by the Severance Clause 
when the Employment Agreement was entered into. 
Ms. Hammer asserts that the Court's finding that the current administration of Sun 
Valley's interpretation of the Severance Clause in the Employment Agreement supersedes the 
intent of Former Mayor Willi ch and Ms. Hammer when they entered into the Employment 
Agreement in June of 2008, and the Court's interpretation of the term "severance" against Sun 
Valley (i.e. the drafter of the Employment Agreement), contradicts Idaho precedent related to 
contract interpretation. Idaho law requires that the Court look to the intent of Ms. Hammer and 
Former Mayor Willich when the Employment Agreement was entered into, and not to the 
contradictory arguments of the subsequent officers of Sun Valley. 
b) Ms. Hammer's And Former Mayor Willich's Clear Intent At the Time They Entered Into The 
Employment Agreement Was To Not Require Ms. Hammer To Release Any Non Wage And 
Employee Benefit Related Claims, Such As Claims Under The IPPEA, Should Ms. Hammer 
Ever Be Terminated Without Cause 
As is described in the Affidavits of Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor Willich, and which 
are also detailed on pages I through 7 of the Facts, Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor Willich 
based their understanding of whether Ms. Hammer would be waiving any non wage related 
claims should she ever be terminated, on their professional understanding of what "severance" 
meant, and by the common usage of"severance" as being related to services rendered. Both Ms. 
Hammer and Former Mayor Willich have provided explicit information, in the form of their 
Affidavits herein, to express that their clear mutual intent at the time the Employment Agreement 
was entered into was that neither intended to require that Ms. Hammer waive any prospective 
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IPPEA claims should Ms. Hammer be terminated ''without cause" and seek to collect on the 
"severance" she was entitled in the Employment Agreement. 
It is also of note that on January 18, 2012, the day before Ms. Hammer was terminated by 
Sun Valley, in a letter to Mr. Naylor (Donoval Rehearing Aff. Para 14), Mr. Donoval confirmed 
this position by stating: 
"the causes of action Ms. Hammer possesses for tort, including the underlying 
harassment allegations against Council Member Ribi and several other claims, do not 
arise "from a termination", they arise out of separate incidents. Nor is it rational to assert 
that Ms. Hammer would have waived any non-contract damage claims she would have 
prospectively been entitled to (i.e. personal injury claims) when she signed the 
agreement. So as I have stated, if the City Of Sun Valley proposes to terminate Ms. 
Hammer without cause and pay her the severance payment in the contract, she will only 
sign a waiver that states the exact language in the contract cited above and nothing 
more." 
There is no genuine issue of material fact that prior to Sun Valley terminating Ms. 
Hammer, Sun Valley, through Mr. Naylor, was aware of Ms. Hammer's assertion that 
"severance", as described in the Severance Clause, only meant wage related claims, and that Ms. 
Hammer had not prospectively waived any non wage related claims should she be terminated 
"without cause" and paid the "severance" when she entered into the Employment Agreement in 
June of 2008. 
3) Even lfThe Court Refuses To Recognize That It Must Take Ms. Hammer's And Former 
Mayor Willich' s Intent Into Consideration, Idaho And Other Legal Precedent Reguires A 
Finding That The Payment Of "Severance" Does Not Include The Settlement Of Non Wage Or 
Service Related Claims 
In the Summary Judgment Decision, the Court found that "severance", as described in the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement, was not "severance", but was actually 
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"liquidated damages"8, even though the phrase "severance" is used at least five (5) times in the 
Severance Clause, including in the heading, and the phrase "liquidated damages" cannot be 
found in the Severance Clause or anywhere else in the Employment Agreement. 
In Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363,367,679 P.2d 640 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 
1984), in determining whether "severance" pay was ''wages" under Idaho Statute 45-608 (related 
to the statute of limitation on collection of wages law suits), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that 
"Severance pay is also a component of compensation in an employment agreement ... Thus we 
hold that a claim for severance pay also comes within the parameters of Idaho Statute 45-608." 
(i.e. Re: Collection Of Wages). 
In Parker v. Underwriters Laboratories, 140 Idaho 517, 96 P.3d 618 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 
2004), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed whether non lump sum, on-going post termination 
payments made to an employee after termination were considered "wages", thus disqualifying 
the former employee from receiving unemployment benefits while she was still receiving the 
post termination payments. In Parker v. Underwriters, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
"'Severance pay' has been defined as 'a sum of money usually based on length of 
employment for which an employee is eligible upon termination.' ( citing to the American 
Heritage Dictionary Of the English Language, 4th Edition, 2000). The purpose of a 
severance plan is to protect employees from economic hardship and to reward them/or 
past services rendered. (emphasis added)" (citing to 27 Am.Jur.2d, Employment 
Relationships, Sec. 70) (@520) 
The Parker v. Underwriters Court then cited to a Colorado case of Moore v. Digital 
Equipment, 868 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Colo. App.Ct. 1994) by stating that "A severance allowance is 
a payment made to an employee in return/or services previously provided (emphasis added)."9 
8 On Page 7 of the Summary Judgment Decision, the Court states: "This case is more comparable to Moore v. 
Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2005), where the Court determined that "liquidated 
damages" for an employee's termination "without cause" were not considered "wages" already earned." 
9 It should be noted that in Porker v. Underwriters the Idaho Supreme Court found that non lump sum, on-going, 
post termination payments to an employee, in that case, were not wage related "severance" payments, but 
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The Court should recognize that for income, employment and withholding tax purposes, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has defined "severance" to be "wages" for services rendered to an 
employer. The issue in the 2014 case of U.S. v. Quality Stores, 134 S.Ct. 1395 (U.S. Sup.Ct. 
2014) was whether an employer was required to withhold employment and FICA taxes on 
"severance" payments made to employees when the company closed. In discussing what 
"severance" payments are, the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Quality Stores, 1399-1400 stated: 
"Severance payments made to terminated employees are 'remuneration for employment'. 
Severance payments are, of course, 'remuneration', and common sense dictates that 
employees receive the payments 'for employment' ... Severance payments are made in 
consideration for employment - for a 'service ... performed' by 'an employee for the 
person employing him.' " 
In making its decision, the Court chose to rely on the Moore v. Omnicare, 141 Idaho 809, 
118 P.3d 141 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2005) to determine that the "severance" paid to Ms. Hammer was 
not "wages", but was "liquidated damages" which covered any and all of Ms. Hammer's non 
wage or benefit claims, including her IPPEA claim. However, there are significant differences 
between the employment settlement payments made to the plaintiff in Moore v. Omnicare and 
the "severance" paid to Ms. Hammer. First, in Moore v. Omnicare, the plaintiff was paid 
separation payments for an extensive period time after the plaintiff's termination for 
employment Ms. Hammer received a single, lump sum payment at termination. Second, the 
employment agreement that the plaintiff in Moore v. Omnicare signed did not include the phrase 
"severance". The phrase "severance" was used at least five (5) times in the Severance Clause of 
the Employment Agreement, including in the heading, in describing what Ms. Hammer would be 
instead were considered payments for settlement of separate non wage claims pursuant to the written settlement 
agreement that the plaintiff had entered into with the defendant, specifically because the settlement agreement 
had used the phrase "enhanced» severance benefits. in Porker v. Underwriters, it was these "enhanced" benefits 
that turned the payments into something other than "wages", not the underlying "severance" that the plaintiff 
was entitled to pursuant to the standard company severance program. 
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paid if she was terminated ''without cause". Additionally, the phrase "severance payment" was 
specifically used in the Supplemental Hammer Release. 
In entering summary judgment, the Court took little notice of the non-reported Sarbacher 
v. Americold Realty, 2011 WL 5520442 (U.S. Idaho 2011) case from the U.S. District Court for 
Idaho. However, Judge Winmill's well thought out analysis in Sarbacher of whether "severance" 
payments are "wages" under Idaho law is pertinent. The facts in Sarbacher are almost identical 
to the facts herein, including that the plaintiff in Sarbacher had entered into a written 
employment agreement in which his termination pay was specifically defmed as "severance" in 
several places, similar to the Severance Clause in the Employment Agreement signed by Ms. 
Hammer. In Sarbacher, Judge Winmill confirmed that the Idaho Supreme Court had clearly 
recognized that Johnson v. Allied Stores "stands for the proposition that severance pay is a wage 
under Idaho's Wage Law."(@ 8) In Sarbacher, Judge Winmill discounts the findings of Moore 
v. Omnicare because the plaintiff in Sarbacher received a lump sum "severance" payment, while 
the plaintiff in Moore v. Omnicare received post termination payments over an extended period 
oftime10• The plaintiff's contract in Sarbacher specifically described the lump sum payment as 
"severance", and as Judge Winmill strongly noted ''the Sarbacher agreement repeatedly uses the 
term 'severance', while the Moore contract did not. Indeed, as Sarbacher points out, the entire 
Moore opinion does not once use the term 'severance"' (Sarbacher, 9). The same is true herein, 
in that the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement uses the phrase "severance" five (5) 
times, including in the heading of the Severance Clause, and the Supplemental Hammer Release 
also uses the phrase "severance", and yet the phrase "liquidated damages" is not used anywhere 
in either document. 
10 On Page 9 of Sarbacher Judge Winmiil notes "the determinative factor in Moore was that the damages award 
ultimately called for a payment of future wages. For the reasons discussed, the severance payment at issue here 
does not. Moore is inapposite." 
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In swnmary, in the Johnson v. Allied Stores and Parker v. Underwriters cases, the Idaho 
Supreme Court clearly defined "severance" as pay for "services previously provided". In US. v. 
Quality Stores, the U.S. Supreme Court clearly defined that "severance" is "remuneration" for a 
"service performed". In Sarbacher, in analyzing Idaho employment law, a U.S. District Court 
Judge found that, when an employee's contract clearly uses the phraseology of"severance" in 
multiple places and the employee receives a lump sum payment upon termination as opposed to 
receiving a stream of post termination payments, that the payments the employee received upon 
termination are clearly "wages". Ms. Hammer asserts that it was judicial error for the Court to 
fail to follow established legal precedent regarding whether Ms. Hammer's severance was 
considered "wages" or "remuneration" for past services, and not related to the waiver of any 
non-wage claims. Ms. Hammer requests that the Court reconsider its Summary Judgment 
Decision, and reverse its findings to specifically find that Ms. Hammer's lump sum "severance" 
payment was "wages" for prior services rendered to Sun Valley, and not related to any settlement 
of other non service related claims such as her IPPEA claims, pursuant to established legal 
precedent. 
4) Because The "Severance" Related To Past Services Rendered By Ms. Hammer To Sun 
Valley. And Not To Any Non Wage Related Claims, Sun Valley Was Required To Provide Ms. 
Hammer With Additional Consideration Iflt Claimed Ms. Hammer Waived Any Non Wage 
Claims. Such As Any IPPEA Claims 
In her prior briefs, Ms. Hammer argued that because the "severance" she was paid only 
covered "wages" for past performance, and because Sun Valley provided no additional 
compensation for the release of non wage claims such as the IPPEA claim, that she was entitled 
to continue to pursue her IPPEA claims. 
If Sun Valley intended the Severance Clause in the Employment Agreement to give rise 
to a release of Ms. Hammer's IPPEA rights and protections, it needed to pay consideration 
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beyond the "severance" (i.e. wages) provided for in the Severance Clause of the Employment 
Agreement for that additional release. (see Groves v. Firebird Raceway, 94-3554, 1995 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 28191 (U.S. 9th App. 1995) citing Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enters, Inc., 99 
Idaho 539, 585 P.2d 949, 952 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 1978) (a release is a type of contract); Vance v. 
Connell, 96 Idaho 417,529 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 1974) (some consideration is a 
necessary element to all contracts); Karnes v. Quality Pork Processors, 532 N.W.2d 560,562) 
(U.S. Minn. 1995) (as with any other contract, a release requires consideration); and, Brown v. 
Kentucky Lottery Corp., 891 S.W.2d 90, 92) (Kentucky App.Ct. 1995) (it is well established that 
a release must be supported by valuable consideration)). 
As Ms. Hammer's prior service to Sun Valley was the consideration for the "severance" 
in the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement, if Sun Valley wanted Ms. Hammer to 
waive any other non wage related claims, Sun Valley was required to provide Ms. Hammer with 
additional consideration. In both Moore v. Omnicare and Parker v. Underwriters, that is exactly 
what the Idaho Supreme Court found. In Moore v. Omnicare the Idaho Supreme Court concluded 
that the post termination on-going payments made to the plaintiff was additional consideration 
for the release of non wage claims, and was therefore not ''wages" but "liquidated damages". In 
Parker v. Underwriters, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the "enhanced" severance that the 
defendant paid the plaintiff, above and beyond what was required by the standard employer 
severance plan, was additional consideration for the release of the plaintiff's other non wage 
claims. As Judge Winmill pointed out regarding Sarbacher, this case is nothing like either Moore 
v. Omnicare or Parker v. Underwriters, as Ms. Hammer received nothing more than she had 
already been entitled to under the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement when she 
received her "severance" pay for the prior service she performed for Sun Valley. 
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The payment of "severance" only applied to Ms. Hammer's past services rendered to Sun 
Valley, and Sun Valley provided Ms. Hammer no additional consideration for the release of her 
IPPEA claims, therefore Ms. Hammer asserts the Court must reverse its findings in favor of Sun 
Valley on the issue, and instead must enter findings on behalf of Ms. Hammer, that as a matter of 
law, Ms. Hammer did not waive any right to further pursue her IPPEA claims when she 
submitted the conditional Supplemental Hammer Release to Sun Valley and was thereafter paid 
the "severance" she was entitled to for past services rendered to Sun Valley, because she was 
provided no additional consideration. 
IV) THEW AIVER AND ESTOPPEL FINDINGS 
In Sales v. Peabody, 157 Idaho 195,335 P.3d 40, 46 (2014) the Idaho Supreme Court 
confirmed that a district court ''may not grant summary judgment on a ground raised sua 
sponte ". Sun Valley did not specifically raise estoppel arguments in its prior briefs. Instead, the 
Court of its own raised the issue of estoppel sua sponte at the oral arguments on the counter 
motions for summary judgment, and discussed it in its Summary Judgment Decision (Pg. 8-9 
Summary Judgment Decision). Ms. Hammer was never allowed to adequately respond to the 
estoppel finding issued by the Court. Therefore, the issue is ripe for reconsideration briefing. 
1) Contrary To The Court's Findings, There Was Extensive Correspondences And Discussions 
Between The Parties Regarding Ms. Hammer's Non Waiver Of Non Wage And Employee 
Benefit Claims, Making Sun Valley And Mr. Naylor Extensively Aware That Ms. Hammer Was 
Refusing To Waive Any Non Wage And Employee Benefit Claims, Including The IPPEA 
Claims, Whether Sun Valley Paid Ms. Hammer Or Not, When Sun Valley Accepted The 
Conditional Clause In The Supplemental Release 
As is described in the Affidavits of Ms. Hammer and Mr. Donoval, and in detail on pages 
7 -17 of the Facts, there was extensive discussions and negotiations between Ms. Hammer, Mr. 
18 
Memorandum In Support Of Summary Judgment Reconsideration 
161 
Donoval Mr. Naylor and Sun Valley officials which made clear to Mr. Naylor and Sun Valley 
that Ms. Hammer was not releasing any non wage or employee benefit claims, such as the 
IPPEA claims; regardless of whether Ms. Hammer signed a release; and regardless of whether 
Sun Valley paid Ms. Hammer the "severance". When Sun Valley accepted the Hammer 
Supplementary Release with the Conditional Clause, and paid Ms. Hammer the "severance" 
described in the Severance Clause, Mr. Naylor and Sun Valley did so with the full knowledge 
that Ms. Hammer was not releasing her IPPEA claims. 
2) Under Idaho Law. Ms. Hammer Did Not Unequivocally Waive Any Non Wage And 
Employee Benefit Claims, Including Her IPPEA Claims. By Submitting The Supplemental 
Hammer Release Which Included The Conditional Clause 
In 2011, in a seminal case regarding the issue of waiver, in Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 
151 Idaho 449,458,259 P.3d 595 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2011), the Idaho Supreme Court clearly and 
succinctly stated in regards to whether someone had waived rights that they possessed that: 
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, and 
the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and 
that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment ... A clear intention to waive must 
be shown before waiver shall be established. Waiver will not be inferred except from a 
clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to 
estoppel." 
As recently as August of 2014, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed this analysis related 
to waiver in Pocatello Hospital v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709,719,330 
P.3d 1067 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2014). Ms. Hammer asserts that the Court should also look to the 
language of the Missouri Appellate Court for guidance as to when a waiver has actually occurred 
described in Frisella v. RVB Corp., 979 S.W.2d 474,477 (Mo. App.Ct.E.D. 1998), namely, that: 
"To rise to the level of waiver, the conduct must be so manifestly consistent with and 
indicative of an intention to renounce a particular right of benefit that no other reasonable 
explanation of the conduct is possible." 
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As is shown by the facts described on pages 7 - 17 of the Facts, during the week 
immediately before Ms. Hammer's termination and the week after Ms. Hammer's termination 
through the submission of the Supplemental Hammer Release, Ms. Hammer and Mr. Donoval 
made numerous specific statements to Mr. Naylor and Sun Valley asserting that under no 
circumstances was Ms. Hammer submitting an unconditional release in return for receiviJ1g her 
"severance" payments as were required under the Severance Clause of the Employment 
Agreement. There is nothing in the communications between Ms. Hammer, Mr. Donoval, Mr. 
Naylor and Sun Valley related to the "severance" payments or Ms. Hammer's submission of the 
Supplemental Hammer Release that could have lead Sun Valley officials to conclude that Ms. 
Hammer was giving Sun Valley a ''voluntary, intentional relinquishment of her rights" to 
continue to seek her claims under the IPPEA; or a "clear intention to waive" her right to continue 
to proceed on her IPPEA claims. Ms. Hammer also did not make a "clear and unequivocal act 
manifesting an intent to waive" her rights to continue proceeding on her IPPEA claims. Ms. 
Hammer made it clear to Sun Valley through her communications that she was refusing to 
release "all" claims and was reserving claims that were not intended when she entered into the 
Employment Agreement in 2008, including any claims under the IPPEA. Through Ms. 
Hammer's and Mr. Donoval's communications and actions, Ms. Hammer made clear that she 
was not providing a "clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive" her right to 
continue pursuing her claims under the IPPEA. 
Knipe requires that Sun Valley bore the burden of showing that it acted in ''reasonable 
reliance" on Ms. Hammer's actions that Ms. Hammer was waiving her claims. Contrary to that 
burden, in the prior pleadings, Sun Valley provided no testamentary or other factual evidence 
related to whether Sun Valley Mayor De Wayne Briscoe or the members of the Sun Valley City 
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Council were informed of Ms. Hammer's communications and refusal to waive "all" claims, or 
what, if anything, they actually ''relied upon" related to what Ms. Hammer was waving and what 
she was not. The Court could only infer what Sun Valley and its officials relied upon, based on 
the unverified and unsupported assertions and arguments in prior Sun Valley briefs. Summary 
Judgment cannot be supported by inferences regarding what Sun Valley officials relied upon, 
and may only be entered when there are no genuine issues of material fact. 
In its Summary Judgment Decision, the Court cited Ms. Hammer's prior Affidavit in 
which she said "In order to secure my immediate financial security, I was forced to sign a release 
of claims that was acceptable to the City" as evidence that Ms. Hammer knew that she was 
waiving all potential claims against Sun Valley when she submitted the Supplemental Hammer 
Release to Sun Valley. Ms. Hammer has now clarified to the Court that by that statement: 
"I was merely reflecting the two options that Sun Valley was asserting that I was facing at 
that time. The Court should note that I rejected Mr. Nay/or's and Sun Valley's demands 
and did not sign the Proposed Sun Valley Release. I assert that I selected a third option, 
by notifying Sun Valley that I was demanding that I be paid the "severance" payment that 
I was entitled to for past performance, service, wage and employee benefits, and that I 
was still retaining any other claims against Sun Valley and its officials, including any 
IPPEA claims. " 14 (Hammer Rehearing Aff., Para. 20) 
Ms. Hammer consistently made this factual allegation and argument in her briefs related 
to the counter summary judgment motions. The Court did not consider that there was a third 
option, which Ms. Hammer selected. On reconsideration, the Court should consider that Ms. 
Hammer selected the third option of retaining "some" claims and waiving only her wage and 
benefit related claims by the submission of the Supplemental Hammer Release and receipt of the 
"severance". 
14 At oral argument on the matter, Ms. Hammer's attorney Eric Swartz asserted that this was one of the issues that 
made clear that there were still "genuine issues of material fact" which prohibited summary judgment from being 
entered, and that the matter should continue to trial for further clarification of the facts surrounding the terms of 
the Employment Agreement and the Supplemental Hammer Release. The Court apparently rejected that assertion 
by Mr. Swartz. 
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There are genuine issues of material fact as to a) whether Sun Valley paid Ms. Hammer 
the ''severance" on January 24, 2012, because if Sun Valley had not paid those "severance" 
payments within forty eight (48) hours pursuant to Idaho Statute 45-606 Sun Valley would have 
been subject to substantial penalties under Idaho wage laws, or, b) whether Sun Valley paid Ms. 
Hammer the "severance" on January 24, 2012 because Sun Valley Mayor De Wayne Briscoe and 
the Sun Valley City Council believed that Ms. Hammer had waived "all" her claims when she 
rejected the Proposed Sun Valley Release and instead submitted the conditional Supplemental 
Hammer Release, as Sun Valley asserts and the Court found. 
Ms. Hammer (and Mr. Donoval) did not waive Ms. Hammer's IPPEA claims. They spent 
two weeks around Ms. Hammer's termination submitting multiple correspondences to Mr. 
Naylor and Sun Valley confirming that Ms. Hammer was not going to waive her non wage 
claims, and negotiating three separate written releases, resulting in the final Supplemental 
Hammer Release which included clear "conditional" language (i.e. the Conditional Clause) 
stating that Ms. Hammer was only waiving claims "as were intended when the City 
Administrator Employment Agreement was entered into on June I, 2008." Ms. Hammer 
unequivocally rejected the unconditional terms of the Proposed Sun Valley Release. Sun Valley 
accepted the replacement Supplemental Hammer Release with the conditional language in the 
Conditional Clause, and, thereafter, knowing that there was conditional language in the 
Supplemental Hammer Release, did nothing further to seek to continue to enforce Sun Valley's 
demands that Ms. Hammer provide an unconditional release of"all" of Ms. Hammer's claims 
before paying Ms. Hammer the "severance" payment on January 24, 2012. 
It was error for the Court to have found that Ms. Hammer did not reject Mr. Naylor's and 
Sun Valley's demands that she sign an unconditional release to receive her "severance", when 
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she explicitly rejected the Proposed Sun Valley Release and instead submitted the Supplemental 
Hammer Release which included the Conditional Clause. As Ms. Hammer did not "clearly and 
unequivocally" intend to waive any of her IPPEA claims when she submitted the Supplemental 
Hammer Release, as was required by Idaho law (i.e. Knipe and Pocatello Hospital). the Court 
erred in entering summary judgment against Ms. Hammer based on a purported waiver of her 
claims by submission of the conditional Supplemental Hammer Release which included the 
Conditional Clause. There continues to be genuine issues of material fact related to the matter to 
require the reversal of the Court's summary judgment findings as to waiver. 
3) Ms. Hammer Should Not Be Estopped From Asserting That She Did Not Waive Her IPPEA 
Claims, Because Of The Extensive Communications Between Ms. Hammer And Sun Valley 
Confirming Such, And Because Of The Language Of The Conditional Clause In The 
Supplemental Hammer Release Confirming Such. Instead, Sun Valley Should Be Estopped From 
Denying That Ms. Hammer Had Reserved Her Rights To Proceed With Her IPPEA Claims 
In the Summary Judgment Decision, the Court cites several cases related to the concept 
of estoppel under Idaho case law. Ms. Hammer has no dispute with the Court's discussion in the 
Summary Judgment Decision that estoppel applies in certain cases. However, Ms. Hammer 
disputes that she did anything which would warrant a finding of estoppel related to her providing 
of the Supplemental Hammer Release to Sun Valley or her other claims in the matter. 
a) The "Without Cause" Verse "With Cause" Estoppel Assertion 
In the Summary Judgment Decision, the Court states that Ms. Hammer is estopped from 
asserting that she waived "all" claims because of her inconsistent arguments that she was really 
terminated ''with cause" rather than ''without cause" (Summary Judgment Decision, Pg. 8). Ms. 
Hammer asserts that this finding misrepresents what Ms. Hammer claimed in her prior filings, 
and continues to claim. 
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Ms. Hammer has never had a problem with having been terminated "without cause". Ms. 
Hammer confirms that Sun Valley had every right to do so, and that Sun Valley actually did so 
on January 19, 2012. In fact, in order to attempt to rehabilitate her ruined career, Ms. Hammer 
continues to seek conclusive, undeniable confirmation from Sun Valley that she was terminated 
"without cause", which Sun Valley, by its actions, refuses to do. It is not Ms. Hammer t.1iat 
claims she was terminated "with cause", it is Sun Valley that is asserting that Ms. Hammer was 
really terminated ''with cause" by publicly and falsely asserting that Ms. Hammer committed acts 
of misconduct, including criminal acts - conduct Ms. Hammer wants stopped or wants damages 
for. 
What Ms. Hammer has consistently asserted to the Court is that Sun Valley was 
prohibited from terminating her ''without cause", for contract purposes, and then thereafter 
publicly asserting that she was actually terminated ''with cause", including by announcing to the 
public that Sun Valley was seeking a criminal investigation against her 15 • Ms. Hammer's 
position has consistently been that Sun Valley could not use a claim of a "without cause" 
termination as a subterfuge for really terminating Ms. Hammer "with cause", subjecting Sun 
Valley to damages outside the contractual "severance" that Ms. Hammer was entitled to in the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement as part of her IPPEA claims. 
Ms. Hammer was entitled to the benefit of the inherent bargain she made in the 
Employment Agreement, namely, that if Sun Valley was going to terminate her ''without cause" 
that Sun Valley was thereafter contractually prohibited from then subsequently professing 
publicly just the opposite. In reality, it is the non "severance" related rights Ms. Hammer had in 
her contract that Ms. Hammer continues to pursue, namely, that Sun Valley violated her 
15 It should be noted that Ms. Hammer's breach of contract claims in the Federal Law Suit (Hammer v. Sun Valley, 
et al., 1:13-cv-00211-EJL (U.S. Idaho)) argues exactly that. 
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contractual right to publicly be found to have been terminated ''without cause", without Sun 
Valley publicly claiming that she was actually terminated ''with cause", and violated the IPPEA 
by using pretext for her termination. By terminating Ms. Hammer "without cause" for contract 
purposes, and using a "without cause' termination as a pretext for publicly asserting that Ms. 
Hammer actually was terminated ''with cause" and then publicly going on a campaign of 
asserting that Ms. Hammer was actually terminated "with cause", if anyone is judicially estopped 
for taking inconsistent positions, it should be Sun Valley. 
It is not inconsistent for Ms. Hammer to readily agree that she was terminated ''without 
cause" under her contract in pleadings, and at the same time assert that Sun Valley has, and 
continues, to violate its non-financial contractual obligations to not publicly ruin Ms. Hammer's 
professional career by asserting that she was actually terminated ''with cause". 
Ms. Hammer has certainly not been "playing fast and loose" with the Court ( see Sword v. 
Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,252, 92 P.3d 492 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2004))(see Summary Judgment Decision, 
Pg. 8). Separate from having been entitled to the payment of her "severance", Ms. Hammer is 
merely trying to enforce that she was actually terminated ''without cause", in contradiction to 
excessive public statements to the contrary by Sun Valley. Ms. Hammer is entitled to the benefit 
of the bargain that Sun Valley would not terminate her "without cause" and still publicly claim 
she was actually terminated "with cause". That is not an inconsistent position, and should not be 
considered to judicially estop Ms. Hammer from pursuing her IPPEA Claims, or any other claim. 
At a minimum, Ms. Hammer should be allowed to testify at an evidential hearing related 
to the issues associated with her purported inconsistent positions related to whether she asserts 
that she was terminated "without cause" or ''with cause", as was the case in Sword v. Sweet, 502, 
where the district court held evidential hearings, and where the Idaho Supreme Court determined 
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that based on the evidential hearings that the person at issue was not playing "fast and loose" 
related to whether a preliminary agreement had been made final or not. As is the case with the 
individual in Sword v. Sweet, Ms. Hammer by no means was playing "fast and loose" in regards 
to assertions that she was contractually and legally terminated "without cause" and that Sun 
Valley has thereafter publically contradicted that Ms. Ham_mer was terminated "without cause" 
in numerous ways. 
b) Ms. Hammer Did Not Lead Sun Valley Officials Into Believing That Ms. Hammer Was 
Unconditionally Waiving All Claims By Submitting the Supplemental Hammer Release. In Fact 
The Opposite Is True 
Sun Valley has argued that Ms. Hammer only had two choices, namely, to sign an 
unconditional waiver and accept the "severance", or not sign an unconditional waiver and forfeit 
her right to the "severance". Ms. Hammer has steadfastly rejected that assertion, and has insisted 
that she entered into a third option, which was to waive any further rights to challenge that she 
was entitled to receive any further compensation for any work she performed for Sun Valley or 
in regards to her employee benefits, and not waive any other non wage related claims she was 
entitled to make, including her IPPEA claims, as had been contemplated when she entered into 
the Employment Agreement in June of 2008. 
The Court should consider Mr. Donoval's previously described letter to Mr. Naylor on 
January 18, 2014 (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 15), the day before Ms. Hammer was 
terminated, repeating what Mr. Donoval had indicated to Mr. Naylor on the telephone that day 
as well, namely, first, that Ms. Hammer was denying that the Severance Clause required a 
release of any non-wage related claims, second, that Ms. Hammer had not ''prospectively" 
waived any non-wage claims when she entered into the Employment Agreement, and third that: 
"if the City Of Sun Valley proposes to terminate Ms. Hammer without cause and pay her 
the severance payment in the contract, she will only sign a waiver that states the exact 
26 
Memorandum In Support Of Summary Judgment Reconsideration 
169 
language in the contract cited above and nothing more." (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 
15) 
Ms. Hammer rejected the Proposed Sun Valley Release and its unconditional waiver of 
"all" claims language, and instead submitted the replacement Supplemental Hammer Release, 
which did not release any claims that had not been intended when she entered into the 
Employment Agreement in June of 2008, including her IPPEA claims. Otherwise, Ms. Hammer 
would have merely signed the Proposed Sun Valley Release and the matter would have been 
resolved. 
It was Sun Valley, not Ms. Hammer, that had the final decision that either a) Sun Valley 
could accept the Conditional Clause in the Supplemental Hammer Release and pay Ms. Hammer 
the "severance" knowing that Ms. Hammer would retain her IPPEA claims, or, b) Sun Valley 
could reject the conditional language in the Supplemental Hammer Release and simply not pay 
Ms. Hammer the "severance" until she provided the unconditional waiver of "all" claims that 
Mr. Naylor had been seeking. Whether or not Sun Valley was feeling the pressure of having to 
pay Ms. Hammer's "severance" or be subject to treble damages under Idaho Statute 45-615, Sun 
Valley none-the-less chose to accept Ms. Hammer's condition that she was not waiving any non 
wage or employee benefit related claims, including the IPPEA claims, and paid Ms. Hammer the 
"severance". Because of Sun Valley's actions in accepting the Supplemental Hammer Release 
with the conditional language inserted, and Sun Valley's inactions in thereafter not rejecting the 
Conditional Clause or otherwise requiring that Ms. Hammer further clarify the ''unconditional" 
nature of the Supplemental Hammer Release before Sun Valley paid Ms. Hammer the 
"severance" by direct deposit into her bank account, if any party is estopped in the matter, it 
should be Sun Valley. 
27 
Memorandum In Support Of Summary Judgment Reconsideration 
170 
• 
Ms. Hammer was terminated by the Sun Valley City Council late in the day on January 
19, 2012. There was no further Sun Valley City Council meetings between Ms. Hammer's 
termination on January 19, 2012 and when the "severance" was paid on January 24, 2012 in 
which Sun Valley Mayor De Wayne Briscoe or the Sun Valley City Council could have discussed 
or approved the Supplemental Hammer Release before paying Ms. Ha.truner's "severance" on 
January 24, 2012, after Ms. Hammer had rejected the Proposed Sun Valley Release17• There is 
no evidence in the record that Sun Valley Mayor DeWayne Briscoe or the Sun Valley City 
Council ever even saw the Supplemental Hammer Release with its conditional language, after 
Ms. Hammer had rejected the Proposed Sun Valley Release, by which they could even 
contemplate what its terms meant, and thus have been convinced that Ms. Hammer had actually 
waived "all" claims in return for payment of the "severance" payment. 
Ms. Hammer gave the Supplemental Hammer Release to Sun Valley fully believing that 
she had made explicitly clear to Sun Valley that she was retaining claims she never intended to 
waive if she was ever terminated when she entered into the Employment Agreement, including 
any IPPEA claims. Ms Hammer heard nothing else from Sun Valley thereafter to clarify matters, 
and instead the next day the sum of$66,935.53 was deposited directly into her checking account 
by Sun Valley, without further clarification. If anyone should be estopped in the matter, it should 
be Sun Valley. 
There is no evidence in the record that any Sun Valley officials were ever actually 
provided the Original Hammer Release, the Proposed Sun Valley Release or the Supplemental 
Hammer Release, or any of the numerous communications between Mr. Donoval and Mr. 
17 It should be noted that Mr. Naylor rejected the Original Hammer Release on Friday, January 20, 2012 (Donoval 
RehearingAff., Ex. 7). Mr. Naylor then drafted and sent Mr. Donoval the Proposed Sun Valley Release on a 
Saturday, January 21, 2012 (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Ex. 9j. There is iittle chance, if any, that either Sun Valley 
Mayor De Wayne Briscoe or any of the members of the Sun Valley City Council ever saw the Proposed Sun Valley 
Release either. 
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Naylor, by Mr. Naylor, by which they could have possibly been deceived or even understand 
what was happening related to the issue of Ms. Hammer's severance. Nor is there any evidence 
that the Sun Valley City Council formally approved the payment of the "severance" to Ms. 
Hahmmer, as is required by Idaho Statute 50-1017 18• With all of the inconsistencies related to 
the waiver issue, and the approval of the payment of the "severance" to Ms. Hammer, there are 
still numerous genuine issues of material fact as to whether Sun Valley was actually somehow 
deceived into believing that Ms. Hammer had waived "all" her claims when the Supplemental 
Hammer Release was submitted to Sun Valley, as opposed to just her wage related claims. 
There are also genuine issues of material fact related to whether, at the time of the 
payment of the "severance" pay January 24, 2012, that by its actions.in withholding income and 
employment taxes on the entire "severance" balance, Sun Valley, through Former Treasurer 
Frostenson, acknowledged that none of the "severance" payments were related to either 
liquidated damages or other civil claims, because if they were, Sun Valley was not supposed to 
have withheld either income or employment taxes on those portions of the "severance". 
In order for the Court to have entered findings that Ms. Hammer was estopped from 
asserting that Ms. Hammer had not waived any non wage and benefit claims at summary 
judgment, including any IPPEA claims, there must be no genuine issues of material fact that Ms. 
Hammer "clearly and unequivocally" waived those claims, and that Sun Valley through its 
elected officials and official representatives (not its lawyer Mr. Naylor) believed that Ms. 
Hammer had also "clearly and unequivocally" waived any and all claims, not just her wage and 
18 The Court should be fully aware, that the Sun Valley Oty Council could only take official action in resolving an 
issue like this, or spend any Sun Valley Funds, unless there was a formal motion in a public meeting. Pursuant to 
Idaho Statute 50-1017, which states that "all claims against the city shall be approved by the city council prior to 
the payment of such claims", Sun Valley was prohibited from paying Ms. Hammer the "severance" until the Sun 
Valley City Council had formally approved doing so. There is also no evidence in the record that Mr. Naylor had 
been formally authorized by the Sun Valley City Council to make decisions of this sort or to authorize the payment 
of the "severance" to Ms. Hammer. 
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employee benefit claims. As has been described herein, Sun Valley placed no evidence in the 
record that between January 21, 2012 when Mr. Naylor was notified that Ms. Hammer rejected 
the Proposed Sun Valley Release and thereafter instead submitted the Hammer Supplemental 
Release to Mr. Naylor and Former Treasurer Frostenson, and when the "severance" was paid by 
direct deposit on January 24, 2012 without further discussion, that Sun Valley Mayor De Wayne 
Briscoe or the Sun Valley City Council ever even saw the Hammer Supplemental Release or 
understood what the terms of the Supplemental Hammer Release even said or meant for Sun 
Valley Mayor De Wayne Briscoe or the Sun Valley City Council to have relied upon it to claim 
they believed that Ms. Hammer had waive "all" claims against Sun Valley in return for the 
payment of the "severance". That being the case, it was error for the Court to conclude that 
estoppel principles applied and to have entered summary judgment based on estoppel. 
Jam s . Donoval 
As ated Counsel For Ms. Hammer 
Solel For Summary Judgment Reconsideration Purposes 
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THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS R1BI; 
and DeWA YNE BRISCOE, 
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NOW COMES the Plaintiff, Sharon R. Hammer, by and through her associated counsel 
for the purpose of reconsideration of entry of summary judgment James R. Donoval, and hereby 
seeks that this Honorable Court reconsider its Memorandwn Decision On Motion For Summary 
Judgment of January 12, 2015, as is allowed pursuant to Rule l l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules Of 
Civil Procedure. 
James Dono al 
Asso iated Counsel For Ms. Hammer 
Sol y For Summary Judgment Reconsideration Purposes 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and 
De Wayne BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
SUN VALLEY'S OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant, the City of Sun Valley, by and through its counsel, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby 
submits its Objection to Plaintifrs Motion for Reconsideration of Summary Judgment. Because this 
Court properly granted summary judgment to Defendant based on correct legal precedent, and 
because the new affidavits and arguments submitted by Plaintiff are irrelevant to that decision, 
reconsideration is not warranted. 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Sun Valley moved for summary judgment in this matter on November 18, 2014, which was 
granted on January 12, 2015, and subsequent judgment filed on January 16, 2015. (See 
Memorandum Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment, hereinafter "Memorandum Decision") 
James Donoval, Plaintiff's husband and frequent legal counsel, entered an appearance in this case 
on January 30, 2015, and filed the currently pending Motion for Reconsideration, due to Plaintiffs 
prior counsel citing an ethical conflict and moving for withdrawal on that same day. 1 In conjunction 
with filing this motion for reconsideration, he also has submitted a memorandum and three new 
affidavits of Plaintiff, Wayne Willich, and himself, on behalf of Plaintiff's motion. These new 
filings, however, have little that this Court has not already seen, as they simply reargue Plaintiff's 
prior legal positions. The new affidavits, as per Plaintiff's established litigation strategy throughout 
this case, simply attempt to take this Court's well-reasoned decision and manufacture issues of 
material fact to avoid dismissal. However, the judgment of this Court should stand as a matter of 
law, and Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration should be denied. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Plaintifr s motion for reconsideration fails to even address the true basis stated for granting 
summary judgment: that due to the unambiguity of Plaintifrs Employment Agreement and her 
Supplemental Release, Plaintiff clearly released "all claims" against the City of Sun Valley and 
therefore her IPPEA claim was part of that unambiguous release. (Memorandum Decision, p. 4-5) 
1Plaintiff' s prior counsel, Eric Swartz, later made it clear in hearing before this Court that 
he was to have "absolutely" nothing to do with the argument of this Motion for Reconsideration 
and that he was concerned with "having [his] name associated with Mr. Donoval in any fashion 
going forward." (February 10, 2015 Hearing, 19:18-24, 37:14-21) 
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Instead, Plaintiff makes a brief-and incorrect-argument that reconsideration is necessary because 
"the Court did not describe whether it looked outside the four corners of the Supplemental Hammer 
Release because it was ambiguous, or because the Supplemental Hammer Release incorporated by 
reference the Employment Agreement." (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Entry of Summary Judgment, p. 8, hereinafter "Reconsideration Memorandum") 
In actuality, this Court clearly stated, "[t]he release operates to 'release the City of Sun Valley for 
any claims defined in Section 3 .A of the City Administrator Employment Agreement.' When looking 
to Section 3.A of the plaintiffs agreement, it unambiguously provides that. .. " (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 5) It is abundantly clear that there was no ambiguity in the Supplemental Release drafted 
by Donoval, and that the Court simply applied the clear, specific, unambiguous direction of the 
language in that release to refer to Section 3 .A. of the Employment Agreement for definition of the 
claims Plaintiff had released. 
It is questionable how there could be any plausible finding of ambiguity in these documents. 
The Supplemental Release defines its own terms through referencing an exact section of Plaintiffs 
own Employment Agreement. (Memorandum Decision, p. 2-3) This section of Plaintiff's contract 
is not only relevant to the release, but requires this very release in order to complete the terms of 
Plaintiffs termination without cause. (Id) A good faith argument for ambiguity might have existed 
had Plaintiffs Supplement Release not referenced that precise section of the Employment 
Agreement. Instead, Plaintiffherselfincluded the language in her Supplemental Release that she was 
releasing "any claims defined in Section 3.A." (Id) Section 3.A. specifically defines those claims 
as "all claims against the City of Sun Valley." (Id.) (emphasis added) 
It is difficult to imagine a clearer, less ambiguous way to state this. The parties involved were 
sophisticated actors (two attorneys and a "fairly high level executive with the Boeing Company") 
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who included the unambiguous terms of "any and all claims" and again later, "all claims," in 
reference to the release required the Employment Agreement, and included an additional requirement 
that no severance be paid until Plaintiff executed a release in accordance with these terms. 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 2-3) The agreement Plaintiff signed is clear, unambiguous, and 
incorporated with a clear merger clause. This Court correctly determined that there was no ambiguity 
in Plaintiffs Employment Agreement and Supplemental Release, and that in reading both documents 
together ( as the language in each clearly intends), that Plaintiff released her IP PEA claim. 
After largely ignoring this Court's primary (and controlling) reason for granting summary 
judgment, Plaintiff focuses the majority of her arguments for reconsideration on the secondary, 
additional reasons why her claim failed. First among these is that her allegation that the Court failed 
to properly acknowledge the intent of the parties as established through multiple affidavits. Plaintiff 
argues that the Court mistakenly "ignored" the conditional clause in the Supplemental Release which 
she argues requires this Court to consider the intent of the parties when the Employment Agreement 
was entered into in 2008. (Reconsideration Memorandum, p. 10) This Court had no need to give 
authority to superfluous or duplicative language in a non-contractual document. The Supplemental 
Release was nothing more than compliance with the specific contractual requirement found in 
Plaintiffs Employment Agreement. It was not a new contract and had there been any ambiguity in 
its terms, it still would have been unenforceable against Defendant because it neither signed nor 
drafted it. 
In addition, it specifically states that Plaintiff is releasing "all claims as defined in Section 
3 .A. of the Employment Agreement," as intended in 2008. "Where preliminary negotiations are 
consummated by written agreement, the writing supercedes all previous understandings a.11d the 
intent of the parties must be ascertained from the writing. 11 Valley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 
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496,498 (1991) (emphasis added). The intent language in the Supplemental Release is superfluous 
because the "intent of the parties must be ascertained from the writing," not from the Plaintiffs latest 
affidavits tailor-made to retroactively modify that written agreement. Id. Plaintiff's tactics are the 
very reason why the parol evidence rule exists, and why summary judgment is still appropriate in 
this case. 
Because the Employment Agreement and Supplemental Release are unambiguous, all 
Plaintiffs additional affidavits and legal memoranda regarding the alleged intent of the parties are 
irrelevant. As this Court stated in its decision, "the Court declines to consider the parties' subjective 
intent, where the contract is clear." (Memorandum Decision, p. 5) Even if this Court were to look 
to the intent of the parties, pursuant to Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602 (2002), "the 
intent of the parties should be ascertained from the language of the agreement as the best indication 
of their intent." ( emphasis added). Looking to other extrinsic evidence is only appropriate when the 
language of the writing is unclear. Id. And all Plaintiff's purported factual evidence as to why she 
did not release her IP PEA claim stem from inadmissible parol evidence of her and Willich's intent 
prior to executing the Employment Agreement. Thus, the latest affidavits which state the thoughts 
and opinions of Plaintiff, Donoval, and Willich leading up to the execution of the Employment 
Agreement are irrelevant at best, and a sham at worst. 
Further arguing intent of the parties, Plaintiff alleges that the multiple communications 
between the Defendant and Donoval prior to the execution of the Supplemental Release put 
Defendant on notice that Plaintiff was not to specifically release any non-wage claims. 
(Reconsideration Memorandum, p. 20-23) Again, Plaintiff fails to grasp the clear and unambiguous 
language of the Employment Agreement and the purpose of the Supplemental Release. It is irrelevant 
what Donoval told Mr. Naylor throughout the negotiation process, as the Supplemental Release, 
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drafted by Donoval and signed by Plaintiff, clearly indicates that it was to release the claims "as 
defined in Section 3.A. of the Employment Agreement." The alleged intent communicated prior to 
the execution of the release is irrelevant to the knowledge of Defendant, because Defendant has 
always objectively relied on the clear and unambiguous language of the Employment Agreement. 
The Empioyment Agreement states that Plaintiffs release wouid relate to, "any and aii claims" and 
"all claims," and this is clear and unambiguous. Plaintiff's Supplemental Release pointed directly 
to that language, and so any other negotiations, statements, or demands surrounding the 
Supplemental Release were immaterial as the release incorporated the contractual language of the 
Employment Agreement. 
Another secondary ground for granting summary judgment was that Plaintiff received 
appropriate consideration for her release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley. Again, the 
majority of Plaintiffs argument is not new, and continues the incorrect assumption that Plaintiff's 
"severance" payment was to be paid immediately upon her termination without cause when in 
actuality it was conditional on her execution of the release for "all claims" prior to receiving that 
severance. The majority of the cases cited by Plaintiff establish clearly that severance payments are 
only considered wages when contractually provided and no additional conditions were contractually 
required of the employee. Defendant was not contractually obligated to pay Plaintiff any severance 
until she executed a release for "all claims against the City of Sun Valley." Thus, although termed 
a "severance," the use of that term alone, no matter how many times used, is not determinative of 
what they payment actually was classified by the contract itself. 
Interestingly, her argument regarding consideration includes two cases not raised previously 
that actually support Defendant's position and not her own argument. Parker v. Underwriters 
Laboratories, Inc., 140 Idaho 517 (2004 ), is a case which is remarkably similar to Plaintiff's, in that 
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an employee who was being terminated was required to sign a release from "all claims relating to 
her employment or subsequent termination," before receiving an agreed upon severance package. 
Id at 521. The total amount she was to receive was, "based in part on Parker's base salary and years 
of continuous employment with Underwriters." Id The "plain language" of the release and other 
documents that Parker signed made it clear that she would not receive this severance package unless 
she signed the release. Id. Even if Parker rejected the general release, she was guaranteed two weeks 
severance pay regardless. Id. She then signed the release and received weekly payments. Id In 
receiving unemployment benefits, Parker failed to report her monthly severance payments to the 
Idaho Department of Labor as income, which after they discovered this, brought action against her 
to recover the benefits already provided. Id. at 518. The Idaho Supreme Court did not consider that 
severance payment to be wages even though it was based on her salary and length of past service, 
because the severance was only to paid upon the signed release of any and all claims of the 
employee, and thus was not actually "severance pay" only in return for services previously provided. 
Id. at 522. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Parker cited to Moore v. Digital Equipment Corp., 868 P.2d 
1170 (Colo.Ct.App. 1994), as support for its ruling that Parker's payments were not considered 
"severance pay" or wages. Similarly in that case, the employee received a lump-sum "severance 
allowance" payment, with the amount therein based on the length of time the employee had worked, 
in exchange for signing a release for "any and all claims of any kind or description." Id. at 1171. 
This payment was then claimed by the State as potential wages for purposes of unemployment 
benefits. Id. at 1170. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed and held as follows: 
Here, the written agreement between the parties demonstrates that the 
employer's primary purpose in making a lump sum payment was, as 
the referee found, not to provide a salary substitute to secure the 
employee's economic well-being during any period of unemployment. 
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While there is self-serving language to this effect in the agreement 
that was unilaterally prepared by the employer, had this been the 
employer's primary purpose for the payment, it would not have been 
conditioned on the employee's execution of the written release. 
Further, a severance allowance is a payment made to an employee in 
return for services previously provided. Hence, payment made by an 
employer to settle a claim asserted by an employee, even though paid 
on a weekly basis, is not a payment for services rendered. 
An employee has no obligation, as a part of the services he or she is 
to provide to the employer, to renounce legal rights possessed by him 
or her. 
Id at 1172-73 ( emphasis added, internal citations omitted). 
· Almost identically to Parker and Moore, Plaintiff's Employment Agreement set forth a 
payment which was defined with the term "severance," and was based on a portion of her base 
salary, but was only to be paid on execution of a release of "all claims against the City of Sun 
Valley." As both cases above established, the payments received, no matter the semantic distinction, 
were not considered wages, as they were received in valid consideration for the employees executing 
releases for all claims against their employers. When the receipt of any severance payment is 
conditioned upon the execution of a release of legal rights, that payment is not wages in 
consideration of prior service rendered, but rather received in consideration of the release of those 
legal rights. Thus, Plaintiff's payment was valid consideration and her argument is incorrect. 
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that this Court acted improperly when it raised the question of 
judicial estoppel against Plaintiffs changing legal positions, allegedly sua sponte. (Reconsideration 
Memorandum, p. 23-30) However, this issue was not raised by the Court exclusively of its own 
volition, but the substance of the judicial estoppel argument was in fact raised by Defendant and 
briefed by the parties throughout, while admittedly not using t"ie specific term "judicial estoppel." 
In Defendant's initial briefing, it raised possible grounds for summary judgment in that Plaintiff had 
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accepted the severance payment and had executed the required release, and had thus acknowledged 
that she had been terminated without cause. (Corrected Memorandum in Support o/Sun Valley's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 15-16) It then raised the issue that Plaintiff was now seeking 
double-recovery for keeping the severance payment and then also bringing her IP PEA claims against 
Defendant. (id) Further, Defendant also argued that should the Court consider Plaintiffs IPPEA 
claim, that she would not be able to establish a prima facie case because Defendant had a legitimate, 
non-retaliatory, non-pretextual basis to terminate her as it did so without cause. (Id at 24-26) 
In response, Plaintiff specifically stated multiple times in her response that she disputed being 
terminated from her position at Sun Valley under the "without cause" provision of her Employment 
Agreement. (Plaintiff's Response to Sun Valley's Motion/or Summary Judgment, p. 2-5) She further 
argued specifically that she had a prima facie case for retaliation in violation of the IPPEA because 
Defendant's position that Plaintiff was terminated without cause was pretextual as "ample evidence 
exists that Ms. Hammer's termination was not 'without cause' and that the stated reasons are mere 
pretext." (Id. at 24-27) Defendant's reply then fully addressed Plaintiff's allegation that she was not 
fired without cause, and argued that because she signed the release, and accepted the severance 
payment, that this indicated that she clearly acknowledged in writing that she was in fact tenninated 
"without cause." (Sun Valley's Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 9-10) 
The relevant portions of this Court's decision regarding judicial estoppel mirrored the 
arguments made by counsel. The Court indicated that as Plaintiff accepted the severance package 
of her own choice, and that the severance package was only available to her if she was tenninated 
without cause, that she acknowledged that she was terminated without cause. (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 8) It then recognized that because she had previously made this choice to accept the 
payment, that she was judicially estopped from making the argument that she was terminated for 
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cause. (Id.) Subsequently, the Court simply refused to consider whether she was actually terminated 
for cause. (Id. at 9) Contrary to Plaintiff's argument here, Plaintiff had ample opportunity to argue 
the substance of judicial estoppel, and did so, even though neither party used that specific term in 
their argument. This issue was not raised by the Court sua sponte, and therefore reconsideration is 
not necessary on this issue. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
As shown above, summary judgment was appropriately granted to Defendant and 
reconsideration of that decision is unnecessary, and Plaintiffs motion should be denied in its 
entirety. 
DATED this 191h day of May, 2015. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and De WAYNE BRISCOE, 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ENTRY OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants. 
n CONTRARY TO SUN VALLEY'S ASSERTIONS IN ITS RESPONSE, THE COURT 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT'S DIRECTIONS IN 
REGARDS TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT REQUEST RELATED TO A WAIVER 
In analyzing whether summary judgment related to a waiver should be granted, as is the 
case herein, the Idaho Supreme Court has directed that a district court act as follows: 
First, the Idaho Supreme Court has directed that ''fact allegations contained in an affidavit 
opposing a motion for summary judgment must be accepted as true ( emphasis added)." (Sutton 
v. Brown, 85 Idaho 104@109, 375 P.2d 990 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1962)). 
Second, the Idaho Supreme Court has directed, "this court has repeatedly stated that upon 
a motion for summary judgment all doubts ( emphasis added) are to be resolved against the 
moving party" (Crane v. Banner, 93 Idaho 69@73-74, 455 P.2d. 313 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1969)). 
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Third, in regards to a waiver, the Idaho Supreme Court has directed that the existence of 
~aiver "is foremost a question of intent (emphasis added). In order to establish waiver the 
intention to waive must clearly appear ( emphasis added)." (Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning 
Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778@ 782,839 P.2d 1192 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1992)). 
And, finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has directed that the existence of waiver "is a 
question of fact, and if there is any (emphasis added) substantial evidence in the record", 
regarding the existence or non-existence of a waiver, "it is for the trier of facf' ( emphasis added) 
(i.e. not the district court) to determine whether the evidence establishes a waiver or not 
(Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515 @519, 650 P.2d 657 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1982). 
Nothing in Sun Valley's Response contradicts these explicit findings of the Idaho 
Supreme Court or contradicts the necessity for the Court to have followed the directives of the 
Idaho Supreme Court in regards to the waiver issues presented in this matter. 
Although Ms. Hammer recognizes and appreciates the Court's efforts, and its struggles in 
making findings in this matter, as was explained in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum In Support Of 
Motion For Reconsideration, and is further described herein, the Court has unwittingly rushed to 
judgment by violating every one of the directives from the Idaho Supreme Court described above 
in entering the Summary Judgment Decision. Most importantly, the Court has ignored the 
extensive communications to Sun Valley, submitted to its attorney Kirtlan Naylor ("Mr. 
Naylor''), making it clear at the time that the Supplemental Hammer Release was submitted to 
Sun Valley that Ms. Hammer was rejecting Mr. Naylor's demands that she sign an 
"unconditional" release waiving "all claims", and that she was instead retaining any non-wage 
claims against Sun Valley, including any IPPEA related claims, even if Sun Valley chose to pay 
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Ms. Hammer the "severance" payments under the Severance Clause of the Employment 
Agreement. 
~ 
On January 24, 2012, Sun Valley paid Ms. Hammer by direct deposit the sum of 
$66,935.53, without any communications to Ms. Hammer that by doing so Ms. Hammer had 
somehow waived any non-wage claims. The payment of the "severance" included v.ithholding of 
both income and employment taxes on the entire amount. Both a) Sun Valley's withholding of 
employment taxes on the entire amount of the "severance" (admitting that the "severance" was 
entirely payment for wages, not liquidated damages or settlement of other non-wage claims 
which would not be subject to employment tax withholdings), and, b) Sun Valley's unilaterally 
deciding to pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" by direct deposit without clarifying that both Sun 
Valley and Ms. Hammer were in agreement as to whether she was waiving any non-wage claims 
- are genuine issues of material fact related to the circumstances surrounding the submission of 
the Supplemental Hammer Release which the Court did not take into consideration in entering 
summary judgment, and which (among other reasons), on reconsideration, requires the Court to 
reverse its summary judgment findings. 
The uncontested facts submitted in Affidavits by Ms. Hammer which the Court was 
required to accept as true for summary judgment purposes ( see Sutton v. Brown), and instead 
ignored, included: 
a) The Court failed to accept as true the un-contradicted Affidavits of Ms. Hammer and 
Former Mayor Willich that neither intended that Ms. Hammer would be required to waive any 
non-wage claims as part of the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement should Ms. 
Hammer ever be terminated ''without cause" and be paid "severance" when the Employment 
Agreement was negotiated in 2008 (see Sutton v. Brown; Hecla Mining v. Star-Morning); 
b) The Court failed to accept as true the un-contradicted Affidavits of Ms. Hammer and 
Mr. Donoval that Ms. Hammer's intent was not to waive any non-wage claims when she rejected 
Sun Valley's "unconditional" Proposed Sun Valley Release and instead submitted the 
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"conditional" Supplemental Hammer Release to Sun Valley, after submitting numerous 
correspondences to Sun Valley confirming such (see Sutton v. Brown; Hecla v. Star-Morning); 
c) The Court failed to recognize that the uncontroverted facts in Ms. Hammer's and Mr. 
Donoval's Affidavits surrounding the rejection of the "unconditional" Proposed Sun Valley 
Release and the acceptance of the "conditional" Supplemental Hammer Release by Sun Valley 
and payment of the "severance" by direct deposit into Ms. Hammer's bank account, which 
included that Sun Valley withheld employment taxes on the entire "severance" payments, lead 
Ms. Hammer to believe that Sun Valley had acknowledged that Ms. Hammer was retaining her 
non-wage and IP PEA claims, as opposed to Sun Valley's subsequent claims that instead Ms. 
Hammer lead Sun Valley to believe that she was waiving "all" claims (see Sutton v. Brown); 
d) The Court violated the Idaho Supreme Court's direction that where there are any facts 
submitted by the opponent of summary judgment which prohibits the entry of summary 
judgment, the denial of summary judgment was, and is, mandated (see Riverside Development v. 
Ritchie); and, 
e) The Court violated the directives of the Idaho Supreme Court that if there are any 
doubts as to the entry of summary judgment in this matter, they were to be resolved against Sun 
Valley, not in Sun Valley's favor (see Crane v. Banner). 
As the Court failed to follow the directives of the Idaho Supreme Court in regards to 
entering summary judgment related to the issue of a purported waiver, and in entering the 
Summary Judgment Decision has ignored and failed to accept facts alleged in the Affidavits 
submitted by Ms. Hammer as being true for the purpose of summary judgment, it is Ms. 
Hammer's position that the Court is required to vacate its findings in regards to the Summary 
Judgment Decision and deny Sun Valley's request for summary judgment in the matter. 
II) CONTRARY TO SUN VALLEY'S DENIALS, THE COURT WAS OBLIGATED TO 
ACCEPT AS TRUE THE SWORN-TO FACTS SUBMITTED BY MS. HAMMER 
It is clear that in entering the Summary Judgment Decision, the Court failed to 
thoroughly review and understand the facts surrounding the "conditional" nature of Ms. 
Hammer's submission of the Supplemental Hammer Release to Mr. Naylor, and Sun Valley's 
payment of the "severance" by direct deposit to Ms. Hammer's bank account. The Court, 
apparently, instead believed that Sun Valley provided Ms. Hammer with a release that Ms. 
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Hammer simply and blindly signed without objection, and voluntarily accepted the payment of 
"severance" in return. The facts asserted by Ms. Hammer in Affidavits that have been submitted, 
which must be accepted as true for purposes of summary judgment (see Sutton v. Brown 
@109), tell a much different story than what has been argued by Sun Valley (without any 
affidavits to back up its assertions), and what the Court, in entering the Summary Judgment 
Decision, apparently accepted as being true. For summary judgment purposes, the Court was, 
and is, required accept as true Ms. Hammer's version of events - an obligation that the Court, 
regardless of its best intentions, violated. 
Sun Valley, Through Its Attorney Mr. Naylor, Was Clearly Made Aware That Ms. 
Hammer Was Not Waiving Any Non-Wage Claims And Considered Any "Severance" 
Payments That Were To Be Made As Entirely Wages, And Not Related To The Release Of 
Any Non-Wage Claims, When Sun Valley Chose To, None-The-Less, Pay Ms. Hammer The 
"Severance" Anyway. By Direct Deposit 
In its Response, Sun Valley provided no additional factual information or Affidavits in 
opposition to Ms. Hammer's Motion For Reconsideration. Thus, the unopposed facts described 
in the Affidavits submitted by Ms. Hammer in opposition to Sun Valley's summary judgment 
request, and in support of her Motion For Reconsideration, which the Court must accept as true 
for purposes of summary judgment (see Sutton v. Brown @109), but which the Court mostly 
ignored in the Summary Judgment Decision, indicate as follows: 
a) On January 13, 2012, Mr. Donoval sent Mr. Naylor an email specifically 
stating "her contract does not require her to waive any tort or any other non contract 
claims she may have with the City. ( emphasis added)" (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 
11, Exhibit 1). 
b) On January 14, 2012, Mr. Donoval sent Mr. Naylor an email specifically 
stating "regardless of whether you terminate her "without cause" - she has a property 
interest in her employment which we will immediately seek to enforce. And of course I 
will immediately re-file the IPPEA claims. (emphasis added). " (Donoval Rehearing 
Aff., Para. 12, Exhibit 2). 
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c) On January 18, 2012, in a recorded telephone conversation, Mr. Donoval 
specifically told Mr. Naylor that ''even if Sun Valley terminates Ms. Hammer "without 
cause " that she was not required to waive any of her non service or wage types of claims 
against Sun Valley, including IP PEA claims, even if she was paid her severance pay 
under the Severance Clause." (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 14)1 
d) Immediately after the January 18, 2012 telephone call with Mr. Naylor, Mr. 
Donoval submitted a letter to Mr. Naylor stating "As I have stated, the causes of action 
Ms. Hammer possesses for tort, including the underlying J,.arassment allegations against 
Council Member Ribi and several other claims (emphasis added), do not arise "from a 
termination", they arise out of separate incidents. Nor is it rational to assert that Ms. 
Hammer would have waived any non-contract damage claims she would have 
prospectively been entitled to (i.e. personal injury claims) when she signed the 
agreement (emphasis added). So as I have stated, if the City of Sun Valley proposes to 
terminate Ms. Hammer without cause and pay her the severance payment in the contract, 
she will only sign a waiver that states the exact language in the contract cited above and 
nothing more." (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 15, Exhibit 5) 
e) On January 19, 2012, Ms. Hammer was terminated "without cause" by Sun 
Valley pursuant to the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement. (Donoval 
Rehearing Aff., Para. 16; Hammer Rehearing Aff., Para. 15) 
f) On January 20, 2012, Ms. Hammer issued her letter to Sun Valley demanding 
full payment of her "severance" required under the Severance Clause of the Employment 
Agreement within forty eight ( 48) hours, or that treble damages would be required to be 
paid pursuant to Idaho Statute 45-606 and 45-615 (Hammer Rehearing Aff., Para. 16, 
Exhibit 2). The letter included a signed "Release Pursuant To City Administrator 
Employment Agreement" (Hammer Rehearing Aff., Para. 16, Exhibit 2) (the "Original 
Hammer Release") which merely repeated the language of the Severance Clause of the 
Employment Agreement, as Mr. Donoval had told Mr. Naylor it would in the letter of 
January 18, 2012 (see Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 15, Exhibit 5). 
g) In two separate communications to Mr. Naylor (Donoval rehearing Aff., Para. 
13, Exhibit 3) (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 21, Exhibit 10), Mr. Donoval also asserted 
that if Sun Valley did not pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" within 48 hours, without 
requiring any limiting language related to her non-wage claims2, Sun Valley would be 
liable for treble damages pursuant to Idaho Statute 45-615, which considering that the 
total amount due to Ms. Hammer was approximately $83,000 (see Donoval Rehearing 
1 Mr. Naylor recorded this telephone conversation (see Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 14, Exhibit 4) and has failed 
to release the transcript of the conversation. Mr. Naylor has also failed to file an Affidavit denying that Mr. 
Oonoval made these statements to Mr. Naylor. For purposes of summary judgment, the Court must accept this 
statement in Mr. Donoval's Affidavit as being true (see Sutton v. Brown @109), and that Mr. Naylor was aware of 
Ms. Hammer's claims that she was not releasing any iPPEA claims by accepting the "severance" payment. 
2 The email of January 21, 2012 from Mr. Donoval to Mr. Naylor specifically states "You can't put limiting language 
on payments." (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 21, Exhibit 10) 
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Aff., Para 30, Exhibit 13), would have resulted in Sun Valley having to pay Ms. Hammer 
$250,0003• 
h) On January 20, 2012 and January 21, 2012 (a Saturday), Mr. Naylor submitted 
two emails to Mr. Donoval, which included that Sun Valley was rejecting the Original 
Hammer Release as written (Donoval Rehearing A:ff., Para. 18, Exhibit 7), that Ms. 
Hammer must add specific language to the Original Hammer Release of "I release all 
claims against the City Of Sun Valley" or Sun Valley would not pay Ms. Hammer the 
"severance" (Donoval Rehearing A:ff., Para 18, Exhibit 7), and that if the sentence "I 
release all claims against the City Of Sun Valley'' was not added to the Original Hammer 
Release that Sun Valley would not "consider that she has complied with the agreement." 
(Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para 19, Exhibit 8) 
i) In a separate email late in the day on Saturday January 21, 2012, Mr. Naylor 
submitted the Proposed Sun Valley Release which included language demanded by Mr. 
Naylor that "I release all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination 
without cause on January 19, 2012, and all claims against the City Of Sun Valley" or Sun 
Valley would not pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" . (Donoval Rehearing A:ff., Para. 20, 
Exhibit 9) 
j) After discussions with Mr. Donoval, Ms. Hammer refused to sign the Proposed 
Sun Valley Release specifically because it did not affirm that Ms. Hammer was retaining 
her non-wage claims against Sun Valley. (Hammer Rehearing Aff., Para. 18-21) 
(Donoval Rehearing A:ff., Para. 22-23) 
k) Based upon the directions of Ms. Hammer, on January 23, 2012, Mr. Donoval 
sent an email to Mr. Naylor indicating that Ms. Hammer would not be signing the 
Proposed Sun Valley Release submitted to Ms. Hammer by Mr. Naylor. (Hammer 
Rehearing Aff., Para. 21; Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 24, Exhibit 11) 
1) On January 23, 2012, on behalf of Ms. Hammer, Mr. Donoval submitted the 
Supplemental Hammer Release to Mr. Naylor which stated that Ms. Hammer was only 
waiving those claims she "intended when the City Administrator Agreement was entered 
into". (Donoval Rehearing A:ff., Para 28, Exhibit 12) At the time, Ms. Hammer and Mr. 
Donoval believed by submitting the Supplemental Hammer Release with the 
"conditional" language that Ms. Hammer made clear that she was not waiving any of the 
non-wage claims in acceptance of the "severance" payments, as had been clearly 
described to Mr. Naylor in previous communications. (Hammer Rehearing A:ff., Para 22-
24; Donoval Rehearing A:ff., Para. 25-28, Exhibit 12) Contrary to Mr. Naylor's demands, 
the Supplemental Hammer Release did not include the "I release all claims against the 
City Of Sun Valley" or "I release all claims for damages of any kind arising from a 
termination without cause on January 19, 2012, and all claims against the City Of Sun 
3 Mr. Donoval's email of January 16, 2012 (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 13, Exhibit 3), estimated that treble 
damages for Sun Valley's failure to pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" would be about $200,000. In reality, based 
on the final "severance" and benefit payments of $82,537.45 (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 30, Exhibit 13), the 
treble damages amount would have actually been closer to $250,000. 
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Valley" Mr. Naylor demanded before Sun Valley would pay Ms. Hammer the 
"severance". (see emails of Mr. Naylor, Donoval Rehearing AfI., Para. 19-20, Exhibit 8 
and9) 
m) On January 23, 2012, Mr. Donoval met with former Sun Valley Treasurer 
Michelle Frostenson ("Former Treasurer Frostenson"), to review the amounts Ms. 
Hammer was to be paid as her final "severance" payments (Donoval Rehearing Aff., 
Para. 30, Exhibit 13). At that meeting, Fonner Treasurer Frostenson confirmed to Mr. 
Donoval that all "severance" payments which were to be paid to Ms. Hammer due to her 
termination ''without cause" were "wages", subject to employment tax withholding, not 
payment for liquidated damages or any non-wage claims which would not have been 
subject to employment tax withholdings 4. (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para 30-32). 
n) Based on the discussions with Fonner Treasurer Frostenson, and believing that 
the issue of whether all of the "severance" payments to be made to Ms. Hammer pursuant 
to the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement was for "wages", as opposed to 
liquidated damages or non-wage claims, on behalf of Ms. Hammer, Mr. Donoval 
approved the Severance Pay Voucher. (Donoval Rehearing AfI., Para 30-32) 
o) On January 24, 2012, without any further communications to Mr. Donoval or 
Ms. Hammer from either Mr. Naylor, Fonner Treasurer Frostenson or any other Sun 
Valley officials, $66,935.53 was direct deposited in Ms. Hammer's bank account, without 
any forewarning to Ms. Hammer (Hammer Rehearing Aff., Para. 25; Donoval Rehearing 
Aff., Para. 33, Exhibit 14). The $66,935.53 payment included withholding of 
employment taxes on the entire "severance" payments made to Ms. Hammer, as had been 
affirmed by Former Treasurer Frostenson and as was indicted on the Severance Pay 
Voucher. (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 30, Exhibit 13) 
In making its findings in the Summary Judgment Decision that Ms. Hammer had 
somehow lead Sun Valley to believe that she had waived any non-wage claims, the Court 
ignored that 1) Mr. Donoval submitted at least four (4) separate communications to Mr. Naylor 
confirming that Ms. Hammer was not waving any non-wage claims should Ms. Hammer be 
terminated "without cause" and be paid the "severance" under the Employment Agreement 
(paragraphs a - d above); 2) Mr. Naylor demanded that Ms. Hammer provide explicit language 
in a release that said that she was waiving "all claims" or sign the Proposed Sun Valley Release 
4 
See Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 32. "At the time, Former Treasurer Frostenson agreed with me that all of the 
"severoncen payments that Ms. Hommer was to receive pursuant to the Severance Clouse of the Employment 
Agreement and listed in the Severance Pay Voucher were "wogesn subject to employment and income tax 
withholdings, and not "liquidated damages" or other damages". 
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which included that language (paragraphs h-i above); 3) Ms. Hammer rejected Mr. Naylor's 
demands to provide a release which explicitly stated that she waived "all claims", and instead 
submitted the "conditional" Supplemental Hammer Release which refused to do so (paragraphs j 
-1 above); 4) Former Treasurer Frostenson acknowledged that the "severance" that was being 
paid to Ms. Hammer was all ''wages", and not related to liquidated damages or non-wage claims 
(paragraphs m- n above); 5) Sun Valley paid the "severance" by direct deposit, notwithstanding 
that Ms. Hammer refused to submit a release admitting that the "severance" was in settlement of 
"all claims" as had been demanded by Mr. Naylor (Hammer Rehearing Aff., Para. 21-24; 
Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 22-28, Exhibit 12); and, 6) the payment of"severance" to Ms. 
Hammer included withholding of employment tax an all payments (Donoval Rehearing Aff., 
Para. 30, Exhibit 13), thus admitting that the "severance" was totally "wages" and not liquidated 
damages or other non-wage claims. With all of these verified facts in the record confirming that 
Ms. Hammer did not intend to waive any non-wage claims related to her termination and that 
Sun Valley acted in a way that confirmed that Sun Valley also accepted that Ms. Hammer had 
not waived any non-wage claims in payment of the "severance", at a minimum, there are genuine 
issues of material fact which prohibit the entry of summary judgment. 
IID THE FAILURE OF SUN VALLEY TO SUPPORT ITS CLAIMS WITH 
AFFIDAVITS THAT SUN VALLEY BELIEVED THAT MS. HAMMER HAD WAIVED 
ANY NON-WAGE CLAIMS BY THE SUBMISSION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
HAMMER RELEASE, REQUIRES THE DENIAL OF SUN VALLEY'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT REQUEST 
In response to the Affidavits filed in support of Ms. Hammer's original Response to Sun 
Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment, and in support of her Motion For Reconsideration, Sun 
Valley has filed no Affidavits explaining any of the circumstances surrounding the submission of 
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the Supplemental Hammer Release and the payment of the "severance" to Ms. Hammer in 
January of 2012, which include that: 
a) Sun Valley failed to supply any Affidavits that show that Mr. Naylor provided 
any of the communications submitted to Mr. Naylor by Mr. Donoval regarding the issue 
of the "severance" payments or that Ms. Hammer was retaining any non-wage claims 
against Sun Valley if she was paid "severance", including her IPPEA claims, to any Sun 
Valley officials or that any Sun Valley officials were aware of these communications. 
b) Sun Valley failed to supply any Affidavits that indicate that Sun Valley 
officials directed Mr. Naylor to draft and issue the Proposed Sun Valley Release, that any 
Sun Valley officials were aware of what the Proposed Sun Valley Release stated, or that 
Mr. Naylor even submitted the Proposed Sun Valley Release to Mr. Donoval on 
Saturday, January 21, 2012 on their behalf. 
c) Sun Valley failed to supply any Affidavits that indicate that Mr. Naylor 
communicated to any Sun Valley officials that Ms. Hammer had rejected the Proposed 
Sun Valley Release submitted to Ms. Hammer by Mr. Naylor. 
d) Sun Valley failed to supply any Affidavits which explained why Sun Valley 
accepted a release (the Supplemental Hammer Release) which did not include the 
language of"I release all claims against Sun Valley" demanded by Mr. Naylor for 
payment of the "severance", and still paid the "severance" to Ms. Hammer. 
e) Sun Valley failed to supply any Affidavits that indicate that Mr. Naylor 
provided the Supplemental Hammer Release to any Sun Valley officials or that any Sun 
Valley officials were aware that the Supplemental Hammer Release had even been 
provided to Mr. Naylor, upon which any Sun Valley officials could have made any 
determinations or decisions related to the intent of the Supplemental Hammer Release. 
f) Sun Valley failed to supply any Affidavits from either Fonner Treasurer 
Frostenson or any other Sun Valley officials denying that Sun Valley considered that the 
entire "severance" payments made to Ms. Hammer were ''wages" as opposed to 
liquidated damages or related to other claims, or why Sun Valley withheld employment 
taxes on the entire "severance" payments made to Ms. Hammer, if a portion of the 
"severance" was actually for liquidated damages or in settlement of other non-wage 
claims, as is now claimed by Sun Valley. 
g) Sun Valley has failed to supply any Affidavits indicating which Sun Valley 
official or officials actually authorized that the direct deposit of the "severance" be made 
to Ms. Hammer's bank account, or on what information they relied before doing so. 
The failure of Sun Valley to enter any Affidavits into the record explaining the conduct 
of Sun Valley officials related to the circumstance surrounding the rejection by Ms. Hammer of 
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• 
the ''unconditional" Proposed Sun Valley Release, and the submission to, and acceptance of, the 
"conditional" Supplemental Hammer Release by Sun Valley, leaves the Court with no basis to 
determine who actually made the decision to make a direct deposit of the "severance" payments 
into Ms. Hammer's bank account- or more importantly - why. In fact, there is no factual 
evidence in the record that any Sun Valley officials, other than Mr. Naylor, were aware of the 
rejection of the Proposed Sun Valley Release, had actually seen the Supplemental Hammer 
Release, or believed that Ms. Hammer had waived her non-wage claims by the submission of the 
Supplemental Hammer Release to Mr. Naylor. At this juncture, except for Former Treasurer 
Frostenson, the record shows that Mr. Naylor was the only Sun Valley related individual with 
any knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the submission of the Supplemental Hammer 
Release and the payment of the "severance" to Ms. Hammer by direct deposit5• 
For all the Court knows, Sun Valley officials paid Ms. Hammer the "severance" because 
they were lead by Mr. Naylor to believe that Ms. Hammer had signed the "unconditional" 
Proposed Sun Valley Release which Ms. Hammer had rejected, rather than having made clear to 
Mr. Naylor that such was not the case and instead submitting the "conditional" Supplemental 
Hammer Release to Sun Valley. And even if the decisions were made by Sun Valley officials 
rather than unilaterally by Mr. Naylor, for all the Court knows Sun Valley officials paid Ms. 
Hammer the "severance" by direct deposit because they were more worried about having to pay 
Ms. Hammer treble damages under Idaho Statute 45-606 and 45-615 than that they were 
convinced that Ms. Hammer had waived any non-wage claims - as has been argued by Sun 
5 
The only persons who held the authority to make decisions regarding the acceptance of the Supplemental 
Hammer Release and the payment of the "severance" by direct deposit to Ms. Hammer was the entire Sun Valley 
City Council by formal vote (which is nowhere to be found in the record) or by Sun Valley Mayor Dewayne Briscoe 
(which is also nowhere to be found in the record). Clearly, Mr. Naylor or Former Treasurer Frostenson had no 
authority to make decisions to accept the Hammer Supplemental Release or to make the "severance" payment by 
direct deposit without the requisite approval of Sun Valley Mayor DeWayne Briscoe or the Sun Valley City Council. 
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Valley. With all due respect, the Court cannot enter summary judgment based on inferences and 
assumptions about what Sun Valley officials did or not believe, or did or did not do, which are 
not in the record. 
Contrary to the arguments of Sun Valley, the verified facts in the record make clear that 
Mr. Naylor, the authorized representative of Sun Valley, was painfully aware of Ms. Hammer's 
assertions and belief that she was not waiving any of her non-wage claims by the rejection of the 
"unconditional" Proposed Sun Valley Release and the submission of the "conditional" 
Supplemental Hammer Release. There is no evidence that Mr. Naylor forwarded those 
communications to Sun Valley officials, or that Sun Valley officials were aware of Ms. 
Hammer's refusal to waive any non-wage claims in return for the payment of"severance". 
Without any Affidavits of what Sun Valley officials understood related to the submission of the 
Supplemental Hammer Release, the Court simply cannot come to the conclusion, at summary 
judgment, regarding what Sun Valley officials beliefs were as to whether Ms. Hammer intended 
to, or actually did, waive any rights to pursue non-wage claims by the submission of the 
Supplemental Hammer Release with the limiting language, especially considering that Ms. 
Hammer's assertions that she did not intend to do so have been submitted in a sworn-to 
Affidavit. 
It should be noted that on January 20, 2012 and January 21, 2012, after Ms. Hammer had 
already been terminated, and after Ms. Hammer submitted the Original Hammer Release, Mr. 
Naylor demanded that Ms. Hammer sign a release that specifically had the "unconditional" 
language "I release all claims against the City of Sun Valley" or Sun Valley would not pay Ms. 
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Hammer the "severance"6 (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para 19, Exhibit 8). Mr. Naylor then sent 
the Proposed Sun Valley Release with the ''unconditional" language of "I release all claims for 
damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause on January 19, 2012, and all 
claims against the City Of Sun Valley" included, and again demanded that if the Proposed Sun 
Valley Release was not signed and returned "payment will not be able to be made." (Donoval 
Rehearing Aff., Para. 20, Exhibit 9). Contrary to Mr. Naylor's demands, Ms. Hammer did not 
sign the Proposed Sun Valley Release or a release that included language that she released "all 
claims" against Sun Valley and instead submitted the "conditional" Supplemental Hammer 
Release. Having demanded that Ms. Hammer sign an ''unconditional" release of"all claims", 
Ms. Hammer was certainly entitled to believe that when Sun Valley did pay the "severance" 
even though Ms. Hammer did not sign a release that actually stated that she had waived "all 
claims", that Sun Valley had accepted that Ms. Hammer was preserving her non-wage claims, 
including claims under the IPPEA. By its own actions in paying the "severance" after Mr. Naylor 
had made clear that Sun Valley would only do so if Ms. Hammer submitted a release waiving 
"all claims", and giving Ms. Hammer the impression that Sun Valley had given up on its efforts 
to require Ms. Hammer to explicitly release "all claims" before Sun Valley made the payments to 
Ms. Hammer by direct deposit, Sun Valley should be estopped from then claiming that Sun 
Valley still somehow believed that she had waived "all claims" anyway. 
6 In the email from Mr. Naylor of January 20, 2012, in response to the submission of the Original Hammer Release, 
Mr. Naylor states "please revise your release agreement to replace the last paragraph with this language, in order 
for payment to be made (emphasis added) "I release all claims against the City of Sun Valley". (Donoval Rehearing 
Aff., Para. 18, Exhibit 7) Then in the first email of January 21, 2012, Mr. Naylor states "Add that sentence to the 
release, or we will consider that she has complied with the agreement ... But you hold the "$$$" in your hands." 
(Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 19, Exhibit 8). Then in the second email of January 21, 2012, Mr. Naylor sent the 
Proposed Sun Valley Release with the language "I release all claims for damages of any kind arising from a 
termination without cause on January 19, 2012, and all claims against the City Of Sun Valley." and demanded that 
the Proposed Sun Valley Release was "the acceptable release. If it is not received by 1:00 pm Monday, payment 
will not be able to be made." (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 20, Exhibit 9) 
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As there are considerable facts related to Ms. Hammer's denial that she waived any non-
wage claims, which challenge Sun Valley's unverified assertions and arguments that Sun Valley 
officials somehow believed that Ms. Hammer had voluntarily waived her right to pursue any 
non-wage claims when Sun Valley unilaterally deposited the "severance" into Ms. Hammer's 
bank account after Mr. Naylor demanded that Sun Valley would only do so upon the receipt of a 
release which specifically stated that she had waived "all claims", which was never provided, 
and Sun Valley officials have been silent as to any of these matters, the Court's entry of 
summary judgment is in error, and should be reversed. 
IV) SUN VALLEY HAS FAILED TO COUNTER THAT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, 
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR IDAHO AND THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
HA VE ALL DEFINED "SEVERANCE" AS WAGES OR AS REMUNERATION FOR 
WORK PERFORMED, NOT AS SETTLEMENT OF OTHER CLAIMS OR AS 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
In her Memorandum in Support Of Reconsideration, Ms. Hammer provided cases from 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. District Court for Idaho and the Idaho Supreme Court, all of 
which define that when an employee is paid a "severance" payment, the payment relates to past 
services performed, and is not liquidated damages or settlement of other non-wage related 
claims, as was argued by Sun Valley, and as was found by the Court in its Summary Judgment 
Decision. 
The most important case law cite, and one which the Court is mandated by stare decisis 
to accept, is that in the 2014 case of U.S. v. Quality Stores, 134 S.Ct. 1395 (U.S. Sup.Ct. 2014), 
the U.S. Supreme Court stated (@1399-1400): 
"Severance payments made to terminated employees are 'remuneration for employment'. 
Severance payments are, of course, 'remuneration', and common sense dictates that 
employees receive the payments 'for employment' ... Severance payments are made in 
consideration for employment - for a 'service ... performed' by 'an employee for the 
person employing him.' " 
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In its Response, Sun Valley has failed to respond to, and has instead chosen to simply 
ignore, the U.S. Supreme Court's recent definition in US. v. Quality Stores that "severance" is 
for "services performed", not for liquidated damages. 
In her Memorandum in Support Of Reconsideration Ms. Hammer also cited to two Idaho 
Supreme Court cases (Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363,679 P.2d 640 (Idaho 
Sup.Ct. 1984)) and Parker v. Underwriters Laboratories, 140 Idaho 517, 96 P.3d 618 (Idaho 
Sup.Ct. 2004) and a U.S. District Court For Idaho case (Sarbacher v. Americold Realty, 2011 
WL 5520442 (U.S. Idaho 2011)), all of which discuss the parameters of what "severance" means 
in the context of an employment settlement under Idaho law. In Johnson v. Allied Stores, in 
determining whether "severance" pay was ''wages" under Idaho Statute 45-608 (related to the 
statute of limitation on collection of wages law suits), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that 
"Severance pay is also a component of compensation in an employment agreement ... Thus we 
hold that a claim for severance pay also comes within the parameters of Idaho Statute 45-608." 
(i.e. Re: Collection Of Wages) (i.e. wages for services rendered). In Parker v. Underwriters, in 
citing a Colorado case of Moore v. Digital Equipment, 868 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Colo. App.Ct. 
1994) (which stated that "A severance allowance is a payment made to an employee in return/or 
services previously provided. (emphasis added))" the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
" 'Severance pay' has been defined as 'a sum of money usually based on length of 
employment for which an employee is eligible upon termination.' ( citing to the American 
Heritage Dictionary Of the English Language, 4th Edition, 2000). The purpose of a 
severance plan is to protect employees from economic hardship and to reward them/or 
past services rendered. (emphasis added)" (citing to 27 Am.Jur.2d, Employment 
Relationships, Sec. 70) (@520) 
And in Sarbacher, the U.S. District Court for Idaho differentiated findings in an Idaho 
case named Moore v. Omnicare, 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2005) that 
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prospective payments in settlement of a termination were considered liquidated damages, not 
wages, to the facts in the Sarbacher case. In Sarbacher, the U.S. District Court differentiated the 
Sarbacher facts from the Moore v. Omnicare case because a) in Sarbacher the payment to the 
plaintiff was a lwnp swn payment (not prospective payments as was the case in Moore v. 
Omnicare), and b) the separation agreement entered into in Sarbacher specifically included the 
phrase "severance" while the word "severance" was never mentioned in the agreements entered 
into in Moore v. Omnicare7• 
As was the case in Sarbacher, in this case, the Severance Clause of the Employment 
Agreement and the Supplemental Hammer Release both referred to the payments that Ms. 
Hammer was to receive as being "severance", and Ms. Hammer received the "severance" in a 
lwnp sum payment. However, in entering summary judgment, the Court specifically dismissed 
the findings of Judge Winmill in the Sarbacher case, and instead determined that the "severance" 
payments to Ms. Hammer were "liquidated damages" pursuant to the rationale of Moore v. 
Omnicare. Judge Winmill has been a U.S. District Judge for approximately twenty (20) years 
and has heard hundreds of employment related cases under Idaho law. Judge Winmill's logic and 
analysis of the definition of"severance" under Idaho law should not be held with such little 
disregard by this Court. Under Judge Winmill's analysis in Sarbacher, if payment is made to a 
terminated employee in a lump swn and if the phrase "severance" is used in connection with the 
payment, under Idaho law, the payment relates to remuneration for services rendered and is not 
to be considered "liquidated damages", as was the case in Sarbacher. Therefore, this Court 
should follow the extensive experience of Judge Winmill in regards to Idaho employment law 
7 In fact, as noted in Ms. Hammer Memorandum in Support Of Reconsideration, in Sarbacher, Judge Winmill 
specifically found that because the settlement agreement in Sarbacher used the phrase "severance", the payments 
made to the plaintiff in that case could not be considered "liquidated damages", as was found in Moore v. 
Omnicare, where the phrase "severance" was never mentioned in settlement documents. 
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matters, and follow the guidance of Sarbacher ( as opposed to Moore v. Omnicare), and find that 
the payments made to Ms. Hammer were strictly "severance" for wages and not liquidated 
damages as the Court found. 
In its Response, Sun Valley also now asserts that the two Idaho cases Ms. Hammer 
mentioned in her Memorandum in Support Of Reconsideration, which Sun Valley did not itself 
previously rely on, namely, Parker v. Underwriters and Moore v. Digital, confirm that 
"severance" is not wages or remuneration for past services. However, like in Moore v. Omnicare, 
the facts in both Parker v. Underwriters and Moore v. Digital are much different that Ms. 
Hammer's situation. In both Parker v. Underwriters and Moore v. Digital, (as was the case in 
Moore v. Omnicare), the plaintiffs received post termination payments which were considered 
"enhanced" benefits (see Parker v. Underwriters@622), which Ms. Hammer did not receive in 
this situation. Sun Valley's arguments regarding both Parker v. Underwriters and Moore v. 
Digital are not applicable as Ms. Hammer did not receive any post-termination or "enhanced" 
benefits, but instead received a lump sum "severance" payment. 
However, no matter what the status was of previous Idaho rulings related to what is and 
what is not "severance", or what the definition of"severance" is, all courts, whether it be the 
Idaho Supreme Court, the U.S. District Court for Idaho or this Court, are now bound by the 
explicit findings of the U.S. Supreme Court in US. v. Quality Stores, that "severance" payments 
are "consideration for employment - for a 'service ... performed' by 'an employee for the person 
employing him."', and not liquidated damages or settlement of non-wage claims, as was found 
by the Court in the Summary Judgment Decision. All cases entered prior to the 2014 findings in 
US. v. Quality Stores regarding what is and what is not "severance" must now be viewed in light 
of the recent findings of the U.S. Supreme Court in US. v. Quality Stores. Any arguments of any 
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litigant, including Sun Valley, that "severance" is anything but payment for a "service 
performed", faces serious scrutiny and skepticism subsequent to the U.S. Supreme Court's 
finding in US. v. Quality Stores. 
Pursuant to the concept of stare decisis, this Court is obligated to respect and comply 
with the rulings of higher courts, and in particular the U.S. Supreme Court. In light of the recent 
findings of the U.S. Supreme Court in US. v. Quality Stores, and the Court's findings that the 
"severance" payment to Ms. Hammer was not wages for a "service performed", but instead was 
liquidated damages, the Court must reconsider its findings in light of its obligations related to the 
U.S Supreme Court's definition of"severance" in US. v. Quality Stores as being payment for 
past services rendered or performed (as has been argued by Ms. Hammer), and not as "liquidated 
damages" or as settlement of non-wage claims (as has been argued by Sun Valley and found by 
the Court). 
Y} FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURPOSES, THE COURT ERRED BY REJECTING 
MS. HAMMER'S AND FORMER MAYOR WILLICH'S SWORN STATEMENTS THAT 
NEITHER INTENDED THAT MS. HAMMER WAS PROSPECTIVELY REOIDRED TO 
WAIVE ANY NON-WAGE RELATED CLAIMS WHEN THE EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED INTO IN 2008 
In support of her Objection to the entry of summary judgment, and in support of her 
Memorandum in Support Of Reconsideration, Ms. Hammer has submitted Affidavits of herself, 
Mr. Donoval and Fonner Mayor Willich regarding the intent of the parties when the 
Employment Agreement was entered into back in 2008. The Court is obligated to accept the 
Affidavits as being true for summary judgment purposes (see Sutton v. Brown@I09). 
Ms. Hammer, Mr. Donoval (who acted as Ms. Hammer's counsel regarding the 
Employment Agreement) and Former Mayor Willich have all sworn that in reviewing the 
Employment Agreement drafted by Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles in 2008, that they all 
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accepted the common definition of "severance" as relating only to remuneration for past services 
rendered, and that none of the three considered that by entering into the Employment Agreement 
that should Ms. Hammer ever be terminated "without cause" that she would be waiving any 
non-wage claims (see Hammer Rehearing Aff., Para 9-12; Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 8-9; 
Willich Rehearing A:ff., Para 5-9). 
Ms. Hammer's basis for her belief that "severance" only applied to past service should 
she ever be terminated, was based on her history as a municipal attorney and as a city 
administrator in Illinois , where statutes provide that "severance" only applies to "past services 
rendered to an employer" (Hammer Rehearing A:ff., Para 8). 
Mr. Donoval's basis for believing that "severance" only applied to past services should 
Ms. Hammer ever be terminated, was based on his work as both an attorney and a CPA wherein 
he was aware that for income and employment tax purposes "severance" is defined by the IRS as 
wages, not as liquidated or other non-wage related payments. (Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 7) 
Former Mayor Willich based his belief that "severance" only applied to past services 
rendered should Ms. Hammer ever be terminated, due to his work as a high level executive at 
Boeing wherein "severance" payments were "limited to performance related compensation". 
(Willich Rehearing Aff., Para I 0) 
Both Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor Willich have confirmed that the specifics 
regarding whether "severance" did not apply to any non-wage related claims should Ms. 
Hammer ever be terminated were not specifically discussed when the Employment Agreement 
was entered into in 2008 because both believed that it was obvious that "severance" clearly 
meant that any compensation under the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement was 
intended to compensate Ms. Hammer "for past services rendered", not for settlement of other 
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non-wage related claims. {Hammer Rehearing AfI., Para. 9-1 O; Willich Rehearing AfI., Para. 5-
6) Both Ms. Hammer and Fonner Mayor Willich have sworn that if there was any question that 
the phrase "severance" in the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement only was 
considered as payment for past services rendered, and not for settlement of any future claims, 
that both would have agreed to add specific language in the Employment Agreement defining 
such, because that was what was intended by both Fonner Mayor Willich and Ms. Hammer 
(Hammer Rehearing Aff., Para. 11; Willich Rehearing Aff., Para. 7). 
Separate from the intent of Fonner Mayor Willich and Ms. Hammer related to the 
Severance Clause, the Court must look to the language of the singular sentence in the Severance 
Clause which requires that Ms. Hammer must provide Sun Valley with an undefined release of 
all claims, within the context of a section of the Employment Agreement which uses the phrase 
"severance" no less than five (5) separate times. Certainly, because the provision requiring a 
release was in a section that described that it related to "severance" in numerous places, and that 
the phrase "liquidated damages" is found nowhere in the Severance Clause, both Ms. Hammer 
and Fonner Mayor Willich had the right to consider that the providing of a release would only 
relate to the release of wage related claims for services rendered, as opposed to the release of any 
tort, injury, constitutional or other non-wage related claims at the time the Employment 
Agreement was entered into. 
It is simply ludicrous for Sun Valley to assert that Ms. Hammer had somehow knowingly 
prospectively released "any and all" potential claims against Sun Valley, even claims that could 
not have been foreseen, when she signed the Employment Agreement8• Under Sun Valley's 
8 Mr. Donoval made this patently clear to Mr. Naylor in his January 18, 2012 email when he stated aNor is it 
rational to assert that Ms. Hammer would have waived any non-contract damage claims she would have 
prospectively been entitled to (i.e. personal injury claims) when she signed the agreement." (Donoval Rehearing 
Aff., Para. 15, Exhibit S) 
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arguments, and the Court's findings, did Ms. Hammer prospectively waive any horrific injuries 
she may have encountered if she was hurt as part of her duties as a Sun Valley fire fighter? 
Under Sun Valley's arguments, and the Court's findings, did Ms. Hammer prospectively waive 
any injuries Ms. Hammer may have suffered if Former Council Member Ribi had hit her over the 
head with a baseball bat rather than only assaulting her? Under Sun Valley's arguments, and the 
Court's findings, if Sun Valley was facing potential multi-million dollar claims from Ms. 
Hammer, Sun Valley apparently could terminate Ms. Hammer "without cause" and limit its 
exposure to only $65,000 (i.e. 6 months of Ms. Hammer's pay). That could not possibly have 
been the intent or purpose of the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement when it was 
entered into in 2008. 
On Page 5 and 6 of the Summary Judgment Decision, the Court asserts that where parties 
disagree over the intent of a contract provision, that "where one party has no reason to know of 
any other meaning than that apparent from the other party's own words, and the other party did 
not did have reason to know the meaning the first party would attach to his words, the first 
party's understanding prevails." However, in entering the Summary Judgment Decision, the 
Court wholly ignores Idaho case law directives that intent of the parties must be looked at "at the 
time the contract was made" (see Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 38 P.3d 1258 
(Idaho Sup.Ct. 2002)). The Court has made the error of using the interpretation of the new 
administration of Sun Valley as to what the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement 
means, rather than the intent of the former administration of Sun Valley in the form of Former 
Mayor Willi ch, who negotiated and entered into the Employment Agreement on behalf of Sun 
Valley. In essence, the view of the new administration of Sun Valley should be irrelevant to the 
analysis. 
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Talcing the sworn-to statements of Former Mayor Willich as being true, which the Court 
must do for summary judgment purposes (see Sutton v. Brown@109), the Court must 
acknowledge that at the time the Employment Agreement was entered into that Sun Valley, as 
an entity, interpreted the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement in the exact same way 
as Ms. Hammer, namely, that the receipt of"severance" should Ms. Hammer ever be terminated 
did not require her to release any non-wage claims. As there is no disagreement between the 
parties who actually entered into the Employment Agreement as to what the language of the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement was meant to provide for when the 
Employment Agreement was entered into, and therefore still must provide for, there simply and 
actually is no disagreement over the intent of the parties who actually entered into the 
Employment Agreement. 
As the two parties who entered into the Employment Agreement, namely Ms. Hammer 
and Former Mayor Willich, had a meeting of the minds as to what the Severance Clause of the 
Employment Agreement meant, the new administration of Sun Valley, and the Court itself, has 
no authority to change that intent. The Court's finding that a corporate owner or a new 
administration of a government entity can change the intent of a contract, notwithstanding both 
the prior owner's or administration's sworn-to statements as to what the intent of the parties were 
when entering into a contract, violates every tenet of the sanctity of contracts. As the Court must 
accept as true, for summary judgment purposes, that both Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor 
Willich were both clear when the Employment Agreement was entered into in 2008 that the 
Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement did not require that Ms. Hammer waive any 
non-wage claims should she be paid the "severance" payments if she was terminated "without 
cause", and as the Court must resolve all doubts regarding what the intent of the parties were 
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when the Employment Agreement was entered into in favor of Ms. Hammer, not Sun Valley (see 
Crane v. Banner@73-74}, the Court must reverse its findings that the Severance Clause of the 
Employment Agreement required that Ms. Hammer waive any non-wage claims when she was 
paid the "severance" . 
V) SUN VALLEY HAS FAILED TO RESPOND TO, OR DENY, THAT BY REQUIRING 
EMPLOYMENT TAX WITHHOLDINGS ON ALL OF THE "SEVERANCE" 
PAYMENTS, THAT SUN VALLEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NONE OF THE 
"SEVERANCE" PAYMENTS WERE FOR NON-WAGE CLAIMS OR FOR 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
Ms. Hammer's assertions about Former Treasurer Frostenson's admission that all 
"severance" Ms. Hammer was about to receive was subject to employment truces, is not an 
insignificant issue in the matter. Sun Valley has failed to respond in any way to the assertion that 
by withholding employment truces on the entire amount of "severance", that Sun Valley was 
admitting that none of the "severance" payments related to liquidated damages or other non-
wage claims, which would have been exempt from employment taxes - or that at a minimum, 
Sun Valley lead Mr. Donoval and Ms. Hammer to believe that by withholding employment truces 
on the entire "severance" payments that Sun Valley had conceded that Ms. Hammer was not 
being paid any of the "severance" in release of any non-wage claims. 
Pursuant to IRS Revenue Ruling 72-268, liquidated damages are not "wages" subject to 
employment taxes (also see Kern v. Mid-Continental Petroleum Corp., 63 F.Supp. 120 (U.S. 
N.D.Iowa 1945, affirmed by the U.S. 8th Circuit Appellate Court (157 F.2d 310 (U.S. App.8th 
1946) (liquidated damages are not ''wages" for employment tax withholding purposes). In fact, 
the entire U.S. v. Quality Stores case previously cited, deals with the issues related to whether 
"severance" payments are subject to employment true withholding or are exempt from 
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withholding of employment taxes (which the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed they were not 
exempt) as some other forms of compensation (such as liquidated damages) are. 
Most competent attorneys, CPA' s and financial professionals are well aware of this 
employment tax provision. Certainly, Mr. Donoval was aware of this employment tax 
withholding provision when he discussed the issue regarding withholdings on the "severance" 
payment about to be paid to Ms. Hammer with Former Treasurer Frostenson on January 23, 2012 
(see Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 30-34). Mr. Donoval also had the right to presume that 
Former Treasurer Frostenson was aware of the implications of whether the "severance" 
payments about to be paid to Ms. Hammer were wages subject to withholding, or liquidated 
damages or other non-wage related payments not subject to withholding. Instead, Former 
Treasurer Frostenson made clear to Mr. Donoval that the entire amount of "severance" was 
wages subject to employment tax withholding, and not liquidated damages or other non-wage 
related compensation which would not be subject to employment tax withholding9• Considering 
that Mr. Donoval had just submitted several correspondences to Mr. Naylor confirming that Ms. 
Hammer was not going to waive any non-wage claims as part of issuing a release, that Ms. 
Hammer and Mr. Donoval had just rejected signing the "unconditional" Proposed Sun Valley 
Release Mr. Naylor was demanding that Ms. Hammer sign in return for the payment, and that 
Former Treasurer Frostenson had just confirmed that none of the "severance" payments related 
to liquidated damages or non-wage claims - both Ms. Hammer and Mr. Donoval had the right to 
believe that they had preserved Ms. Hammer's rights to bring further non-wage claims, such as 
the IPPEA claim, even if Sun Valley paid Ms. Hammer the "severance". 
9 Pursuant to Mr. Donoval's Affidavit, on January 23, 2014 "Former Treasurer Frostenson agreed with me that all of 
the "severance" payments that Ms. Hammer was to receive pursuant to the Severance Clause of the Employment 
Agreement and listed in the Severance Pay Voucher were "wages" subject to employment and income tax 
withholdings, and not "liquidated damages" or other damages." Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 32) 
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For summary judgment purposes, the Court must accept as true (see Sutton v. Brown 
@109) the statements of Former Treasurer Frostenson on January 23, 2012 that all of the 
"severance" payments to be made to Ms. Hammer were wages and that none of the "severance" 
payments were considered by Sun Valley at the time they were paid to be either liquidated 
damages or in regards to the settlement of other non-wage claims. (Donoval Rehearing Aff., 
Para. 32) The fact that Sun Valley withheld employment taxes on the entire "severance" 
payments made to Ms. Hammer is additional evidence that at the time of the direct deposit of the 
"severance" funds into Ms. Hammer's bank account, that Sun Valley officials did not consider 
any of the "severance" payments to Ms. Hammer to be liquidated damages or payment for other 
non-wage matters, in direct contradiction to what Sun Valley has subsequently argued and the 
Court has determined. 
As there is evidence in the record in the form of Former Treasurer Frostenson's 
uncontroverted admission that none of the "severance" being paid to Ms. Hammer was liquidated 
or other damages, and Sun Valley's withholding of employment taxes on the entire "severance" 
payments made to Ms. Hammer (evidencing that Sun Valley did not consider any of the 
"severance" to be liquidated damages at the time of payment), which directly contradicts Sun 
Valley's claims and the Court's fmdings, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether 
Sun Valley really did consider that the "severance" payment to Ms. Hammer included settlement 
of non-wage claims, which prohibits the entry of summary judgment. 
VI) THE COURT'S FINDING THAT MS. HAMMER WAIVED HER RIGHT TO BRING 
THE IPPEA CLAIMS BECAUSE SHEW AS PAID THE "SEVERANCE" BY DIRECT 
DEPOSIT, AND DID NOT RETURN THE PAYMENT BEFORE BRINGING SUIT, IS 
ERROR . 
In the Summary Judgment Decision, based on arguments of Sun Valley, the Court found 
that Ms. Hammer had the choice of rejecting the "severance" payment and pursuing her non-
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wage claims or accepting the "severance" payment and waiving all claims, including any non-
wage related claims. Ms. Hammer has asserted that she actually had a third option, which was to 
refuse to sign a waiver that included any language that she was waiving any non-wage claims 
and still demand that her wage related "severance" be paid (Hammer Rehearing AfI., Para. 19; 
Donoval Rehearing Aff., Para. 23). 
The Court made its findings, apparently, misunderstanding that Ms. Hammer did not 
voluntarily receive a check from Sun Valley and cash it in settlement of "all" claims - but 
instead that the "severance" payment was made by Sun Valley by direct deposit into Ms. 
Hammer's checking account, without any indication from Sun Valley that by doing so Sun 
Valley considered that Ms. Hammer had waived any and all claims, as it later asserted. 
Although no Idaho cases can be found regarding whether a payment made by an 
employer must be returned if the plaintiff thereafter seeks to challenge the legitimacy of a 
waiver, several federal cases have discussed the issue. In Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F .3d 1046 
(U.S. App.8th 2006), the U.S. 8th Circuit Appellate Court found that former University Of 
Arkansas basketball coach Nolan Rishardson was not required to return approximately a half 
million dollar payment he was paid pursuant to the termination provision of his contract, when 
he thereafter brought a federal discrimination law suit against the University of Arkansas. 
Closer to home, the U.S. 9th Circuit Appellate Court, in Botefur v. City Of Eagle Point, 7 
F.3d 152 (U.S. App.8th 1993), found that requiring a plaintiff to return the termination payments 
made to an employee who signed a release, as a prerequisite to filing a law suit related to the 
termination, was not necessary. The Botefur Court found that "A tender back requirement is 
neither"indispensible to any scheme of justice" nor an "indispensible prerequisite to litigation." 
(@ 156). The Botefur Court concluded that "We hold that a civil rights plaintiff is not required to 
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return consideration received pursuant to a valid release agreement as a prerequisite to initiating 
a Section 1983 action premised on the violations purportedly released by the agreement."(@ 
156). 
In this case, Ms. Hammer did not voluntarily receive and cash a check from Sun Valley 
in settlement of any claims. Instead, Sun Valley unilaterally chose to direct the deposit the 
"severance" payments into her bank account, when Ms. Hammer had been clear in her 
communications that she was not releasing any non-wage claims, or at a minimum, that the issue 
had still not been resolved. Based on the cases cited above, the Court should not have taken into 
consideration that because Sun Valley paid Ms. Hammer the "severance" by direct deposit it 
somehow was evidence that she had waived "all" claims, or required that she was required to 
return any of the "severance" funds received before she brought suit. 
VII} THE COURT'S FINDINGS THAT JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL APPLIES CANNOT 
STAND CONSIDERING THAT ALLEGING THAT SUN VALLEY TERMINATED MS. 
HAMMER FOR REASONS OTHER THAN "WITHOUT CAUSE" OR "AT WILL" IS A 
PLEADING REQUIREMENT FOR A PRETEXT OR RETALIATION CLAIM 
In its Summary Judgment Order, the Court found that Ms. Hammer was judicially 
estopped from bringing her IPPEA claims because she asserted that she was terminated "without 
cause" and at the same time she asserted that she was really terminated "with cause"10• Sun 
Valley has responded that the :findings of the Court related to judicial estoppel should stand. 
The Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement describes that if Ms. Hammer was 
terminated ''without cause" she would be entitled to a six month "severance" payment. The 
Employment Agreement also describes that if Ms. Hammer was instead terminated ''with cause" 
10 The definition in the Employment Agreement related to Ms. Hammer being terminated "without cause" is akin 
to an Idaho employee being terminated "at will". 
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she would be entitled to a hearing to defend herself against the claims which resulted in a "with 
cause" termination. 
Whether it was based on her contract tenns, or whether it was based on Idaho case law, 
Ms. Hammer was entitled to a name clearing hearing if she was not terminated "at will"/"without 
cause", but was actually terminated for a reason. Multiple Idaho cases confinn that an "at will" 
employee has a right to bring a cause of action if the employer terminated the employee "at will" 
as a pretext for terminating the employee for some other reason. In order to bring a "pretext" 
cause of action, by necessity, the employee must allege that the employer terminated the 
employee "at will" as a pretext for the other real reasons that the employee was terminated, 
entitling the employee to a name clearing hearing. (see Hatheway v. University Of Idaho, 155 
Idaho 255,310 P.3d 315 @327 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2013); Cantwell v. Boise, 146 Idaho 127@136, 
191 P.3d 205 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2008)) That is exactly what Ms. Hammer has done, namely, in 
various pleadings in this case as well as other matters, she has alleged that she was terminated "at 
will" (i.e. "without cause") as a pretext, when in reality Sun Valley terminated her for the 
numerous erroneous public claims made by Sun Valley officials that she had committed all kinds 
of egregious acts. As it is a pleading requirement to bring a pretext cause of action against Sun 
Valley to assert that Sun Valley claimed Ms. Hammer was terminated "at will"/ ''without cause" 
when Sun Valley actually terminated Ms. Hammer for other publicly enumerated reasons 
without providing her with a name clearing hearing, the Court was in error for ruling that Ms. 
Hammer was judicially estopped from raising that allegation. 
As is the case with a pretext claim, by bringing a claim under the IPPEA, a plaintiff, by 
necessity, must assert that the public employer did not terminate the employee "at will" or for 
other reasons, but instead terminated the employee in retaliation for complaints the employee 
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made about the public employer or its officials, as Ms. Hammer has done herein. In both Curlee 
v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,224 P.3d 458 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2008) and Van 
v. Portneu/Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552,212 P.3d 982 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2009) (also Van v. 
Portneuf Medical Center, 156 Idaho 696,330 P.3d 1054 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2014)) the Idaho 
Supreme Court made clear that the parameters of a case under the IPPEA, by necessity, requires 
that the employee was terminated not for the reasons described by the employer or "at will", but 
instead for a retaliatory reason, namely, because of complaints made by the employee against the 
employer or its officials/employees11• As is the case with a pretext claim, the Court was in error 
for ruling that Ms. Hammer was judicially estopped from claiming that she was terminated "at 
will"/''without cause", when in reality Ms. Hammer was terminated in retaliation for bringing 
harassment, hostility and assault claims against Former Council Member Ribi, when that is a 
pleading requirement to bring any retaliation claim against Sun Valley under the IPPEA. 
In McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 303 P .3d 578 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2013) the Idaho 
Supreme Court acknowledged that judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously 
taking one position, then subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible with the 
first (@894). In this case, Ms. Hammer's allegations that Sun Valley terminated her "at will" 
under the "without cause" of the Employment Agreement, when in reality she was terminated 
either "with cause" under the Employment Agreement or generally ''with cause" as an "at will" 
employee ( entitling her to a name clearing hearing which was never provided), or that she was 
terminated in retaliation for making harassment complaints against Former Council Member Ribi 
(thus allowing for claims under the IPPEA), are not inconsistent with her position, but are 
11 In Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue (@394), the employee was purportedly fired for "creating 
dissension". In Van v. Portneuf Medical Center(@ 985 }, the employee was purportedly terminated for "his inability 
to maintain positive interpersonal relations with his colleagues." In both cases the employees asserted that in 
reality they were terminated because of complaints they made about misconduct of co-workers or the company 
itself. 
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instead pleading requirements to bring a pretext case or a retaliation case under the IPPEA. 
That being the case, the Court's findings th.at Ms. Hammer was judicially estopped from raising 
the same claims that are a pleading necessity for either a pretext case or a retaliation case under 
the IPPEA (i.e. claiming a termination "at will"/"without cause" when the employee was actually 
terminated "with cause" or for a reason) must be reversed. 
vnn SUMMARY 
As was stated in Ms. Hammer's Memorandum in Support Of Reconsideration, in Knipe 
Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 458, 259 P .3d 595 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 2011 ), the Idaho 
Supreme Court clearly and succinctly stated in regards to whether someone had waived rights 
that they possessed that: 
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, and 
the party asserting the waiver must show th.at he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and 
that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment ... A clear intention to waive must 
be shown before waiver shall be established. Waiver will not be inferred except from a 
clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to 
estoppel." 
Ms. Hammer asks the Court to also consider the language of the Missouri Court of 
Appeals in Frisella v. RVB Corp., 979 S.W.2d 474 (Miss. App.Ct. 1998), where the Missouri 
Appellate Court reversed the entry of summary judgment related to an asserted waiver, when it 
stated: 
"To rise to the level of a waiver, the conduct must be so manifestly consistent with and 
indicative of an intention to renounce a particular right or benefit th.at no other reasonable 
explanation of the conduct is possible." 
In this case Ms. Hammer's and Former Mayor Willich's sworn-to intent was that Ms. 
Hammer was not required to waive any non-wage claims should Sun Valley ever terminate her 
without cause under the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement. Based on both of their 
professional understanding of what "severance" was meant to be, both had the legitimate right to 
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assert that they understood "severance" meant wage claims related to services rendered only, not 
liquidated damages or other non-wage claims. The U.S. Supreme Court's recent description of 
"severance" being for "services performed" and not as liquidated damages in US. v. Quality 
Stores justifies both Ms. Hammer's and Fonner Mayor Willich's position as to what "severance" 
meant in the Severance Clause of the Employment Agreement. 
And, during the days surrounding the issuance of the "severance" to Ms. Hammer by Sun 
Valley by direct deposit, both Mr. Donoval and Ms. Hammer had the legitimate right to believe 
that they had retained the right to proceed on any non-wage claims notwithstanding that Sun 
Valley paid Ms. Hammer the "severance", including, that a) Mr. Donoval sent at least four 
communications to Mr. Naylor confirming that Ms. Hammer was not waiving any non-wage 
claims even if Sun Valley paid the "severance"; b) Ms. Hammer refused to sign the 
"unconditional" Proposed Sun Valley Release that Mr. Naylor demanded be signed before the 
"severance" would be paid; c) Ms. Hammer refused to add the language of"I release all claims 
against Sun Valley" to the Supplemental Hammer Release as had been demanded by Mr. Naylor 
before Sun Valley would pay the "severance", d) Fonner Treasurer Frostenson confirmed that 
none of the "severance" payments that were about to be paid to Ms. Hammer included any 
"liquidated damages" or settlement of other non-wage claims, and, e) Sun Valley withheld 
employment truces on the entire "severance" even though employment truces were not required to 
be withheld on "liquidated damages" or settlement of other non-wage related claims. 
Contrary to Sun Valley's assertions, Sun Valley had a choice - either pay Ms. Hammer 
the "severance" and admit that she was retaining several non-wage claims (including the IPPEA 
claims), or withhold payment and demand that Ms. Hammer actually provide the unconditional 
release with the language of "I release all claims against Sun Valley'' included, which Ms,. 
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Hammer refused to provide. Having paid Ms. Hammer the "severance" without getting the 
unconditional release Sun Valley was seeking, Sun Valley cannot now claim that it somehow 
believed that Ms. Hammer had waived "any and all claims". 
Based on the Affidavits provided by Ms. Hammer, which the Court must accept as true 
for purposes of summary judgment (see Sutton v. Brown @l 09), Ms. Hammer certaiTJ.ly did not 
voluntarily and intentionally relinquish her right to proceed on non-wage claims she refused to 
sign the Proposed Sun Valley Release and instead submitted the Supplemental Hammer Release 
which did not include the language regarding the release of "all claims" that Mr. Naylor was 
demanding, as is required by Knipe v. Robinson. Ms. Hammer also certainly did not show a 
"clear intention" to waive any non-wage claims (see Knipe v. Robinson) by the submission of the 
Supplemental Hammer Release. In fact the opposite is true, namely that Ms. Hammer believes 
she showed a "clear intention" not to waive any non-wage claims based on the communications 
to Sun Valley by Mr. Donoval, her refusal to sign the Proposed Sun Valley Release, and her 
refusal to add the language that Mr. Naylor had demanded in the Supplemental Hammer Release. 
As Ms. Hammer's conduct was not "manifestly consistent with and indicative of an intention to 
renounce" any rights Ms. Hammer had to proceed with any non-wage claims against Sun Valley 
even if the '"severance" was paid ( see Frisella v. RVB Corp.), it was error for the Court to have 
concluded, at summary judgment, that Ms. Hammer had waived any right to proceed on the 
IPEP A claims. At a minimum, there are genuine issues of material fact which prohibits the entry 
of summary judgment based on a waiver claim. 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served by 
facsimile to the above listed recipients on or before 5:00 p.m. on May 26, 2015. 
To: Kirtlan Naylor 
Naylor & Hales 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Wyatt Johnson 
Angstman & Johansonz 
3649 Lakeharbor Lane 
BoiseJ10 83703 
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James "4. Donoval 
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·--Court BlalM Cnuntv. Idaho 
Associated Attorney for Plaintiff S-naron R. Hammer 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF1DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plainti~ 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and DeWA YNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
ORDER ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TiilS MATTER having come before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration Of 
Entry Of Summary Judgment: 
IT IS ORDERED: 
The Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration Of Entry Of Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
- ..... 
1 
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Wyatt Johnson 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and De WAYNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants- Res ondents. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST TO 
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD ON 
APPEAL 
IDAHO SUP. CT. 43079 
1. On February 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed her Notice Of Appeal, seeking appellate review 
of an Order of the Fifth District Court, Blaine County (the "District Court"), entering summary 
judgment against the Plaintiff in the matter, as well as in regards to several interlocutory orders 
entered by the District Court. 
2. The Notice Of Appeal indicated that because a Motion For Reconsideration regarding 
the entry of summary judgment had been timely filed by the Plaintiff with the District Court, that the 
appeal of the matter herein was automatically stayed pursuant to I.A.R. 14( a), until such time as the 
District Court made findings related to the pending Motion For Reconsideration. 
3. As part of the Notice Of Appeal, the Plaintiff requested that the standard record be 
prepared by the Clerk of the District Court. 
1st REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD - 1 
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4. On March 11, 2015, the Defendants filed their Request For Additional Transcripts 
And Record with the Clerk of the District Court, seeking that numerous filings with the District 
Court be included as part of the Record on Appeal. Plaintiff had no objection to the addition to the 
Record On Appeal of all of the filings that the Defendants sought be included in the Record On 
Appeal in their Request For Additional Transcripts And Record. 
5. On March 12, 2015, the Notice Of Appeal was transmitted to the Supreme Court by 
the Clerk of the District Court, with the Supreme Court assigning Case No. 43079 to the matter 
herein. 
6. On June 2, 2015, Plaintiffs counsel was served by the Clerk of the District Court 
with a seven (7) volume Record On Appeal. 
7. Plaintiff's counsel has reviewed the Record On Appeal and, in addition to the 
pleadings related to the Motion For Reconsideration, has discovered several documents that have not 
been included as part of the Record On Appeal, which should be included in the Record On Appeal. 
8. First, the Record On Appeal fails to include the January 17, 2014, Memorandum 
Decision Denying Plaintiffs Motion To Enforce Subpoena And Compel. Although the Defendants' 
Request For Additional Transcripts And Record did not included a specific request that the January 
17, 2014 Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff's Motion To Enforce Subpoena And Compel be 
included in the Record On Appeal, all of the other pleadings related to the issue were included as 
part of the Record On Appeal, and the Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff's Motion To 
Enforce Subpoena And Compel is one of the rulings of the District Court that the Plaintiff has sought 
to appeal as part of the Notice Of Appeal, and thus should be included in the Record On Appeal. The 
Plaintiff requests that the Clerk of the District Court add the January 17, 2014 Memorandum 
Decision Denying Plaintiff's Motion To Enforce Subpoena And Compel to the Record On Appeal. 
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9. Second, the Defendants' Request For Additional Transcripts And Record sought that 
Exhibits "A" and "B" of the Affidavit Of Kirtlan Naylor In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To 
Compel, which were submitted to the District Court in camera on December 10, 2013, be included 
as part of the Record On Appeal. The Plaintiff agrees that these exhibits should be included as part of 
the Record On Appeal, for review by the Supreme Court in the matter, even if in camera. There is no 
evidence in the Record On Appeal that the documents provided to the District Court in camera on 
December 10, 2013 have been included as part of the Record On Appeal in any way. Plaintiff 
requests that the Clerk of the District Court prepare a separate volume of the Record On Appeal to be 
presented to the Supreme Court in camera, which includes Exhibits "A" and "B" of the Affidavit Of 
Kirtlan Naylor In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion To Compel, which were submitted to the District 
Court in camera on December 10, 2013. 
10. Third, the Defendants' Request For Additional Transcripts And Record sought that a 
Declaration of Kirtlan Naylor, which was submitted to the District Court under seal on November 
18, 2014, be included as part of the Record On Appeal. The Plaintiff agrees that this declaration 
should be included as part of the Record On Appeal, for review by the Supreme Court in the matter. 
There is no evidence in the Record On Appeal that the Declaration of Kirtlan Naylor filed with the 
District Court under seal on November 18, 2014 has been included as part of the Record On Appeal 
in any way. Plaintiff requests that the Clerk of the District Court prepare a separate volume of the 
Record On Appeal to include the Declaration of Kirtlan Naylor which was filed under seal on 
November 18, 2014, and that such volume be filed under seal by the Clerk of the District Court with 
the Supreme Court. 




:08:28 06-18-2015 4/5 
DATED this \ ~{l\ day of June, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this R)i"- day of June, 2015, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated: 
Kirtlan Naylor 
Naylor & Hales 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Counsel for Respondent 
Wyatt Johnson 
Angstman & Johnson 
3649 N. Lakeharbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
Counsel for Appellant 
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[X] U.S. Mail 
[X] Fax: (208) 853-0117 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
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James R. Donoval 
4110 Eaton Ave., Suite D 
Caldwell, ID 83607 
Ph: (312) 859-2029 
Fax: (208) 649-1603 
Idaho Atty No. 8142 
jdonoval@aol.com 
Attorney for Appellant Sharon R. Hammer 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; 
and De WAYNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants- Res ondents. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND REQUEST 
TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD ON 
APPEAL 
IDAHO SUP. CT. 43079 
l. On February 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed her Notice Of Appeal, seeking appellate review 
of an Order of the Fifth District Court, Blaine County (the "District Court"), entering summary 
judgment against the Plaintiff in the matter, as well as in regards to several interlocutory orders 
entered by the District Court. 
2. The Notice Of Appeal indicated that because a Motion For Reconsideration regarding 
the entry of summary judgment had been timely filed by the Plaintiff with the District Court on 
January 30, 2015, that the appeal of the matter herein was automatically stayed pursuant to IA.R. 
14(a), until such time as the District Court made findings related to the pending Motion For 
Reconsideration. 
3. As part of the Notice Of Appeal, the Plaintiff requested that the standard record be 
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prepared by the Clerk of the District Court. 
4. On March 11, 2015, the Defendants filed their Request For Additional Transcripts 
And Record with the Clerk of the District Court, seeking that numerous filings with the District 
Court be included as part of the Record on Appeal. Plaintiff had no objection to the addition to the 
Record On Appeal of all of the filings that the Defendants sought be included in the Record On 
Appeal in their Request For Additional Transcripts And Record. 
5. On March 12, 2015, the Notice Of Appeal was transmitted to the Supreme Court by 
the Clerk of the District Court, with the Supreme Court assigning Case No. 43079 to the matter 
herein. 
6. On June 2, 2015, Plaintiff's counsel was served by the Clerk of the District Court 
with a seven (7) volume Record On Appeal. 
7. Since the filing of the Motion For Reconsideration, the parties have filed various 
pleadings related to the Motion For Reconsideration and the District Court has held hearings on the 
matter. 
8. On June 8, 2015, the District Court entered its Order On Motion To Reconsider Entry 
Of Summary Judgment denying the Plaintiff's request to reverse or revise the District Court's ruling 
entering summary judgment against the Plaintiff. 
9. Plaintiff wishes to supplement the Record On Appeal with the various pleadings 
related to the Motion For Reconsideration. 
10. The Plaintiff requests that the following filings with the District Court be added to the 
Record On Appeal: 
a) The Associated Appearance Of Attorney James R. Donoval For Reconsideration OfEntry 
Of Summary Judgment Purposes Only filed on 1/30/15. 
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b) Motion For Reconsideration Of Entry Of Summary Judgment filed on 1/30/15. 
c) Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration Of Entry Of 
Summary Judgment filed on 1/30/15. 
d) Facts In Support Of Motion For Reconsideration Of Entry Of Summary Judgment filed on 
1/30/15. 
e) Affidavit Of Wayne Wiilich In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration filed on 
1/30/15. 
f) Affidavit Of Sharon R. Hammer In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration 
filed on 1/30/15. 
g) Affidavit Of James R. Dono val In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration filed 
on 1/30/15. 
h) Sun Valley's Objection To Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration Of Summary Judgment 
filed on 5/19/15. 
i) Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration Of Entry Of 
Summary Judgment filed on 5/26/15. 
j) Order On Motion To Reconsider Entry Of Summary Judgment entered on 6/8/15. 
DATED this ,trth day of June, 2015. 
SR.DONOVAL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \ ~~\\ day of June, 2015, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served on the follo\m.ng individual(s) by the method indicated: 
Kirtlan Naylor 
Naylor & Hales 
950 W. Bannock St, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Counsel for Respondent 
Wyatt Johnson 
Angstman & Johnson 
3649 N. Lakeharbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
Counsel for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and 
DeWayne BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT HEREBY IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
The judgment entered on January 16, 2015, is supplemented to add the following sentence: 
Defendant City of Sun Valley is awarded a judgment for costs in the total amount of 
$8,281.15 against Plaintiff Sharon R. Hammer. 
DATEDthis ff dayofJuly,2015. 
P. Brody, District Judge 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _L_ day of July, 2015, I caused to be served, by 
the method.(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
James R. Donoval 
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste. D 
Caldwell, ID 83607 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Wyatt Johnson 
Angstman Johnson 
3649 Lakeharbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Fax Transmission: 649-1603 
7 Email: jdonoval@aol.com 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Fax Transmission: 853-0117 
.i- Email: wyatt@angstman.com 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Fax Transmission: 383-9516 
_jl Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; 
tdw@naylorhales.com; 
jake@navlorhales.com 
BLAINE COUNTY CLERK 




JUL 1 7 2015 /1? 
Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Jacob H. Naylor [JSB No. 8474] 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Coun , Idaho 
Tyler D. Williams [ISB No. 8512] 
NAYWR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Email: kirt(@,naylorhales.com; iake(i4na}±)rhales.con1. tdw(tTulyylorhales.com 
Attorneys for Defendants City of Sun Valley, 
Ribi, and Briscoe. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and 
DeWayne BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
STIPULATION OF PARTIES FOR 
INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL 
TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORD 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED APPELLANT AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AND 
THE COURT REPORTER AND CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Plaintiff-Appellant and Defendant-Respondents, in 
the above-entitled proceeding hereby lodge their stipulation pursuant to l.A.R. 29(a) for the 
inclusion of the following additional material in the reporter's transcript or the clerk's record, already 
produced in this action. 
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The following documents were to be included as part of the standard record on appeal, but 
were inadvertently omitted, and should be included in the record1: 
A. 1/17/2014 Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff's Motion to 
Enforce Subpoena and Compel 
B. 5/8/2014 Order Denying Permissive Appeal 
The parties also stipulate to also has no objection to providing the Supreme Court with 
the in camera Exhibits "A" and "B" of the Affidavit ofIGrtlan Naylor in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, submitted on December 10, 2013. However, Defendant-
Respondent requires that any transmission of these documents by the Clerk of the District Court 
be only to the Supreme Court and be provided in a confidential manner such that their in camera 
status is maintained. 
The parties stipulate to the addition of Plaintiff-Appellant's requested documents 
included in her Second Request to Supplement Record. 
The parties also stipulate to the addition of the Judgment (filed January 16, 2015); 
Supplemental Judgment (filed July 2, 2015); and transcript of the following hearing into the 
reporter's transcript before the Supreme Court: 
A. Hearing date: June 2, 2015 
Name of hearing: Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Entry of Summary Judgment 
Has a transcript been made? No 
Name ofreporter: Maureen Newton (208) 679-2534 
Estimated number of pages: 1-100 pages 
1The parties recognize that the sealed exhibit of the November 18, 2014 Declaration of 
Kirtlan Naylor has already been provided to the Court, and was memorialized through 
certification by the Clerk ofthe District Court, (see Vol. VII, p. 1573), and thus re-production of 
this exhibit is unnecessary. 
STIPULATION OF PARTIES FOR INCLUSION 
OF ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS AND RECORD - 2. 
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As the parties stipulate to these additions, and as provided in I.A.R. 29(a), this Court may 
make an order regarding these additions without requiring a hearing. 
DATED this 9th day of July, 2015. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
f/R 17 
By '- /( / tf-~:-?:ti4<
1 
J s R. Donoval 
A mey for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R HAMMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RIBI; and 
DeWayne BRISCOE, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-479 
ORDER 
The Stipulation of Parties for Inclusion of Additional Transcripts and Record having 
come before this Court, and good cause appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties' Stipulation of Parties for Inclusion of 
Additional Transcripts and Record is ADOPTED in full. 
(\ 
DA TED this _Jf) day of--:J ... .J"-4(.....," ,...._. __ ....,, 2015. - ( 
ORDER-1. 
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ORDER-2. 
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Wyatt Johnson 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
SHARON R. HAMMER, 
Plaintiff /Appellant, 
vs. 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; NILS RiBI; and 
DeWAYNE BRISCOE, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 












Supreme Court No. 43079 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Supplemental Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled and bound under my direction and is a 
true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules as well as those requested by the Appellant. 
I do further certify that all, if any, exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled 
cause and exhibits requested by the Appellant will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court along with the Supplemental Clerk's Record on Appeal. 
IN WITNESS JCV,HJ=REOF, I havSepi:nto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court at Hailey, Idaho, this .Lf:::/. day of • • , 2015. 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk of the Court 
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Supreme Court No. 43079 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Supplemental Clerk's 
Record to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
JAMES R. DONOVAL 
4110 Eaton Ave., Ste D 
Caldwell, ID 83607 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
KIRTLAN NAYLOR 
950 W. Bannock St., Ste 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
IN WITNES~HEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court this ~ day of ~. , 2015. 
JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court 
By~~--""..._..."----'1'===--==-+-'--===----1,,,L--
Crystal Rigby, Deputy Cl 
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